Lois B. Roberts

The appellant appealed a final order from the Superior Court of Justice (Family Court) that determined issues of property division and child and spousal support.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal: lack of jurisdiction to grant summary judgment when a divorce claim was present, improper treatment of the matrimonial home, unfair division of household contents, mathematical errors in calculating net family property, and allegations of judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the motion judge properly severed the divorce claim under the Family Law Rules, made no error regarding the matrimonial home, fairly divided the household contents, and appropriately addressed mathematical errors through a subsequent motion.

The court rejected unsubstantiated allegations of judicial bias.

An estate trustee appealed a summary judgment dismissing a claim as statute barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The deceased had loaned money secured by a promissory note payable on demand or upon sale of specified property.

The trial judge found the limitation period began when the deceased became aware the property had been sold.

The estate trustee made demand in May 2015 and commenced action in July 2015, more than two years after the limitation period began.

The appellant argued that section 7 of the Limitations Act should extend the limitation period to account for the time needed for the estate trustee to review the deceased's affairs and obtain probate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that section 7 does not apply to deceased persons and that an estate trustee cannot be construed as a litigation guardian for purposes of the statute.

The appellant appealed from an order striking out his entire Answer pursuant to a consent order requiring disclosure of financial documentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the settlement judge's jurisdiction to strike pleadings for failure to comply with disclosure obligations, finding that such orders may be made at settlement conferences to promote the overarching objectives of the Family Law Rules.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the portion of the Answer relating to custody and access should not have been struck, as custody decisions must be based on the best interests of the children and require full participation of both parents.

The matter was ordered to proceed to trial on an expedited basis.

The respondent consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the order of Carey J. dated July 24, 2018 was made without jurisdiction, as an order under Rule 31.10 cannot be made without a proceeding having been undertaken in Ontario.

The order was set aside.

The respondent undertook not to enforce the order of Bondy J. dated July 17, 2018.

Costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion seeking an order that his brother disclose information about their late father's assets and account for property and finances under a power of attorney.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred on the standing issue but upheld the dismissal on discretionary grounds.

The court found the parents had executed written instructions prohibiting disclosure to the appellant, and there was no evidence of improper conduct by the brother acting as attorney for property.

Two consolidated appeals from Superior Court orders in a family law matter.

The first appeal (C63096) concerning the striking of the appellant's pleadings was found to be moot as the order had been stayed and the trial proceeded.

The second appeal (C64255) challenged the trial judge's final order following trial, including findings of non-disclosure by the appellant, an unequal division of family property (75% to the respondent), and the denial of spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings and dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a judgment dismissing its claim that the disclosure statement was false, deceptive, or misleading regarding the disclosure of parking lease obligations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that sufficient information was included in the disclosure statement and that it was not false, deceptive, or misleading.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a disbarred lawyer whose licence was revoked on December 10, 2014, appealed two orders that permanently enjoined him from advertising, holding himself out, and practising as a lawyer in Ontario.

The appellant challenged the fairness of the proceedings and claimed various bases for his right to practise law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the permanent injunctions, finding that the appellant had clearly breached section 26.1 of the Law Society Act by continuing to hold himself out as a lawyer and offer legal services after his disbarment.

The court rejected all of the appellant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and his claimed rights to practise law.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a trial judgment concerning liability for damages arising from an accident.

The appellants sought to challenge the trial judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal determined that liability should be apportioned two-thirds to Safranyos and one-third to Hamilton.

The court made a Sanderson order requiring Safranyos to pay one-third of McHugh's costs of trial and appeal, but declined to impose such an order against Hamilton, as Hamilton made no arguments relating to McHugh's liability at trial or on appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for luring, sexual exploitation, and making, possessing and accessing child pornography involving two complainants, as well as his 20-month custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the application judge erred in dismissing the appellant's Charter s. 11(b) application regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay of approximately 43 months from charge to trial exceeded both the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months and the Morin guideline of 14-18 months.

The court identified errors in the application judge's analysis, including: (1) incorrectly characterizing the adjournment of the exit judicial pre-trial as a discrete exceptional event; (2) inflating the neutral intake period for Crown disclosure to five months when only 2.5 months was appropriate; (3) treating institutional delay as neutral rather than attributable to the Crown; and (4) failing to consider inferred prejudice from the length of delay.

The court concluded that transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the delay, and the proceedings were stayed.

Datawind Inc. appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice registering a costs order from the United Kingdom High Court of Justice under the Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.

Datawind argued that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over it as a third party to the original proceeding, that the costs order was not for a definite sum, and that it was denied natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the foreign court had jurisdiction, that the interim payment on account of costs constituted a registrable judgment for a definite sum, and that no denial of natural justice occurred.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages arising from the transfer of his house to his former common law spouse and caregiver in 2004.

The appellant, who suffered a catastrophic brain injury in 1998, had transferred the house to the respondent, who held his power of attorney.

The respondent subsequently mortgaged the property to her mother and later transferred it to her mother in satisfaction of the mortgage.

The trial judge found the transfer was a gift and dismissed all claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were deficient and failed to address the pleaded claims for breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant purchased land from the respondents with a vendor take-back mortgage.

The purchase agreement and mortgage provided that if the official plan was not amended to change the zoning designation to "Business Commercial" prior to June 17, 2018, the principal amount would be reduced by $600,000.

The mortgage also contained a standard charge term providing that if the lands were sold without the respondents' consent, all amounts owing plus a three-month interest bonus would immediately become due.

The appellant sold the property in February 2017 without consent and paid $600,000 into court, arguing the price reduction applied.

The application judge dismissed the application, and the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the plain language of the mortgage clearly stipulated the June 17, 2018 deadline and that the appellant's sale triggered the obligation to pay all monies owing including the interest bonus.

The appellants owned vacant land in the Township of Havelock-Belmont-Methuen and placed a recreational motor home on their property.

The Township sought a declaration that this was a non-permitted use under its Comprehensive Zoning By-Law and an injunction prohibiting the placement of any vehicle for human habitation.

The application judge granted the Township's application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in interpreting the by-law to include recreational motor homes, which were not expressly prohibited.

The court also found that providing electrical power to the motor home was insufficient evidence of intended habitation without actual habitation, and that the injunction was overly broad as it prohibited all vehicles, including cars.

The appellant sought an order declaring that it had properly commenced an arbitration by written demand dated October 6, 2017.

The arbitration clause in the insurance contract allowed the insured to select the venue and procedural laws of Bermuda or one of London, Toronto, or Vancouver under the English Arbitration Act of 1996.

The appellant argued that while the Act was incorporated by reference, its procedural provisions were excluded for arbitrations outside the UK, and that the UNCITRAL Rules would apply instead.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the plain wording of the contract required that where Toronto was the seat chosen, the arbitration be conducted in accordance with the procedural laws set out in the Act.

The Court also declined to determine whether the arbitration had been properly commenced, reserving that question to the arbitrators.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding sentences imposed following convictions in two cases.

The central issue concerned whether a sentencing judge may impose a small fine as part of a sentence for the purpose of reducing the mandatory victim fine surcharge.

The summary conviction appeal judge had corrected an illegal sentence by removing a fine that violated s. 731 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits combining probation with both custody and a fine.

Leave to appeal was dismissed on two grounds: the issue did not arise squarely on the facts, and a pending Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Tinker regarding the constitutional validity of the victim fine surcharge would likely address the applicant's concerns.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to 5.5 years in custody with a restitution order of $799,600.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds challenging the custodial term and one ground challenging the restitution amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the sentence was neither manifestly excessive nor demonstrably unfit, that mental illness was not established as a mitigating factor at the time of the offences, that the remand into custody was justified despite procedural concerns, and that the full restitution order was appropriate given the nature of the fraud and the paramount consideration of victims' claims.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years' custody for domestic violence offences, including assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment.

The trial judge imposed a three-year global sentence with 24 months of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, leaving one year to serve, and a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The appellant identified a calculation error: he should have received 33 months of credit, not 24 months.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the appellate court should increase the global sentence to three years and nine months to maintain the one-year custodial effect and allow time for correctional authorities to develop a release plan.

The appellate court granted the appeal, corrected the credit to 33 months, and reduced the remaining custodial term to three months, rejecting the Crown's argument that the sentence should be increased to accommodate administrative planning.

The appellants appealed from the dismissal of an application for mandamus challenging a Justice of the Peace's refusal to issue process arising from a private information.

The lower court found that the Justice of the Peace had acted within jurisdiction and did not deny the appellants natural justice.

The appeal was scheduled for hearing but faced adjournment requests due to the co-appellant's health concerns.

The court granted one final opportunity for oral submissions to be heard on a peremptory basis.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his appeal from his summary conviction for criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal applied the stringent test for leave to appeal, requiring either a clear error of law or an issue of public importance.

The court found that the appellant failed to meet this test, as he challenged factual findings and credibility determinations made by the trial judge rather than identifying errors in the appellate judge's decision.

The court upheld the trial judge's findings that the complainant's evidence regarding the poisoning of her cat was not relied upon, that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's credibility, and that the appellant's conduct constituted criminal harassment.