Lois B. Roberts

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the summary conviction appeal judge's dismissal of his appeal from conviction under s. 445(1) of the Criminal Code for wilfully killing a dog.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's finding of mens rea relating to recklessness.

The trial judge had found that the appellant threw the dog six feet onto a pile of debris with protruding nails, knowing that landing there was likely to cause the dog's death.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as the test for granting leave to appeal had not been met.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The appeal was granted on consent.

The court imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $321,945.79 and increased the restitution order to the same amount.

The court further ordered that if the fine is not paid within ten years of the respondent's release from serving all current sentences, the respondent will be subject to a term of imprisonment of three years.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on May 27, 2016, raising multiple grounds of appeal including claims of trial judge bias, involuntary or uninformed guilty plea, ineffective assistance of counsel, breach of solicitor-client privilege, and alleged Crown breach of an agreement regarding the reading of facts into the record.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the record to support any of these claims and determined that the record amply supported the conviction and that the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and fully informed.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion to strike affidavits filed by the appellant in support of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The motion was dismissed.

The Crown raised concerns that the fresh evidence materials were prepared by a lawyer found to be in a conflict of interest and sought to put the appellant on notice that it would challenge the admissibility or weight of evidence tainted by that conflict.

The court held that the appellant was now on notice of the Crown's position and that the Crown could raise these concerns before the appeal panel.

An appeal date was set for December 10, 2018, with provisions for the Crown to request an adjournment if necessary.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding a guilty plea conviction and refusing to admit new evidence to set aside the plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by applying the Palmer test when rejecting the affidavit in the application to set aside the guilty plea.

Leave to appeal was granted.

However, upon examination of the record, including the detailed plea inquiry conducted by the original trial judge, the court found that the appellant fully understood and agreed to the plea and the underlying facts.

The appellant's claim of misunderstanding regarding a mandatory weapons prohibition was rejected as the record showed the trial judge and appellant's counsel had made clear that the prohibition would be mandatory.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to bring a section 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay.

The adjournment request was made on the sentencing date, approximately three months after conviction, without supporting evidence or documentation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision to deny the adjournment, concluding that the proposed application appeared designed to further delay proceedings.

The trial judge's reasons demonstrated consideration of the delay issue and a finding that any delay was attributable to the appellant with no resulting prejudice.

The appellant appealed a conviction.

On consent of both parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was directed to appear on December 10, 2018 to set a trial date.

The appellant brought an appeal in the Court of Appeal for Ontario against a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent of the Crown, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was directed to appear on December 10, 2018 to set a trial date.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention at the General Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on impaired driving and assault charges and was diagnosed with Bipolar Affective Disorder and Substance Use Disorders.

The Board issued conflicting reasons: initially a detention order, then reasons supporting a conditional discharge, and finally amended reasons supporting detention.

The Court of Appeal found the conflicting and unexplained reasons rendered the disposition untenable and allowed the appeal, ordering a new hearing before a differently constituted panel within three weeks.

The appellant failed to attend the appeal hearing or contact counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of three counts: intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to his dwelling house knowing it was inhabited or occupied (s. 433(a)), intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire that seriously threatened the safety and property of residents in proximity (s. 434.1), and wilfully endangering his dog (s. 445(1)(a)).

The trial judge found the appellant deliberately set a fire by igniting paper under a television.

On appeal, the court allowed the appeal on counts one and four, quashing those convictions, while upholding the conviction on count two.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing his friend during a physical altercation that began as a fist fight and escalated when the deceased produced a knife.

The appellant admitted to causing the death but claimed self-defence.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 12 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of various evidence, the jury charge on self-defence and provocation, and the sentencing decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, though it identified an error in sentencing that had no impact on the outcome.

The respondents moved to quash an appeal brought to the Court of Appeal for Ontario on the basis that the appellant was seeking to appeal interlocutory orders of the Superior Court of Justice, which should have been appealed to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant sought to appeal orders made by Justice Lynne Leitch and Justice A. Duncan Grace, including an order transferring a judicial review application to the Divisional Court and a costs order of $10,000.

The Court of Appeal found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and granted the motion to quash, awarding nominal costs of $2,000 to the respondents.

Appellants were convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a trial in Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellants appealed on grounds that evidence seized in breach of their Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, and 10(b)) should have been excluded under s. 24(2), and that the trial judge erred in procedural matters and in accepting co-accused evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the evidence of marijuana odour and a water bill should have been excluded due to a serious and deliberate s. 10(b) breach, the convictions were nonetheless supported by ample remaining evidence, including the appellants' extended presence in a sophisticated grow operation and corroborating testimony from the co-accused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants brought a class action against defendant manufacturers and suppliers alleging they conspired to fix the price of lithium-ion batteries sold in Canada between January 2000 and December 2011.

The conspiracy allegedly impacted all purchasers, including "umbrella purchasers" whose batteries originated from non-defendants, as the cartel's price increases caused non-conspirators to also raise prices.

The certification judge certified only a statutory claim under the Competition Act for non-umbrella purchasers.

The Divisional Court certified an unlawful means conspiracy claim but excluded umbrella purchasers, citing indeterminate liability concerns.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the principle of indeterminate liability does not apply to either the statutory claim or the unlawful means conspiracy claim, and that umbrella purchasers should be included in the class with a subclass created for non-umbrella purchasers regarding aggregate damages quantification.

Two appellants, T.F. and M.W., appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the execution-style killing of their friend Tyrone Bracken.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on text messages, video surveillance, and post-offence conduct.

The trial judge found that the appellants participated in a pre-arranged plan to murder the victim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in using post-offence conduct to infer their participation and intent, committed a Villaroman error by reversing the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the appellants' failure to express shock or horror at the killing as circumstantial evidence of their knowledge and participation in a planned murder.

A physician licensed to practice in the United States sought to obtain full licensing in Ontario through the Pathway 4 program.

He was employed by a hospital under a one-year fixed-term contract conditional on successful completion of the program.

Following personality conflicts with members of the cardiac team and a dispute over work assignments, his supervisor withdrew, causing his conditional license to automatically expire and his employment to terminate.

The trial judge dismissed his claims for wrongful dismissal, bad faith conduct, and defamation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the physician was wrongfully dismissed.

However, the court remitted issues regarding quantification of damages, bad faith conduct in the manner of dismissal, and defamation to a new trial due to inadequate reasons from the trial judge.

A young person was convicted of sexual assault charges against his half-sister based on a two-witness credibility contest.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and rejected the appellant's denial, resulting in convictions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by treating credibility assessments as determinative of guilt without properly applying the legal framework for assessing burden of proof in credibility-based cases.

The court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed her conviction for trafficking heroin and possession of the proceeds of crime, as well as her sentence of 26 months imprisonment.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on three grounds: that the Crown had not proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial judge engaged in impermissible speculation rather than permissible inference, and that the trial judge failed to consider contrary evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's inferences from circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, the appellant's brief presence in the target's vehicle, and the possession of cash and heroin, were reasonable and not speculative.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

An appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated November 17, 2017.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge or, alternatively, a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that counsel had conceded at the hearing before the Board that an absolute discharge was not being sought, and that the evidence fully justified this concession.

The court found no air of reality to the conditional discharge argument, noting that the instability of the appellant's condition was a central concern of the psychiatrists and required ongoing treatment and monitoring.