Leora Shemesh

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a single-vehicle collision on Highway 410.

The defendant sought to exclude breath sample evidence on the basis that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, thereby violating sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the arresting officer failed to properly consider whether grounds for arrest existed and proceeded with the arrest without adequate Charter consideration.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The applicants brought a Garofoli application challenging the admissibility of firearms evidence seized during a search of their home.

The search warrant was originally obtained in relation to alleged offences committed by their son.

The applicants argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that the affiant was not full, frank, and fair.

Before the court could rule on the application, the parties reached a resolution, rendering the motion moot.

The court nonetheless cautioned police that search warrants must be based on cogent evidence, not merely suspicion or anecdotal experience.

The applicant sought to quash a search warrant executed at his residence on April 9, 2013, arguing that his Charter rights under section 8 were infringed.

The applicant contended that the Information To Obtain (ITO) was misleading and deficient, failing to demonstrate credibly-based probability that cocaine would be found at his home.

He also argued the warrant was facially invalid because it lacked a start time for the search.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the surveillance evidence sufficiently corroborated the confidential informant information to establish reasonable grounds to believe cocaine would be found at the residence.

The court noted deficiencies in the ITO's compliance with R. v. Rocha regarding disclosure of confidential informants' criminal records and motivation, but found these did not vitiate the warrant.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a police investigation based on information from a confidential informant.

Police conducted surveillance, observed the accused retrieving a duffle bag from a residence, and arrested him.

The court found no violation of s. 9 (arbitrary detention) or s. 8 (unlawful search) of the Charter, as the arrest was supported by reasonable and probable grounds based on the informant's information combined with police observations.

However, the court found a violation of s. 10(b) rights (right to counsel) due to a ten-hour delay in allowing the accused to contact counsel.

The court convicted the accused of simple possession of marijuana, finding that the Crown failed to prove the marijuana was possessed for the purpose of trafficking, as the expert evidence regarding THC degradation was insufficiently established.

Sentencing decision for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

Police executing a warrant seized seven kilograms of methamphetamine and cash from a vehicle controlled by the offender.

The court found the offender was a wholesale-level trafficker motivated by profit and not drug addiction, and that denunciation and general deterrence were the paramount sentencing objectives given the scale and seriousness of the offence.

Although the offender was a first offender and had endured lengthy restrictive bail conditions, his extensive prior involvement in kilo‑level cocaine trafficking and the large quantity of methamphetamine significantly aggravated the offence.

A global custodial sentence of nine years for trafficking, reduced by six months for restrictive bail conditions, with a concurrent sentence for possession of proceeds of crime, was imposed along with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with first degree murder arising from a fatal shooting in a Toronto bar.

The court ruled on several pre-trial evidentiary motions, including the admissibility of motive evidence, post‑offence conduct, hearsay statements of the deceased, and lay opinion recognition evidence based on surveillance footage.

Evidence of animus between the accused and the deceased and evidence of the accused’s alleged attempt to disguise his appearance after the offence were admitted as relevant circumstantial evidence.

Lay opinion identification evidence from a witness familiar with the accused was also admitted under the Leaney recognition rule.

However, hearsay statements attributed to the deceased describing a prior altercation were excluded for lack of threshold reliability under the principled hearsay exception.

A disclosure motion involving alleged alternate suspects and informant privilege was deferred pending an in camera and ex parte hearing.

The accused was tried for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The police seized seven kilograms of methamphetamine and $1,800 from the accused's vehicle pursuant to a general warrant.

The accused argued that the drugs were planted by the police from a previous seizure.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding him to be an active drug trafficker who engaged in counter-surveillance.

The court accepted the police evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction sentence after pleading guilty to using a stolen credit card and possessing credit cards obtained by crime.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by relying on facts not in evidence, misapprehending the facts, and improperly emphasizing denunciation and deterrence over rehabilitation when declining to grant a conditional discharge.

The court held that the sentencing judge properly relied on the agreed facts and reasonably concluded that the offences involved planning and deceit.

Applying the deferential appellate standard for sentence appeals, the court found no error in principle and concluded the sentence of fines totaling $1,000 and 18 months’ probation was not demonstrably unfit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing that police violated section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by requiring her to remove her underwire bra during the booking process at a police station.

The trial judge held the removal of the bra did not constitute a strip search and that the police acted pursuant to a routine safety policy.

On appeal, the court held that requiring removal of an undergarment for visual inspection falls within the Supreme Court of Canada's definition of a strip search under R. v. Golden.

The court concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the requirement that strip searches be justified by reasonable and probable grounds based on case‑specific circumstances rather than routine policy.

Because the search relied on an unwritten policy automatically applied to female detainees wearing underwire bras, the Charter analysis was flawed.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from search warrants on the basis that the information presented to the issuing justice was insufficient.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of break and enter and theft related to a series of automobile thefts from driveways and garages in the Greater Toronto Area.

Police obtained a general warrant for covert entry into a storage locker and a subsequent search warrant.

The court examined the affidavit supporting the warrants and found that despite numerous unsupported opinions and speculative statements by the affiant, there remained sufficient factual basis for the issuing justice to have granted the warrants.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their fraud convictions, arguing that a production order for bank documents violated their s. 8 Charter rights due to the non-disclosure of statutory declarations.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that while a s. 8 violation occurred regarding personal documents, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the officer's carelessness did not render the breach serious enough to warrant exclusion.

The court found the trial evidence overwhelming and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test for assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed the complainant's testimony and provided ample explanation for accepting it independent of rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The court also found the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) test, having acquitted the appellant on two other counts.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The accused sought to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a vehicle and a subsequent residential search warrant, alleging violations of s. 8 of the Charter.

The court found that police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking based on surveillance, corroborated confidential informant information, and observed conduct consistent with drug transactions.

The vehicle search was held to be lawful as a search incident to arrest under common law principles.

The accused’s Garafoli challenge to the residential search warrant failed, as the Information to Obtain contained sufficient indicia of informant reliability and a nexus between the accused, suspected trafficking activity, and the residence.

The court dismissed the Charter application and admitted the impugned evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, extortion, and obstructing justice, arising from a prolonged period of domestic violence against his intimate partner.

The court accepted a joint submission for a global sentence of three years.

Applying a 1.5 to 1 credit ratio for two years of pre-trial custody due to lockdown conditions, the court suspended the passing of sentence and imposed three years of probation with strict conditions.

The accused pleaded guilty to twelve charges arising from a domestic relationship involving multiple assaults, unlawful confinement, extortion, threats, obstruction of justice, and breach of probation.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years imprisonment, credited on a 1.5:1 basis for two years of pre-trial custody, resulting in a suspended sentence and three years of probation with strict conditions including no contact with the victim and her family, anger management counselling, and weapons prohibitions.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for sex and drug offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the sentencing judge and trial counsel were misinformed about the length of a prior sentence, the sentencing judge properly anchored the sentence in a careful assessment of the totality principle.

The sentence imposed was deemed appropriate given the unique and difficult circumstances of the offence.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's conclusions.

The Crown requested a stay of the order of Lederman J. pending the release of the Court of Appeal's reasons on the main appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to grant the stay, finding that the Crown had not demonstrated sufficient potential prejudice to warrant it.

The Court relied on the Crown's stated intention to operate under its interim policy pending the decision, with leave for any party to apply for interim relief if circumstances change.