Nancy J. Spies

V.J. was convicted of eight offences, including assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement, against his wife, A.J., over a two-year period.

The court considered aggravating factors such as domestic violence in the home, escalation of violence, and the victim's vulnerability, alongside mitigating factors like the offender's lack of criminal record and strong work ethic.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and following the approach of assigning fit sentences for each offence before considering totality, the court imposed a total penitentiary sentence of 35 months, along with a mandatory weapons prohibition, DNA order, Sex Offender Registry order, and a no-contact order.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, sought an order for the committal for extradition of Jhoan Manuel Ciprian-Guzman for the Canadian offence of possession of child pornography.

Guzman opposed the application and brought a cross-application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the anticipated prison conditions in Florida would violate his Charter rights.

The court found that the test for committal was met and dismissed Guzman's cross-application, holding that the extradition judge's jurisdiction to consider Charter issues is limited to the fairness and integrity of the committal hearing itself, not the potential future treatment or punishment in the requesting state, which falls under the Minister of Justice's purview.

The defendants, Ludovico Minicucci and 2181860 Ontario Limited, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss an action by Windrock Associates Ltd. for a success fee of $97,350.

Windrock claimed the fee was owed under an agreement for advisory services related to the purchase of a one-half interest in real property, or alternatively, under quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

The defendants argued that the agreement contravened the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 (REBBA) because Windrock was not registered under the Act, and therefore, the claim for remuneration was barred.

The court found that Windrock's services were "in connection with a trade in real estate" and that the success fee, calculated as a percentage of the sale price and conditional on the transaction closing, gave Windrock a direct pecuniary interest in the sale.

Consequently, the court held that Windrock's claims under the agreement, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment were all barred by section 9 of REBBA.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the Applicant's request for leave to commence an action against the Respondents.

The court assessed the costs payable by the Applicant to the successful Respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the reasonableness of two separate sets of costs, duplication of legal work by multiple lawyers of similar call years, and the hourly rates and disbursements claimed.

The court reduced the costs sought by Centennial College and the individual Respondents due to concerns about duplication and excessive disbursements, while approving the costs sought by the Toronto Police Services Board.

The Applicant, a vexatious litigant, was ordered to pay costs, and his approval of the costs order's form and content was waived.

The applicant, The Scoular Company, sought to enforce Letters Rogatory from a U.S. District Court against the respondents, who were former employees and associated entities of a third party in the U.S. litigation.

The primary issues were whether the respondents' costs for complying with the discovery requests should be capped at $20,000 and whether they should receive costs for responding to the enforcement application.

The court found that the respondents were not "strangers to the litigation" due to their indemnification agreements with a party in the foreign action and their cooperation.

Consequently, the court imposed a $20,000 cap on the costs for complying with the Letters Rogatory and denied the respondents their costs for the enforcement application, as the applicant was wholly successful.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to invalidate Full and Final Releases she signed and a Notice of Discontinuance against two former lawyers, alleging they acted contrary to her instructions or mistakenly.

The court found that a settlement agreement existed, and the lawyers had ostensible authority to effect it.

Considering factors for setting aside a settlement, including the significant delay by the plaintiff in challenging the settlement and the public policy favoring enforcement of settlements, the court dismissed the motion.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada and attempting to import cocaine, arising from a scheme to ship packages from Costa Rica to Toronto through FedEx.

Intercepted communications demonstrated the accused’s involvement in coordinating shipments and arranging for a contact within FedEx to intercept packages before delivery.

The cocaine was discovered when two packages were intercepted in Panama, and documentary evidence from Panamanian authorities obtained under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act was tendered to prove the contents of the packages.

The court held that the foreign investigative and laboratory records were admissible under s. 36 of the MLACMA and could be relied upon for their truth after assessing their reliability and corroboration with other evidence.

The court concluded that the packages contained approximately 355 grams of cocaine and that the accused was a participant in a conspiracy to import the drug into Canada.

Following a jury conviction for sexual assault, the accused applied for a mistrial based on alleged inconsistencies between the complainant’s trial testimony and her victim impact statement, arguing the differences supported an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court first considered whether it had jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict and the discharge of the jury.

Relying on appellate authority, the court held that a trial judge is generally functus after a jury verdict and may only intervene in very narrow circumstances, such as where the jury did not deliver the verdict it intended or where the defence of entrapment arises.

Neither exception applied.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to declare a mistrial and dismissed the application.

The accused was convicted by a jury of sexual assault arising from non‑consensual intercourse following an initial period of consensual sexual activity.

The court assessed aggravating factors including anal intercourse, the accused continuing despite the complainant’s repeated objections, and significant psychological harm to the complainant.

Mitigating considerations included the absence of gratuitous violence and the offender’s personal circumstances.

The court held that the appropriate sentencing range for sexual assault involving intercourse without additional violence is generally two to four years’ imprisonment.

A custodial sentence of three years was imposed together with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, sex offender registration, and a no‑contact order.

The accused applied for a second bail review after a prior review had been dismissed by another Superior Court judge.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the original justice of the peace’s decision or only the earlier review decision, concluding that under s. 520(8) of the Criminal Code and the authority of Saracino, the review was limited to assessing the earlier judge’s decision.

The applicant argued there had been a material change in circumstances and that the earlier judge misapplied the test from St‑Cloud in light of subsequent appellate authority.

The court found that the alleged new evidence, including statements by a co‑accused during sentencing, was not credible or capable of affecting the bail determination and therefore did not constitute a material change.

The court further held that the prior reviewing judge made no material error in principle and that detention on primary and secondary grounds remained justified.

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from a series of alleged domestic assaults against his spouse over a two‑year period, including assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats to cause death, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The case turned primarily on credibility assessments between the complainant and the accused, with supporting testimony from a family member and a community counsellor, as well as medical and documentary evidence.

The court applied the principles from R. v. W.(D.) in assessing the accused’s testimony and emphasized that the burden of proof remained on the Crown.

After rejecting the accused’s evidence as not credible and accepting the complainant’s evidence as reliable and internally consistent, the court found the Crown had proven each count beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a complainant under 16.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant’s testimony and supporting evidence from the complainant’s mother, including an alleged admission by the accused and observations of blood following the alleged assault.

The court found serious credibility and reliability concerns with both witnesses, including significant inconsistencies and the complainant’s change of the alleged date of the assault by several years.

The court held that the Crown failed to establish the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

Following a jury conviction for trafficking approximately half a kilogram of heroin, the court determined the appropriate sentence within the established appellate range.

The defence argued that heroin trafficking sentences should be reduced because heroin is not demonstrably more harmful than cocaine or methamphetamine.

After reviewing expert evidence, historical arguments, and appellate jurisprudence, the court held that existing authorities establish an eight‑to‑twelve‑year range for trafficking in a half kilogram of heroin and that trial courts are not entitled to lower that range based on the record before them.

The court concluded that even if other drugs are similarly harmful, that would justify increasing sentences for those drugs rather than lowering heroin sentences.

Each offender received an eight‑year penitentiary sentence, with additional concurrent time for possession of proceeds of crime and a fine in lieu of forfeiture against one offender.

Two accused were charged with possession of cocaine, marijuana, and hashish for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and discovered drugs and alleged trafficking paraphernalia hidden throughout the unit.

Both accused denied knowledge of the drugs and asserted that a third individual, who allegedly lived in the apartment and was known by the nickname “Stinky,” was responsible.

The court considered whether the Crown had proven knowledge and possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code through circumstantial evidence, applying the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

Given that the drugs were concealed, not in plain view, and that multiple individuals had access to the apartment, the evidence did not establish knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The testimony of the accused and supporting witness raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew of the drugs or trafficking activity.

The accused sought bail review of a detention order made in relation to serious firearm trafficking and criminal organization charges arising from a large police investigation.

The review court considered whether there had been a material change in circumstances based on new proposed sureties and a proposed GPS electronic monitoring plan, and whether the justice of the peace erred in detaining the accused on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court held the justice of the peace properly considered the statutory factors, including the strength of the Crown’s case, gravity of firearm trafficking offences, and potential penitentiary sentence, and did not err in ordering detention to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The proposed new supervision plan, including electronic monitoring, did not constitute a material change and did not adequately address the risk of re‑offending.

The bail review application was dismissed.

Following a jury trial, three accused were convicted of robbery arising from a group robbery of two complainants in a Toronto hotel room during Caribana weekend.

The sentencing judge found that although threats of violence were made by a co‑accused not before the court, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used or that the robbery was pre‑planned.

The court assessed the offenders’ differing personal circumstances, including one offender’s extensive criminal record and the others’ relative youth and rehabilitative prospects.

Applying principles of proportionality, parity, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed distinct sentences reflecting each offender’s background and role.

Sentences included time served and probation for one offender, a short custodial sentence consecutive to an existing federal sentence for another, and a conditional sentence with probation for the third.

Following a jury conviction for robbery, the sentencing judge was required to determine whether a firearm had been used during the offence, as the jury verdict did not resolve that factual issue.

The Crown sought a finding that a real firearm had been used, which would significantly aggravate the sentence.

The court reviewed the trial evidence, including the complainants’ testimony and identification evidence, and assessed whether the Crown had proven the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found serious credibility concerns and extensive inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts, as well as a flawed and tainted identification process involving surveillance images, photographs, and police communications.

In the absence of reliable corroboration, the court held that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used in the robbery.

The accused brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case on charges of robbery and possession of stolen property.

The Crown’s theory was that the accused assisted the robbery by making a telephone call to the robbers and that she constructively possessed property stolen during the robbery that was later found in the home where she lived.

Applying the directed verdict test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court conducted a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The court held there was no evidence that the accused made any call or participated in the robbery, and no evidence of knowledge or control over the stolen property sufficient to establish constructive possession.

As the Crown’s theory required impermissible speculation, the motion was granted and verdicts of acquittal were directed.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking to exclude recognition evidence from a witness who had identified him in surveillance footage and a YouTube video related to a robbery investigation.

The defence argued the witness lacked sufficient familiarity with the accused to place her in a better position than the jury to identify him and that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test from governing appellate authorities, the court held that the witness had known the accused for several years through extended family connections and had seen him frequently enough to possess an advantage over jurors viewing the footage for the first time.

The absence of a specific distinguishing feature underlying her recognition went to weight rather than admissibility.

The recognition evidence was therefore admitted, subject to jury instruction.

The Crown sought a ruling permitting cross‑examination of an accused using a written statement he had provided to police if he testified at trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statement was voluntary.

The accused alleged the statement was written after an officer suggested he would be in a better position if he provided it and that the officer removed the statement from him despite his attempt to withhold it until speaking with counsel.

Applying the voluntariness principles from R. v. Oickle, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained through an inducement or other circumstances undermining voluntariness.

The Crown’s application to rely on the statement was dismissed.