OCA 2010

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to pass accounts as guardian of property, arguing that leave was required but not sought or granted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that leave was implicitly granted by the motion judge based on the respondent's position as a beneficiary and trustee under the will.

The court also declined to interfere with the scope of the order or the costs awarded below.

The appellant challenged terrorism convictions and sentence arising from his participation in and support of a group engaged in violent jihad, including training, financing, transporting supplies, and building remote detonator devices.

The court held that the definition of "terrorist activity" in s. 83.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code did not infringe s. 2(b) of the Charter, rejected the trial judge's "chilling effect" analysis, and upheld the convictions.

The court also held that the armed conflict exception was unavailable and that judicial notice of basic facts concerning Afghanistan was proper.

On the Crown's cross-appeal, the court found the total sentence manifestly unfit and imposed life imprisonment with ten years before eligibility for full parole.

The respondent pleaded guilty to participating in a terrorist plot to detonate bombs at the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS Headquarters, and a military base.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14-year sentence (7 years after pre-trial custody credit) and declined to increase parole ineligibility, emphasizing the respondent's youth, lack of criminal record, and rehabilitative prospects.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge gave inadequate weight to the enormity of the planned mass murder and the unique nature of terrorism offences.

The sentence was increased to 20 years (13 years after credit), and the respondent was ordered to serve one-half of his sentence before being eligible for parole.

The Crown appealed the 12-year sentence imposed on the respondent for his role in a terrorist bomb plot targeting locations in Toronto.

The respondent had pleaded guilty to doing anything with intent to cause an explosion for the benefit of a terrorist group.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge over-emphasized mitigating factors and under-emphasized the enormity of the crime.

The effective sentence was increased from 12 to 18 years, and an order was made requiring the respondent to serve one half of his sentence before being eligible for full parole.

The United States sought the appellant's extradition to stand trial on terrorism charges for his alleged role in attempting to purchase weapons for the LTTE.

The appellant appealed his committal order and applied for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order, arguing that the terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code violated his Charter rights to freedom of expression and fundamental justice (overbreadth).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, finding that the provisions were not unconstitutionally overbroad, the test for committal was met, and the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The appellant, the mastermind of a terrorist bomb plot targeting locations in Toronto, pleaded guilty to terrorism offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 10 years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and that a fixed term of 18 to 20 years was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a life sentence was warranted given the catastrophic potential of the plot and the appellant's guarded prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant, sought by the United States on terrorism charges related to the LTTE, appealed his committal for extradition and applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the committal on corresponding Canadian terrorism offences.

The Court also dismissed the judicial review application, holding that the Minister's independent Cotroni assessment and surrender decision were reasonable and did not deny the appellant procedural fairness.

The Superintendent appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Licence Appeal Tribunal order revoking the registration of a private career college.

The Divisional Court had found a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the adjudicator's statement that the self-represented principal was 'misleading the Tribunal' and her irrelevant questioning about his possible ties to a terrorist organization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding of bias, rejecting the argument that the bias claim was waived, and affirming that a new hearing was the appropriate remedy despite the strength of the Superintendent's case.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that a change of beneficiary form for a life insurance policy was not forged.

The trial judge preferred the evidence of the respondent's handwriting expert over the appellant's expert and found no clear evidence of fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were open to him and that he did not err in his treatment of the evidence or in declining to draw adverse inferences.

The appellants appealed a decision granting priority to the respondent's equitable mortgage over their registered mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants had actual notice of the intended priority of the respondent's mortgage, meaning s. 93(3) of the Land Titles Act did not preclude the equitable mortgage from having priority.

The appeal was dismissed, with minor amendments to the formal order regarding subsequent encumbrancers and notice for power of sale.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats against his ex-wife.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based primarily on credibility findings, rejecting the appellant's testimony.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on inappropriate considerations to assess the appellant's credibility, including the conduct of defense counsel, evidence from a voir dire that was not part of the trial record, and the appellant's proficiency in French.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision, arguing the trial judge committed a Harper error by failing to consider evidence suggesting his daughter was present during the alleged offences.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no compelling basis to conclude the daughter was present, as both the appellant and the complainant agreed she was not.

The court held that the trial judge's failure to review every piece of evidence pointing to a different conclusion did not constitute a reversible error.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's section 10(b) Charter rights because the police failed to adequately facilitate contact with his counsel of choice, but admitted the breathalyzer readings under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower courts that the evidence was admissible and dismissed the appeal.

The vendor of an apartment building appealed its property tax assessment and subsequently sold the property.

After closing, the assessment appeal succeeded, resulting in a tax refund that the City paid to the purchaser pursuant to s. 306(2) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The vendor sought the refund, arguing unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal held that the right to the refund was a chose in action that did not run with the land and was not assigned to the purchaser.

The Court further held that s. 306(2) is merely an administrative provision and does not provide a juristic reason for the purchaser to retain the refund.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to properly analyze inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, erred in finding the assault was not consensual, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed no error in his analysis of the inconsistencies, properly accepted the complainant's evidence which was confirmed by her friends, and reasonably rendered the verdict.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's orders regarding child support arrears, equalization, property division, and costs following a divorce.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding errors in the calculation of child support arrears and the equalization payment, which were adjusted accordingly.

The Court also set aside the trial judge's order to sell a commercial property registered to the appellant's father, as the father was not a party to the proceedings and no finding of fraudulent conveyance had been made.

Finally, the trial costs award was reduced to exclude costs incurred prior to a previous consent order and costs from unrelated proceedings.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus probation imposed on the respondent for serious offences committed while in a position of trust.

The sentencing judge recognized that the primary sentencing goals were denunciation and general deterrence, and that the usual range was a penitentiary term in the mid to upper single digits, but identified particular circumstances justifying the lower sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or improper weighing of factors and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault involving two child complainants, as well as a subsequent conviction involving a third child complainant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and ordered new trials.

In the first trial, the court found the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury about the opportunity for innocent collusion between the complainants and the specific frailties of their evidence.

Furthermore, the Crown's inflammatory closing address deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

In the second trial, the judge erred in law by holding she was bound by the jury's verdict in the prior case when assessing similar fact evidence.

The appellants brought a motion to amend the court's previous order to address the issue of costs granted by the motion judge.

The court initially declined to hear the motion, believing the issue had not been properly advanced, but later invited written submissions after realizing its mistake.

Noting that the appellants were successful on one major issue on appeal and failed on another, the court reduced the motion judge's costs order in favour of the respondents from $293,101 to $100,000 inclusive of disbursements.

The Minister of Finance appealed a Superior Court of Justice decision regarding the interpretation of the Retail Sales Tax Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Act.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $22,500.