Nicholas Hay

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and uttering a threat.

He appealed his sentence of five years for sexual exploitation, six months for sexual assault, and 90 days for uttering a threat, all concurrent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by misapprehending the timing of the complainant's pregnancy and by relying on his lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's misstatement regarding the pregnancy timing did not affect the sentence, as the pregnancy's impact was intrinsically connected to the exploitation.

The court also found the trial judge merely commented on the appellant's lack of insight and remorse, not using it as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence fit and within the appropriate range for sexual offences against children.

The appellant sought to appeal a sentence of over 8 months for fraud and probation breach, arguing that a retroactive legislative change in 2013 removed his right to appeal a criminal inadmissibility finding to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) because his sentence exceeded six months.

He requested a reduction of the jail term to less than six months to restore this right.

The Court of Appeal, applying R. v. Pham, found that the original 8-month sentence was lenient and fit, considering the nature of the fraud and the appellant's criminal record.

The court held that reducing the sentence to avoid immigration consequences would constitute an "inappropriate and artificial sentence" and would circumvent Parliament's will.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent for second-degree murder, where the trial judge found the respondent acted in self-defence.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, making an unsupported factual finding, failing to undertake a contextualized reasonableness inquiry, and not considering the risk to third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no overriding error in the trial judge's holistic consideration of evidence and self-defence factors, despite acknowledging a minor factual error that did not materially impact the verdict.

The court reiterated that appellate courts cannot reweigh evidence or hear appeals from unreasonable acquittals.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction and three-year sentence, raising grounds including unreasonable verdict, error in applying *R. v. W.(D.)*, and disproportionate sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the *W.(D.)* ground, finding the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether the complainant's rejected evidence (denying a second sexual incident) could raise a reasonable doubt regarding consent for the second incident.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Michael Baylis, appealed his sentence for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by not properly considering and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, specifically by concluding the victim did not provoke the fight, and by failing to apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors was appropriate, given the violent nature of the offences and the appellant's criminal record.

The court also found that a Gladue analysis was not required as the appellant's Indigenous ancestry was unconfirmed and no information was available on how it might have affected his life.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault with a weapon and possession of a dangerous weapon, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that continued her detention order.

She sought an absolute or conditional discharge, or a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable.

The court noted the appellant's schizophrenic illness requiring medication, her lack of insight into her condition, and the risk of decompensation and danger to the public without supervision, especially given her history of substance abuse contributing to the index offences.

The court emphasized that her progress occurred under direct hospital supervision and that there was no record of success in a controlled community setting.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's conditional discharge, seeking an absolute discharge.

He argued the Board's finding of significant public safety risk was unreasonable, citing his non-violent history and good behaviour.

Amicus curiae argued the Board failed to fully exercise its inquisitorial powers regarding the appellant's reintegration and treatment.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's risk assessment reasonable, supported by the treatment team's assessment of potential harm without supervision.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the Board's inquisitorial powers, noting the appellant's improved situation and the Board's continued attentiveness to treatment and community supports.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, A.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge found the complainant was incapable of consenting due to intoxication and that the appellant did not have an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

On appeal, A.B. argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to apply the W.(D.) principle, and did not properly consider the possibility of consensual sexual contact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge correctly applied legal principles, including the assessment of consent and honest but mistaken belief.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after a joint trial.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's misapprehension of video surveillance evidence, which was believed to be uninterrupted but contained significant gaps.

The Court of Appeal found this misapprehension material and central to the trial judge's reasoning for conviction, thus warranting setting aside the convictions.

However, the Court declined to enter an acquittal, determining that the verdict was not unreasonable given other circumstantial evidence, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, M.R., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and reliability, particularly concerning the DNA evidence, the complainant's level of intoxication, and the sufficiency of reasons.

He also alleged uneven scrutiny of the parties' evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility and reliability assessments were well-grounded in the evidence and did not rely on speculation.

The court affirmed that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and that the complainant's erratic post-assault behaviour was a reasonable inference of genuine traumatization, not cognitive impairment.

The appellant, E.M.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The trial judge had convicted him after finding the sexual activity was not consensual, despite the complainant and a witness having consumed drugs.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider innocent collusion and misapplied the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed reliability and applied W.(D.).

The court also dismissed the application to adduce fresh evidence regarding sentence, stating it did not meet the Palmer criteria and that reducing the sentence would not reflect the gravity of the offence, especially given the victim's age and vulnerability.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for dangerous operation, resisting arrest, breach of probation, and breach of a release order.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a sentence exceeding the joint submission without inviting further submissions.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and to admit fresh evidence demonstrating the appellant's significant rehabilitation efforts.

The sentence was reduced to time served, while the 12-month driving prohibition was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his five-year global sentence for drug and firearm offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred by exceeding the Crown's four-year proposal without notice or reasons.

The Court of Appeal held that a sentencing judge must notify counsel and provide clear reasons when intending to impose a sentence higher than the Crown's proposal, even in the absence of a joint submission.

Finding an error in principle that impacted the sentence, the Court allowed the appeal and substituted a four-year sentence.