Maureen Salama

The College alleged that the registrant, a diagnostic medical sonographer, engaged in professional misconduct and sexual abuse during an echocardiogram.

The allegations included touching a patient's buttocks, watching her wipe gel off her chest, and blocking the treatment room doorway.

The Discipline Tribunal found the patient's evidence to be unreliable due to inconsistencies and the physical improbability of the alleged touching.

The Tribunal concluded that the College failed to prove the allegations on a balance of probabilities and made no finding of professional misconduct.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a bid-rigging scheme, brought an application for the disclosure or third-party production of investigative files held by counsel for cooperating witnesses.

The cooperating witnesses had received immunity or leniency under the Competition Bureau's programs.

The applicants argued that the witnesses' lawyers acted as state agents when interviewing their clients and that solicitor-client privilege over those interview notes was waived.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the lawyers were not acting as state agents, the communications remained protected by solicitor-client privilege, and the privilege was never waived.

Consequently, the materials were not within the Crown's control for Stinchcombe disclosure and could not be produced as third-party records.

The applicants sought to quash charges of fraud on the public and conspiracy to defraud the public, arguing that the evidence identified 38 specific corporate victims, thus requiring individual naming in the indictment.

The Crown contended that the charges were properly framed against the public due to the impossibility of identifying all victims (e.g., individual condominium owners affected by increased fees) and the broad interpretation of "public" in the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were appropriately framed as offenses against the public, consistent with recent jurisprudence where a segment of the community or a regulated industry can constitute "the public" and where a ripple effect on unidentifiable parties exists.

The accused, a trucking dispatcher, was found guilty of importing 50 kilograms of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The Crown sought 13 to 15 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 9 to 12 years.

The court considered the significant quantity of cocaine, the accused's role in directing an unknowing driver, and his lack of a criminal record.

The court sentenced the accused to 12 years for importing and 9 years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently, less 104 days of pre-sentence and Downes credit, resulting in a net sentence of 11 years and 261 days.

The accused, a head dispatcher for a trucking company, was charged with importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine after 50 bricks of cocaine were found hidden in a shipment of plastic resin at the Canadian border.

The accused denied knowledge of the conspiracy, claiming he was unaware the shipment had been diverted to avoid a police search in Texas and that a co-worker had arranged the falsified customs documents.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as not credible, finding that his actions—including maintaining a cover story, rerouting the shipment, and sending falsified documents—provided overwhelming circumstantial evidence of his knowledge and participation.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to call a forensic psychiatrist to testify that the accused may have been in a cocaine-induced psychosis at the time of the offence, and that the alleged conduct was out of character.

The court ruled that the expert could testify about the potential impact of cocaine consumption and the possibility of psychosis, as this was relevant to the defence of intoxication and the ability to form specific intent.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion that the offence was out of character for the accused, finding it to be impermissible character evidence and oath-helping.

During a murder trial, the deceased's family brought an urn containing the deceased's ashes into the overflow courtroom.

The trial judge ruled that the urn must be removed from the courthouse.

The court found that leaving the urn overnight posed practical and security concerns, and carrying it in and out risked the jury seeing it, which could prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial.

The court also noted that the presence of the remains could adversely impact the appearance of neutrality.

In a first-degree murder trial involving an East Indian accused and a white victim, the court ruled on jury selection procedures following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan.

The court established specific anti-bias instructions and challenge for cause questions addressing conscious and unconscious bias regarding race, drug use, and the Indigenous status of Crown witnesses.

The court determined that the trial judge, rather than counsel, would ask the challenge for cause questions, and that prospective jurors would be given advance notice of the questions.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and sexual assault, brought a motion to introduce evidence suggesting an alternate perpetrator.

The proposed evidence included trace DNA found on the deceased, social media posts by the deceased expressing fear of her neighbours, and evidence of criminal activity at the neighbouring rooming house.

The Crown opposed the admission, arguing it was speculative and prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it relevant as circumstantial context that could raise a reasonable doubt, and held that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to exclude DNA evidence obtained under a warrant.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on unlawfully obtained information, specifically banking records from a US bank and a cast-off DNA sample seized by US Homeland Security Investigations.

The court found the banking information was obtained unlawfully and the extraction of the DNA profile from the cast-off sample potentially violated s. 8 of the Charter.

While bound to excise this information from the ITO, rendering the warrant invalid, the court ultimately admitted the DNA evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown sought to introduce historical text messages sent by the accused to his wife, which were obtained by police pursuant to a valid general warrant.

The accused sought to exclude the messages on the basis of spousal privilege under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act and s. 189(6) of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, holding that spousal privilege is a testimonial privilege that protects a spouse from being compelled to testify, but does not render the communications themselves inadmissible when independently and lawfully obtained by police.

The College of Veterinarians appealed a decision of its Discipline Committee excluding evidence against a veterinarian accused of possessing child pornography.

The evidence was obtained by police during a criminal investigation that was later withdrawn due to a conceded s. 8 Charter breach.

The Discipline Committee excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, relying on a case (Viscomi) to find the police search warrant application was materially misleading.

The Divisional Court held that the Committee's reliance on Viscomi was wrong in law, rendering its s. 24(2) Grant analysis unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking following two field strip searches conducted by police in a motel room.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the strip searches violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal found that both strip searches violated the appellant's section 8 rights because they were conducted in the field rather than at a police station, and the Crown failed to establish exigent circumstances justifying the field searches.

However, the Court of Appeal did not exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant police officer appealed a Hearing Officer's decision ordering her to resign or face termination after she pleaded guilty to four counts of misconduct, including deceit and neglect of duty.

The misconduct involved forging supervisors' signatures on reports, lying about working penalty hours, and failing to attend court.

The appellant argued the Hearing Officer erred in failing to find a nexus between her misconduct and her psychological disabilities, which included the impact of a miscarriage and the deaths of loved ones.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding the Hearing Officer reasonably concluded there was no connection between the disabilities and the deceitful conduct, and properly applied the dispositional factors in determining that the appellant's usefulness as a police officer had been annulled.

Three appellants were convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and committing those offences for the benefit of a criminal organization arising from a drive-by shooting in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from two gang members who testified the appellants confessed to the shooting.

The appellants challenged numerous aspects of the trial including jury selection procedures, joinder of counts, admission of bad character evidence, ballistics evidence, jury instructions on Vetrovec witnesses, and alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Atkins and Riley but allowed Wisdom's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an attempted theft four months after the shooting, which had minimal probative value but significant prejudicial effect.

The applicant requested to reactivate her human rights application after it was deferred pending a Special Investigations Unit investigation.

The corporate respondent did not oppose reactivation but sought an extension of time to file its Response until after receiving a related Peel Regional Police Services report.

The Tribunal reactivated the application and found an extension of time unnecessary, as the respondents had 35 days from the reactivation date to file their Responses under the Tribunal's rules.

Five police officers appealed their convictions for attempting to obstruct justice and perjury arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent efforts to conceal it.

The officers argued various trial errors, including Charter violations regarding the use of their preliminary inquiry testimony, improper jury instructions, and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

The Crown cross-appealed the 45-day conditional sentences.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the sentences demonstrably unfit for police officers committing perjury and obstruction of justice, and substituted 3-year custodial sentences, but stayed their operation due to the passage of time.

The appellant police officer appealed two penalty decisions ordering her dismissal from the police service.

The first penalty arose from findings of breach of confidence and discreditable conduct for disclosing confidential accident locations to a tow truck operator and offering to help withdraw a traffic ticket.

The second penalty arose from a finding of deceit for lying to investigators during a compelled interview regarding the first matter.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld both dismissal penalties, finding that the hearing officers properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the officer's short employment history, prior discipline, and lack of rehabilitative potential.

The accused was charged with forcible confinement, threatening bodily harm, assault, and criminal harassment arising from events on March 20, 2011, involving his former romantic partner.

The Crown's case consisted primarily of the victim's testimony.

The assault charge was dismissed at the conclusion of the Crown's case for lack of prima facie case.

Following trial, the accused was acquitted on all remaining charges.

The court found reasonable doubt on the confinement charge regarding whether the victim's presence in the vehicle was unwilling, on the threat charge regarding whether the words conveyed a genuine threat in context, and on the harassment charge regarding whether the conduct caused the victim to reasonably fear for her safety.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in his analysis of past signification by misapprehending the evidence and failing to provide clear reasons.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to make a necessary ruling under s. 10(b) of the Charter, rendering his s. 24(2) analysis invalid.