Monte MacGregor

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of codeine following a traffic stop.

The accused brought an application to exclude the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing the stop was arbitrary and based on racial profiling, and the subsequent arrest and search were unlawful.

The court found the arresting officer's testimony regarding the reason for the stop and his observations of the drugs to be untruthful.

Concluding that the accused's ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were seriously breached, the court excluded the drug evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

He contended that the trial judge erred by placing too much reliance on the victim's companion, disregarding expert evidence on the victim's blood alcohol level, and unjustifiably discrediting the evidence of the appellant and his companions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was merely inviting the court to re-weigh the evidence, and that the trial judge's treatment of the evidence was perfectly reasonable.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committals for trial following a preliminary inquiry on charges relating to a large cocaine importation scheme.

Police had intercepted a shipping container containing 112 kilograms of cocaine concealed in wooden pallets and conducted a controlled delivery, leading to arrests after the pallets were opened.

The applicants argued there was insufficient evidence of knowledge of the cocaine to permit committal.

Applying the limited weighing standard from R. v. Arcuri, the court held that the circumstantial evidence permitted reasonable inferences of knowledge and participation, including involvement in opening the container and dismantling pallets containing narcotics valued at approximately $4 million.

The court concluded that a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer guilt and that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in committing the applicants to stand trial.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender following his conviction for aggravated assault against a fellow inmate.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive criminal record, which included multiple spontaneous and violent assaults, and considered psychiatric evidence diagnosing him with antisocial personality disorder.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a likelihood of causing future injury.

The court sentenced the offender to two and a half years' imprisonment followed by a ten-year Long Term Supervision Order.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and failing to comply with his recognizance after stabbing a stranger in the neck at a public library.

The offender, who was homeless and suffered from schizophrenia, attacked the victim without provocation.

The court weighed the severe injuries to the victim and the unprovoked nature of the attack against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, guilty plea, and mental health issues.

The court sentenced the offender to 6 years in custody, less 2 years credit for pre-sentence custody.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit several categories of hearsay statements made by the deceased, including statements to a school friend and her sister, text messages to her mother, personal writings, and contextual evidence regarding discipline within the household.

The defence opposed portions of the evidence, arguing that it constituted inadmissible hearsay or impermissible prior discreditable conduct whose prejudicial effect outweighed probative value.

Applying the analytical framework for hearsay admissibility, including the state of mind exception and the principled exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability, the court held that most of the deceased’s statements were admissible as either non-hearsay evidence of state of mind or under the principled exception.

Evidence concerning family discipline and prior incidents was also admitted as relevant contextual evidence with probative value exceeding potential prejudice.

One diary entry dated more than a year prior to the death was excluded because its limited probative value was outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a pretrial application to admit the videotaped police interviews of the eight-year-old brother of the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The child had returned to Jamaica and his mother refused to permit him to testify.

While the necessity requirement was met, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability due to material inconsistencies, the child's tendency to guess or make assumptions, and the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.

The Crown's application to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

In a pre‑trial evidentiary motion in a homicide prosecution, the accused sought to exclude several items of proposed Crown evidence on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The court applied the common law balancing test governing admissibility and considered whether the evidence would undermine trial fairness or invite improper jury reasoning.

Several graphic autopsy photographs and circumstantial forensic evidence were permitted where they illustrated the nature of the injuries or were relevant to the location and manner of the assault.

Evidence consisting of a written message on a pacifier package was excluded from the Crown’s case due to minimal probative value and risk of prejudice, though it could be used in cross‑examination if the accused testified.

A baseball bat potentially linked to the killing and a partial fingerprint found at the scene were admitted, with concerns about evidentiary weight left for the jury.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder in a stabbing death, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown conceded the primary ground but argued for detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the accused's attempts to interfere with the investigation and the gravity of the offence.

The court found that the proposed plan of release, involving strict house arrest and substantial sureties, addressed the secondary ground concerns.

Regarding the tertiary ground, the court noted weaknesses in the Crown's case for first-degree murder and concluded that releasing the accused on strict terms would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

Bail was granted.

The Crown applied for the forfeiture of personal property bearing the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC) insignia seized from the residences of individual members and the Toronto clubhouse, arguing it was offence-related property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The individual respondents had been convicted of various drug trafficking offences.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while membership in the HAMC facilitated the drug transactions by providing a trustworthy network, the physical items bearing the insignia were not used to commit the offences, nor was it proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they were intended to be used for such purposes.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly relied on circumstantial evidence to support police identification, and effectively reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s reasons adequately explained the rejection of defence evidence and that no material evidence was misapprehended.

The court further found the identification evidence was properly assessed in light of corroborating circumstantial evidence, including ownership of the vehicle and its return to the appellant’s residence shortly after the incident.

The judge also concluded that the burden of proof remained properly on the Crown throughout the trial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to attempted murder, aggravated assault, break and enter, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

He appealed his nine-year sentence, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing proceedings.

The Court of Appeal assumed without deciding that representation was ineffective, thereby reviewing the sentence without deference.

The Court found the nine-year sentence entirely fit, noting it already reflected significant mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, lack of prior record, and rehabilitation efforts, which reduced what would otherwise be a double-digit penitentiary term.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a jury conviction for second-degree murder, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The offender participated in a planned ambush in which the victim was lured to a vacant apartment, forcibly confined, beaten, and shot multiple times.

The jury recommended the minimum ten-year period, while the Crown sought fifteen years.

Considering the offender’s criminal record, the firearm-related nature of the murder, the offender’s participation while on probation and under a weapons prohibition, and the possibility of rehabilitation, the court increased the parole ineligibility period to twelve years.

The accused brought a motion requesting a judicial inquiry into jury deliberations following a conviction for second-degree murder.

The motion relied on an affidavit from a juror alleging coercion and improper comments during deliberations.

The court held that after a verdict is received and the jury discharged, the trial judge is generally functus officio and lacks authority to revisit the verdict, subject to limited exceptions such as errors in recording the verdict.

Applying the jury secrecy rule under s. 649 of the Criminal Code and the principles articulated in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court concluded that the allegations related to intrinsic aspects of jury deliberations rather than extrinsic information capable of impeaching the verdict.

As the affidavit did not demonstrate the introduction of extrinsic evidence, the court declined to conduct an inquiry and held that any challenge to the verdict must proceed on appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a no-probative value instruction regarding his attempted suicide, by conducting a lengthy review of evidence, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding a strong case of planning and deliberation based on handwritten notes and the appellant's actions prior to the murder.

The court noted defence counsel had used the attempted suicide evidence as part of the defence theory and found no error in the trial judge's review of the evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for 21 years.

He appealed the parole ineligibility period, arguing it should be in the 16-18 year range proposed by the Crown at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not over-emphasize the brutality of the crimes and that the 21-year period was justified.

The Crown appealed a youth justice court decision declaring sections 487.051(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional as they apply to young offenders.

The sentencing judge had refused to make mandatory and presumptive DNA collection orders for three young offenders who pled guilty to designated offences, finding the provisions violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for two of the youths (quashing the third for jurisdictional reasons), holding that the provisions are reasonable and constitutional.

The Court found that the legislative safeguards protecting the privacy of young offenders, including the mandatory destruction of DNA records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, appropriately balance the state's interest in law enforcement with the youths' privacy interests.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, and dangerous driving.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge made a serious error relating to self-defence in the main charge to the jury and in answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal found that the misdirection affected all charges, as the events occurred in one continuous series.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.