Nicholas Hay

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault, primarily on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).

The Court of Appeal reviewed the materials and submissions, concluding that the IAC claim lacked merit as it was not supported by the factual record and failed to meet the established test for IAC.

The court specifically addressed the appellant's concern regarding certain video evidence, accepting trial counsel's assertion that it would not have aided the defence, and noting that the appellant's identity was otherwise compellingly established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Adam Leroy, sought leave to appeal a 164-day concurrent sentence for assault (choking) and uttering threats to cause death, arguing the sentence was excessive and the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his mental health and drug addiction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the sentencing judge's decision, noting the serious and premeditated nature of the assault, the appellant's related criminal record involving intimate partner violence, and the consideration of drug issues.

The Court found no errors in principle, failure to consider relevant factors, or erroneous consideration of aggravating/mitigating factors, and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of trafficking two girls under 18, identity theft, and possession of property obtained by crime, appealed her conviction and sentence.

She sought an adjournment to find counsel, which was denied due to the appeal's age and previous opportunities to secure representation.

The appellant also challenged a mandatory lifetime SOIRA order imposed at sentencing, arguing it was unconstitutional following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *R. v. Ndhlovu*.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, holding that the SOIRA order could not be varied on appeal without a proper Charter application in the trial court, and declining to apply a new statutory appeal provision retrospectively.

The appellant, Christopher Briscoe, appealed the sentence imposed after pleading guilty to two counts of robbery.

The sentencing judge had accepted a joint submission for a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, plus pre-sentence custody.

The appellant sought a reduced sentence, citing remorse and arguing for parity with a co-accused who received a shorter sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the sentence.

The Court affirmed that the sentencing judge was required to accept the joint submission as it was not contrary to the public interest or administration of justice, and found no substantial disparity in sentence given the differing roles of the co-accused and the absence of a fine imposed on the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house and his sentence of two years less a day incarceration.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's finding on identity, which was based on circumstantial fingerprint evidence.

The appellant argued a speculative possibility that his fingerprints were on the jewelry box prior to the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that speculative possibilities do not need to be disproven.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge failed to consider rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion, given the serious nature of the offence, its impact on victims, and the appellant's criminal record.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The Crown applied for a sealing order and related relief in an appeal to protect the identity of two jurors.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the order, finding it necessary to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system by safeguarding juror anonymity and privacy.

The court determined that the carefully tailored order minimized impact on the open court principle, and its salutary effects clearly outweighed any minimal deleterious impact.

The appellant, Romaine McBean, appealed convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by stating that the appellant compelled the complainant to engage in sexual touching by abusing a position of power and authority, claiming there was no basis for such a finding.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the trial judge's reasons did not hinge on the complainant's inability to consent due to a power imbalance, but rather on the complainant's subjective lack of consent stemming from fear induced by the appellant's actions, including preventing her from leaving, threatening her, and making demands for sexual activity.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's approach to consent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, S.C., appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the use of the complainant's prior consistent statement (a Facebook message).

The Crown had invited the jury to use this statement as corroboration and the appellant's lack of response as evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by not providing a limiting instruction, which was crucial given the Crown's impermissible use of the evidence and the central role of the complainant's credibility.

The court reiterated that prior consistent statements are presumptively inadmissible for truth or corroboration and require limiting instructions even if admissible under an exception or as after-the-fact conduct.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

The only issue raised on the sentence appeal concerned the amount of credit allowed for stringent bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision to allow two months credit.

Consequently, the conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving his five-year-old niece, arguing the complainant's evidence was fabricated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's credibility findings, which favoured the complainant's consistent testimony and rejected the defence witness's "goal-based" evidence.

The court found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.D. analysis.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The Toronto Star and journalist Morgan Bocknek appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to quash a subpoena for journalistic notes related to an interview with a sexual assault complainant.

The subpoena was sought by the accused, Bruce Timothy Cavey, under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for potential prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision not to grant certiorari, finding that the trial judge was the appropriate forum to address issues of journalistic privilege and relevance within the s. 278 application process.

The appellant, convicted of aggravated assault on his intimate partner and sentenced to seven years imprisonment, appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence, including video footage, overwhelming and the defence of necessity lacking an air of reality.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found the sentence fit given the egregious nature of the assault, despite the appellant's arguments regarding mitigating factors.

The court did, however, correct errors in the imposition of weapons prohibition orders under the Criminal Code.

The appellant, Dalien Ilunga, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and failure to comply with a probation order, advancing three grounds: the trial judge erred in shifting the burden of proof, provided insufficient reasons, and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof or sufficiency of reasons.

Regarding ineffective assistance, the court found trial counsel did not deprive the appellant of his right to testify and that counsel's overall strategy and advice, despite some flawed understanding of legal principles regarding prior convictions and utterances, fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance.

The appellant appealed his sentence for convictions including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

His primary grounds were that the trial judge failed to consider his Indigenous roots (Gladue factors), the impact of contracting COVID-19 in pre-sentence custody, and his rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal found that the record did not support these submissions, as the trial judge had indeed considered these factors when accepting a lenient joint submission.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of failing to remain at the scene of an accident resulting in death, appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded two errors by the sentencing judge: an 18-month probation period imposed without reasons for exceeding the Crown's 12-month position, and the failure to credit the appellant for 20 months and 21 days of pre-sentence driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal accepted these concessions, varying the probation and crediting the driving prohibition.

However, the appellant's argument that the remaining 5-year driving prohibition was excessive was rejected, as significant aggravating factors justified the sentence.

The appellant sought to appeal a sentence imposed following a joint sentencing position for numerous firearm-related offences, arguing insufficient pre-sentence custody credit (Duncan credit).

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had given careful attention to the Duncan issue and had used the difficult circumstances of the appellant's pre-sentence custody as a strong mitigating factor, resulting in a lenient sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Bradley Munroe, appealed his convictions for arranging to commit sexual assault (believed victim under 16) and distributing child pornography, as well as his global sentence of 66 months.

On conviction, he raised issues of entrapment, lack of warrant for Facebook records, failure to prove complainant age, and ineffective trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in these assertions, noting the careful guilty plea inquiry by the trial judge.

On sentence, the appellant argued insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court found the trial judge properly applied principles from R. v. Marshall, treating the conditions as a strong mitigating factor, and that the sentence was fit.

The appeal was dismissed on all grounds, and the Criminal Code s. 161 order was upheld.

The appellant, Julie Menard, appealed her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's thorough reasons regarding witness credibility and reliability.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed, with the exception of a consensual reduction of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order from lifetime to 20 years, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Ndhlovu.

The appellant, Allan Dale Sutherland, appealed his sentence for operating a motor vehicle while disqualified and prohibited, challenging both the 18-month custodial sentence and the lifetime driving prohibitions imposed by the sentencing judge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 18-month sentence, finding it fit given the appellant's extensive record and the need for specific deterrence.

However, the court found that the sentencing judge erred in imposing lifetime driving prohibitions, as legislative amendments to the Criminal Code (specifically the repeal of s. 259(4) and replacement by s. 320.18, with maximums set by s. 320.24(5)) made such prohibitions discretionary with specific maximum periods.

The court vacated the lifetime prohibition on the first count and varied the prohibition on the second count to 11.5 years, reflecting the maximum permissible period plus the sentence duration.

The appellant, Lorne Clement, appealed his sexual assault conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The grounds included counsel's failure to ensure the appellant reviewed his police statement, failure to review potentially exculpatory evidence from a witness (R.D.), and failure to order witness statement transcripts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even assuming factual shortcomings in counsel's performance, the appellant failed to establish prejudice.

The court reasoned that the appellant's own admissions to police regarding intoxication were pivotal to the trial judge's rejection of his testimony, and the witness's evidence was not clearly exculpatory.