Harry G. Black

Police officers Paul Fyke and Jeffrey Smith were jointly charged with assault causing bodily harm following an altercation with Mario Maurice Baptiste Jr. during an attempted arrest for theft.

The court found that Constable Smith's initial arrest for theft lacked reasonable and probable grounds, making his use of force unlawful.

However, Constable Fyke's subsequent involvement was justified as he had reasonable grounds to arrest Mr. Baptiste for assaulting a peace officer or resisting arrest.

The court acquitted Constable Fyke, finding the Crown failed to prove his force was excessive.

Constable Smith was acquitted of assault causing bodily harm but found guilty of the lesser included offence of assault, as the Crown failed to prove his force caused the specific bodily harm alleged.

The applicant, a police sergeant, sought a stay of criminal proceedings for assault and assault with a weapon, alleging abuse of process and violations of his Charter rights (ss. 7, 10(b), 15).

He argued that the police improperly re-investigated him after initially taking criminal charges "off the table" and compelling a statement under the Police Services Act, and that his solicitor-client consultation was improperly videotaped.

The court dismissed the application, finding no bad faith or ulterior motive in the re-investigation, that the compelled statement was inadmissible at trial, and that the inadvertent video recording without audio did not breach his Charter rights or privilege, thus not warranting a stay.

The appellant, a police officer, pleaded guilty to assaulting a handcuffed suspect and falsifying his notes and use of force report.

He was sentenced to 30 days intermittent custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by treating the use of a taser and the false reports as aggravating factors, and by failing to adequately consider the collateral consequence of his inevitable job loss.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence was not manifestly unreasonable given the serious breach of trust.

This criminal trial concerned an assault charge against a police officer, Constable Scott Douglas, for an incident involving the arrest of Mr. Trevaughn Titus.

The defence relied on section 25 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the officer acted on reasonable grounds and used necessary force during the arrest for a Trespass to Property Act violation.

The court found that the officer had a credible basis for reasonable grounds to arrest and that the single distractionary punch delivered was a reasonable and necessary use of force in the circumstances, consistent with police training.

The officer was found not guilty.

Two police officers were charged with assault and assault with a weapon following the arrest of a fleeing suspect.

The suspect had engaged in a high-speed pursuit and attempted to hide under a barbecue.

The officers used a Taser and multiple leg strikes to subdue him.

The court found that while the initial use of force was justified under s. 25 of the Criminal Code due to the dangerous and dynamic circumstances, the final leg strikes delivered after the suspect was immobilized and pulled out from under the barbecue were gratuitous and constituted unjustified assaults.

Both officers were found guilty of assault level one.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of a subsequent sexual relationship with the complainant.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to provide context for his narrative that the relationship was consensual from the outset, while the Crown opposed it as violating the twin-myth prohibitions.

The court granted the application in part, allowing evidence of the fact and nature of the subsequent sexual relationship to be admitted to assess credibility and context, but excluding details of specific sexual encounters.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a Stage 1 application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of a post-incident sexual relationship with the complainant.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to contradict the complainant's narrative of their subsequent relationship and to support his defence that the initial encounter was the start of a consensual, months-long relationship.

The court found the proposed evidence was capable of being admissible as it did not rely on prohibited twin-myth reasoning and was relevant to the complainant's credibility and the narrative of the relationship.

The application was granted, moving the matter to a Stage 2 hearing.

The appellant, a police officer, brought an appeal under section 87(1) of the Police Services Act.

Before the Commission rendered its decision, the parties advised that the appellant had retired from the respondent police service.

Consequently, the Commission determined it no longer had jurisdiction over the matter and quashed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a Hearing Officer's decision to stay Police Services Act misconduct proceedings against two police officers for abuse of process due to delay.

The proceedings arose from an incident over eight years prior, and the Hearing Officer found the delay, largely attributable to the prosecution, was inexcusable and caused significant prejudice to the officers.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Hearing Officer properly applied the Blencoe test for abuse of process.

The Commission concluded the Hearing Officer's decision was reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

A police officer employed with the City of Kawartha Lakes Police Service pleaded guilty to breach of trust contrary to section 122 of the Criminal Code.

The officer, who had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and developed an opioid addiction following traumatic incidents during his policing career, stole drugs from an evidence locker and siphoned prescription pills from a pharmacy investigation.

His criminal conduct resulted in eight active drug prosecutions being stayed.

The court rejected the defence submission for a conditional discharge and a suspended sentence, finding that while the officer's addiction and PTSD constituted exceptional mitigating circumstances, a jail sentence was warranted.

However, the court imposed a conditional sentence order to be served in the community rather than incarceration, recognizing the officer's rehabilitation efforts and the need to balance denunciation and deterrence with individualized sentencing principles.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for assault and the conditional discharge imposed after he forcibly removed a motorist from a car.

The appellant claimed the motorist assaulted him by slamming a car door on his knee, justifying the arrest.

The trial judge rejected this account, finding no lawful authority for the appellant's actions and no assault by the motorist.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessment, and finding no legal errors or misapprehension of evidence in the conviction or sentence.

The appellant police officer was found guilty of disciplinary offences and ordered dismissed.

He appealed to the Commission.

After the appeal was heard but before a decision was rendered, the appellant retired.

The Commission held that pursuant to section 90(1) of the Police Services Act, it lacks jurisdiction to continue with an appeal or render a decision once an appellant is no longer a police officer.

The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The proposed appellant sought leave to appeal a Hearing Officer's decision staying Police Services Act misconduct charges against two officers due to delay.

The Hearing Officer had found the delay amounted to an abuse of process under the Blencoe framework.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the matter raised issues of significant importance to the policing profession and the community, particularly regarding the role of a public complainant's interests in a Blencoe analysis and the impact of parallel criminal proceedings on administrative delay.

The appellant, a police sergeant, appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding him guilty of deceit under the Police Services Act Code of Conduct and demoting him to third-class constable.

The deceit charge arose from the appellant recording on three Provincial Offence Notices that he had used a LIDAR device to measure speed, when he had actually used RADAR or paced the vehicles.

The Commission upheld the conviction, finding the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the appellant intended to deceive was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

However, the Commission varied the penalty, finding the Hearing Officer erred in principle by treating the appellant's fabricated testimony as an aggravating factor and by penalizing him for an uncharged intent to mislead the courts.

The penalty was varied to a demotion to second-class constable for six months, and to first-class constable thereafter.

The appellant, an Ontario Provincial Police officer, appealed a penalty decision ordering his resignation or dismissal after he pleaded guilty to discreditable conduct for recording and sharing a sex video of his former girlfriend without her consent.

The appellant argued the Hearing Officer erred in assessing the seriousness of the misconduct, the role of his PTSD diagnosis, and the consistency of the penalty.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding the Hearing Officer's decision was reasonable, supported by the record, and contained no errors in principle.

The penalty of dismissal was confirmed.

The appellant appealed the penalty of forfeiture of five days' pay imposed on the respondent police officer for discreditable conduct.

The respondent had previously been convicted of assault with a weapon for his actions during the appellant's arrest at the G20 Summit.

The appellant argued the Hearing Officer erred in assessing aggravating and mitigating factors, and the intervener argued the Hearing Officer improperly allowed a collateral attack on the criminal conviction.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding the Hearing Officer's penalty decision was reasonable and did not constitute an impermissible collateral attack.

The Crown prosecuted three accused on sexual assault charges arising from sexual activity in a hotel room after a night of drinking among off-duty colleagues.

The central issues were whether the complainant consented and whether she was incapable of consenting because of alcohol, an unknown drug, or both.

The court applied the reasonable doubt framework and the W.(D.) approach, finding serious reliability and credibility problems in the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with prior statements, video footage, text messages, and toxicology evidence.

Although sexual activity was established, the Crown failed to prove non-consent or incapacity beyond a reasonable doubt.

All three accused were acquitted.

The defendants were charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit expert toxicologist evidence regarding the effects of "date rape" drugs, consistent with the complainant's symptoms of incapacitation, despite no direct evidence of drug administration.

The defence objected, arguing irrelevance due to the absence of a drug charge and late disclosure of new testimonial details.

The court ruled the expert evidence admissible, finding it relevant to the issue of consent and the complainant's incapacitation, even without knowing the exact drug or its administration method.

The court noted that late disclosure, if remedied by adjournment, affects weight rather than admissibility.

The appellant brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence at the hearing of his appeal regarding the penalty imposed on a police officer for misconduct during the G20 protests.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence and found that the proposed evidence either could have been adduced at the original hearing with due diligence, was already part of the record, or was irrelevant.

The motion to adduce fresh evidence was dismissed.

The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to delay.

The Crown had obtained a direct indictment, moving the trial to the Superior Court without a preliminary inquiry.

The applicants argued the 18-month presumptive ceiling from Jordan should apply because they were denied a preliminary inquiry.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the 30-month ceiling applies to all cases tried in the Superior Court, regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry actually occurs.

As the anticipated delay was 28 months, falling below the 30-month ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.