Nicholas Hay

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

After guilty pleas to two counts of possessing loaded prohibited firearms, the appellant sought sentence reduction and Downes credit.

The court granted leave but upheld the seven-year global sentence and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant challenged multiple convictions as unreasonable, legally flawed, and affected by ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court found the evidentiary record supported the trial findings, identified no legal error, and held no miscarriage of justice was shown.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Sandra Forcier, appealed her convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s credibility findings or conclusions.

The court noted the assistance of amicus curiae due to the appellant’s brain injury and confirmed that the trial judge’s reasons were entitled to deference.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Ashir Mahmood’s conviction and sentence appeals for sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by not giving a post-offence conduct instruction regarding a text message, by providing insufficient instructions on prior consistent statements, and by delivering an unbalanced charge.

The court found the jury was properly instructed and that the trial judge considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the appellant’s youth and lack of criminal record.

The conviction and sentence were upheld.

The appellant, Taylor Kuhni, appealed the imposition of a lifetime driving prohibition following guilty pleas to several offences, including dangerous operation of a conveyance.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a lifetime prohibition, as the maximum allowed by law was 10 years.

The court substituted a 10-year prohibition and dismissed the appellant’s request for an adjournment to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant, Milad Babadi, sought to reopen his appeal from convictions and sentence after his appeal was previously dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario declined to admit new evidence and dismissed the motion to reopen, finding no compelling basis to do so and confirming the finality of its earlier decision.

The appellant, Kyle Watson, appealed his sentence for robbery and failure to comply with a release order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s application of the principles of restraint and consideration of the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge had taken into account the appellant’s Indigenous identity, personal history, and the conditions of pre-sentence custody, and provided appropriate credit for time served.

The sentence imposed was found to be within a reasonable range given the circumstances.

The appellant, Errol Francis, appealed the sentence imposed for sexual assault.

The only issue on appeal was whether the sentencing judge erred by not considering that a conditional sentence order would have preserved the appellant’s right to appeal under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal found that, although defence counsel misstated the law, the sentencing judge’s reasons made clear that a conditional sentence would have been unfit given the seriousness of the case.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Michael Westcott, appealed his sentence on the basis that it significantly exceeded the sentence requested by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to provide adequate notice that she was considering a sentence higher than the Crown’s request, as required by R. v. Nahanee.

However, the Court found no error in principle in the judge’s application of the totality principle or her consideration of harsh pretrial custody conditions.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court clarifying the distinction between joint submissions and contested sentencing hearings.

The appellant, Charles Kennedy, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault.

He sought the appointment of counsel under section 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge’s findings and the legal standards for appointing counsel, ultimately dismissing the application on the basis that the grounds of appeal did not surpass the "arguability" threshold and were not legally complex enough to require appointed counsel.

The appellant, David Bynoe, appealed his sentence for firearms offences, assault, and uttering threats.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s reasoning or exercise of discretion.

The court addressed arguments regarding the use of lack of acceptance of responsibility as an aggravating factor, the failure to allow the appellant to speak before sentencing, and the reasonableness of the custodial sentence for assault and uttering threats.

The court found that while the appellant should have been allowed to address the court, there was no basis to conclude this would have affected the sentence.

The appellant, Milad Babadi, appealed his convictions for uttering threats and criminal harassment, as well as the sentence imposed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not informed or voluntary.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel’s representation was competent, that the appellant’s mental health issues were properly considered, and that the pleas were voluntary.

The court also denied a request for a sealing order and publication ban on medical information, emphasizing the open court principle.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraudulent personation and offences related to a forged certificate of stay of probation.

She argued the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove she prepared and sent the documents, and that the trial should have been heard in Superior Court because a testifying lawyer allegedly acted as a second prosecutor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded guilt was the only logical inference, and rejected the jurisdictional argument as meritless.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

John William Fisher sought leave to appeal his sentence for aggravated assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and carrying a concealed weapon without authorization.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to consider the impact on his family and erred in finding the attack unprovoked.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge was aware of collateral impacts and that the finding of an unprovoked attack was supported by surveillance video evidence.

The court reiterated that its role is not to reweigh aggravating and mitigating factors.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds related to the trial judge's assessment of consent.

The first ground argued the judge erred in finding no consent to pre-intercourse activity, which the Court of Appeal clarified was a misunderstanding of the trial judge's reasons, noting the judge understood prior activity was consensual but highlighted the lack of explicit consent.

The second ground contended the judge erred in disbelieving the appellant's claim of seeking explicit verbal consent for more invasive activity, which the Court dismissed, affirming the judge's right to assess credibility holistically.

The third ground alleged the judge relied on ungrounded assumptions regarding consent to unprotected sex due to a past chlamydia diagnosis; the Court found this discussion was not central to the rejection of the appellant's evidence and was a permissible factor in assessing consent likelihood.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault and sexual assault, arguing denial of his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to bring a s. 11(b) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's refusal to hear the late s. 11(b) application, noting it was a tactical decision and had been expressly abandoned by counsel with the appellant's awareness.

The court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as the decision not to bring the application was informed and reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of arson and other charges, appealed his conviction on two grounds: alleged legal and factual errors by the trial judge and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's comprehensive findings in an overwhelming circumstantial case, and concluding that the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the required threshold of incompetence.

The appellant, Biao Zhou, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The appeal raised multiple grounds, including errors in jury selection, a jury question, loss of juror notes, closing arguments, and jury instructions on post-offence conduct and consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors by the trial judge.

The court addressed the trial judge's procedural error in allocating peremptory challenges, applying the curative proviso, and upheld decisions regarding juror impartiality and trial management.

The appellant, Daniella Marciano, appealed her conviction for possession of stolen goods, arguing that as a self-represented litigant at trial, she did not understand how evidence was to be presented and that the trial judge failed to adequately ensure her understanding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had adequately explained the evidentiary process, interjected with appropriate explanations, and ensured the appellant understood the implications of not testifying.

The court concluded that the trial judge fully discharged his obligation of providing a fair trial to the unrepresented accused.