Intoxication

This is an appeal from a conviction for choking in committing sexual assault and sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the complainant's capacity to consent due to intoxication, the assessment of the appellant's credibility and mens rea, and the sufficiency of reasons for the choking conviction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's conclusions that the complainant lacked capacity to consent, the appellant's testimony was not credible, and sufficient reasons were provided for the choking conviction.

The appellant, B.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on consent and the defence of honest, mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on non-consent was unassailable and that any alleged errors regarding the honest mistaken belief defence could not have affected the verdict, as the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent, particularly given the complainant's intoxicated and ill state.

The appellants, convicted of sexual assault, appealed their convictions.

They argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's memory gaps due to intoxication, reversing the burden of proof, and failing to consider an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's analysis of consent and memory gaps was reasonable, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the exculpatory statement lacked probative value regarding the complainant's subjective consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of attempt murder, aggravated assault, uttering threats, and failure to comply with probation, as well as his 13-year sentence.

The appeal raised issues concerning the trial judge's assessment of intent (capacity vs. actual intent), the admissibility of opinion evidence regarding credibility and demeanour, the alleged misapprehension of evidence concerning the appellant's intoxication and state of mind, and the use of the appellant's out-of-court statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against both conviction and sentence, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's reasoning or findings.

The appellant, Jesse Wabegijig, appealed his convictions, including sexual assault, arguing he acted in a state of parasomnia or extreme intoxication akin to automatism, rendering him not criminally responsible on account of a mental disorder (NCRMD).

The defence presented expert evidence and the appellant testified.

The Crown maintained the appellant was highly intoxicated but not to the point of involuntary conduct, calling its own expert.

The trial judge rejected the defence, preferring the Crown's expert evidence and finding the appellant's testimony not credible on certain issues.

The trial judge also found insufficient evidence for intoxication-induced automatism.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge and upholding her assessment of witness credibility and the weight of expert evidence.

P.R. was charged with break and enter, sexual assault, and assault with a weapon following an incident where he mistakenly entered a residence while intoxicated.

The accused claimed mistaken entry and self-defence.

The court acquitted P.R. of break and enter and sexual assault, finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent due to intoxication and inconsistencies in witness testimony.

However, P.R. was convicted of assault with a weapon, as his use of a flashlight against the homeowner was deemed disproportionate and not a reasonable act of self-defence given the homeowner's right to remove an intruder.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to prove lack of consent by arguing the complainant lacked capacity due to voluntary alcohol ingestion.

The court found that the complainant's lack of memory was not solely indicative of incapacity, and considering the totality of evidence, including the accused's detailed account and post-incident communications, a reasonable doubt existed regarding the complainant's capacity to consent and actual consent.

The accused was acquitted.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown applied to admit three graphic autopsy photographs of the deceased.

The defence opposed, citing prejudicial effect and proposing alternatives such as limiting the number of photographs or presenting them in black and white.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, finding the photographs highly relevant to central issues including intent, self-defence, and a potential third-party suspect theory.

The court emphasized that modern juries are capable of dispassionate evaluation and concluded that the significant probative value of the photographs strongly outweighed any potential prejudicial effect.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to limit the photographs, as doing so would undermine their evidentiary purpose.

The Crown's application was granted, allowing the introduction of all three full-colour autopsy photographs.

Darren Roth was charged with assault with a weapon (bottle), assault with a weapon (glass), and aggravated assault arising from a bar fight.

The second count was withdrawn by Crown counsel.

The court found the self-defence claim lacked an "air of reality" as the accused's subjective belief of threat was not reasonably held.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon (bottle) and the included offence of assault causing bodily harm, but not guilty of aggravated assault, as the complainant's injuries did not meet the threshold for wounding, maiming, disfigurement, or endangering life.

The accused, Shevon McKitty and Celdon Parris-Thompson, were charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, R.H., had incomplete memory due to blackouts from intoxication but clearly expressed non-consent to sexual intercourse.

The court found that R.H. did not lack the capacity to consent to any sexual contact but explicitly withheld consent for sexual intercourse.

McKitty was found guilty of sexual assault for engaging in intercourse after R.H.'s clear non-consent.

Parris-Thompson was found guilty of sexual assault for physically pressing into R.H. and attempting penetration despite her verbal and physical resistance.

Neither accused was found to be a party to the other's offence.

The accused, G.D., was charged with two counts of sexual assault against two teenage male complainants, PT and WV, occurring between 1997 and 2001.

The Crown sought to admit evidence from each count as similar act evidence for the other.

The court found both complainants credible and reliable, despite their substance abuse and the passage of time, noting specific details and corroboration from other witnesses and the accused's own testimony.

The accused's denials were found evasive, self-serving, and unbelievable.

The court granted the Crown's application for similar act evidence, finding a distinctive pattern of conduct.

The judge concluded that the Crown proved the essential elements of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt for both counts, leading to findings of guilt.

The accused, Michael Baylis, faced a six-count indictment for various assaults, threats, and obstruction of justice stemming from two separate gatherings at a trailer park.

The court heard evidence from multiple witnesses, including the accused, and considered the reliability of intoxicated and "disreputable" Crown witnesses, applying the Vetrovec and W.(D.) analyses.

Baylis was found not guilty of assault on William Joel Jeffs (Count 1), uttering threats (Count 3), assault on Kenneth Bristol (Count 4), and obstruction of justice (Count 5).

He was found guilty of aggravated assault on Anthony Elias (Count 2) and assault with a weapon on Kenneth Bristol (Count 6).

The defendant, Ghenadie Carpov, was charged with sexual assault, administering a noxious substance to cause bodily harm, and administering a stupefying thing to commit an indictable offence, involving two complainants, L.M. and L.O. The court found the defendant guilty of two counts of sexual assault but not guilty of the charges related to administering a noxious substance.

The court rejected the defendant's testimony regarding consent, finding that both complainants lacked the capacity to consent due to intoxication, which the defendant exploited.

The accused, O.K., was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, S.H., testified that the sexual contact (oral sex and vaginal penetration) occurred without her consent while she was heavily intoxicated.

The accused claimed consensual activity and honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court disbelieved the accused's testimony, finding his claims of consent and lack of awareness of intoxication to be untrue and lacking an air of reality.

The court accepted the complainant's account, finding her memory issues due to intoxication did not undermine her credibility regarding the assault itself.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having sexual intercourse with a highly intoxicated complainant.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly account for his use of an interpreter when assessing his credibility and finding he feigned confusion during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or her conclusion that the appellant's evidence was replete with inconsistencies.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and the sentence increasing his period of parole ineligibility.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication and the required intention for murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the relevance of intoxication to mens rea and adequately summarized the defence's position regarding an alcohol-induced blackout.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence of a conditional discharge and two years' probation imposed on the respondent for assault causing bodily harm.

The respondent had severely beaten the victim while intoxicated, causing facial fractures and brain damage.

The Court of Appeal found the conditional discharge was manifestly unfit and failed to reflect the gravity of the offence and the principles of deterrence and denunciation.

The court allowed the appeal, entered a conviction, and imposed a sentence of six months' incarceration followed by two years' probation, along with mandatory DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 15 years.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for murder and the statutory defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by instructing the jury that the narrow statutory definition of provocation applied when considering the impact of the deceased's conduct on the appellant's state of mind for the mens rea inquiry.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and put to bed by friends, who shortly after discovered the appellant having sexual intercourse with her.

The trial judge found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent and rejected the appellant's claim of consensual sex.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, proper application of the burden of proof, and no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to nine years globally, with a net sentence of seven years after credit for pre-trial custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in his treatment of mitigating factors and in failing to provide 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the treatment of mitigating factors but concluded the sentencing judge made a mathematical or principled error by failing to apply the intended 2:1 credit.

The appeal was allowed and the net sentence was varied to five and a half years.