Intoxication

The accused, Ali Alavi, pleaded not guilty to a charge of sexual assault.

The Crown alleged he sexually assaulted the complainant, S.A., at his residence after drugging her, rendering her incapacitated for consent in the master bedroom, and then forcing non-consensual vaginal intercourse in a second bedroom.

The defence contended the allegations were fabricated or based on false memories.

The court found the complainant was drugged and incapable of consenting in the master bedroom, and that she did not consent to sexual activity in the second bedroom.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

The appellant, Nicholas Necan, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, having previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The appeal raised four grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge: inadequate anti-bias instruction (specifically regarding the appellant's Indigenous identity and the 'firewater myth'), confusing instructions on intoxication, failure to provide an after-the-fact conduct instruction, and failure to provide a propensity reasoning instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, while not perfect, adequately equipped the jury to judge the case, and that no reversible errors occurred regarding the challenged instructions.

The defendant, Enrique Humberto Martinez-Reynosa, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on a sexual assault count at the close of the Crown's case.

The defence argued insufficient circumstantial evidence of lack of consent or capacity to consent.

The Crown contended the evidence could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the complainant's prior disinterest in the accused, her high level of intoxication leading to a blackout, her post-event confusion and distress, and the accused's own statements, to allow the jury to consider the count.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on three grounds: inferring the complainant's non-impairment without expert evidence, alleged improper conduct by the Crown regarding the complainant's prior relationship, and uneven scrutiny of the appellant's and complainant's testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence regarding non-impairment, that the Crown's submission, while potentially improper, caused no prejudice as the prior relationship's nature was irrelevant to consent, and that the trial judge's differential treatment of argumentativeness and assessment of inconsistencies did not constitute reversible error or uneven scrutiny.

In a criminal trial for aggravated assault, the Crown sought to admit a witness's prior inconsistent statement for the truth of its contents.

The witness had recanted parts of her police statement given shortly after the incident, claiming intoxication at the time.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, assessing necessity and threshold reliability.

While necessity was met due to the witness's recantation, the court found insufficient indicia of procedural and substantive reliability.

Factors such as the witness's intoxication, absence of an oath or warning, lack of video/audio recording, and unclear circumstances of the statement's taking undermined its trustworthiness.

Despite the witness's availability for cross-examination, the court concluded that the statement's reliability was not sufficiently established to allow the trier of fact to rationally evaluate it.

The application to admit the statement was dismissed, as its low probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The appellant, S.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault related to a second sexual encounter with the complainant.

The complainant, heavily intoxicated, had no memory of this encounter.

The Crown's case relied significantly on Facebook messages exchanged between the appellant and the complainant's boyfriend (impersonating the complainant), where the appellant described overcoming resistance and not taking "no" for an answer.

The appellant argued these messages were exaggerated due to impairment and an attempt to sound "macho." The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation, finding the messages to be a truthful account demonstrating the complainant's non-consent and the appellant's knowledge or recklessness regarding it.

On appeal, S.W. challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment and reliance on the messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's reasoning or her application of legal principles regarding consent and credibility.

The appellant, M.J., appealed his conviction on one count of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference, as well as a 15-month custodial sentence.

The appeal grounds included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence, material misapprehension of evidence, failure to instruct on the meaning of beyond a reasonable doubt, and an unreasonable verdict.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were owed deference, there was no material misapprehension of evidence, the standard of proof was properly applied, and the verdict was reasonable.

The court also found the imposed sentence was not demonstrably unfit, considering the aggravating factors and the need for denunciation and deterrence in sexual offense cases involving a position of trust.

The appellant, S.T., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's findings regarding the appellant's sobriety were unreasonable and erroneous, and the trial judge's finding of partiality in a defence witness was not supported by evidence and led to an erroneous rejection of their testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material, reversible error.

The court held that the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's intoxication was within their purview and did not require expert evidence.

While the finding of witness partiality was problematic due to lack of opportunity for the parties to respond, it was deemed not material to the overall assessment of evidence or the trial's outcome, and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, alleging four errors in the trial judge's jury charge: an inadequate rolled-up instruction, an imbalanced charge, confusing references to "accident," and improper instructions on after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected the first three grounds but found that the trial judge erred by failing to provide proper cautionary or limiting instructions on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence, particularly its relevance to distinguishing between murder and manslaughter beyond assessing intoxication.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault after stabbing the complainant, his cousin, during an altercation.

The defendant claimed self-defence.

The court assessed the credibility of the intoxicated witnesses, noting inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and his criminal record for assault with a weapon.

Applying the principles of self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defence, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The accused, Mr. Verma, was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the complainant, JB, consented to sexual activity, specifically focusing on her capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainant, another witness (Ms. Morriseau), and the accused.

The court found that the complainant was too intoxicated to have the capacity to consent to sexual activity, rejecting the accused's version of events.

While some alleged sexual touchings were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to the complainant's fragmented memory, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused inserted his penis into the complainant's mouth to achieve an erection and engaged in vaginal intercourse, despite her lack of capacity to consent.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant, B.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on consent and the defence of honest, mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on non-consent was unassailable and that any alleged errors regarding the honest mistaken belief defence could not have affected the verdict, as the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent, particularly given the complainant's intoxicated and ill state.

The accused, I.F.L., was charged with sexual assault on his wife.

The complainant testified that the accused, while intoxicated, sexually assaulted her in their guest room, an incident corroborated by her mother.

The defence argued fabrication due to ongoing family law disputes and highlighted inconsistencies and a 13-month delay in reporting.

The court applied the R. v. W.D. framework for credibility, finding the accused's testimony not credible or truthful, and accepting the complainant's and her mother's evidence as credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies and the delayed report.

The court found the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a finding of guilt.

The appellants, convicted of sexual assault, appealed their convictions.

They argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's memory gaps due to intoxication, reversing the burden of proof, and failing to consider an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's analysis of consent and memory gaps was reasonable, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the exculpatory statement lacked probative value regarding the complainant's subjective consent.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and choking to assist in the commission of a sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The court found the complainant's testimony, despite inconsistencies regarding intoxication and memory, to be credible on the core facts of non-consensual sexual activity and choking, corroborated by physical injuries and DNA evidence.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to contradictions with physical evidence.

The defense of mistake of age was rejected, as the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and was found to be reckless as to her underage status, having ignored "red flags" regarding her appearance and circumstances.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The accused, J.B., was charged with sexual assault and uttering death threats against his cousin, C.B. The alleged sexual assault occurred in September 2017, after C.B. ingested a substance provided by J.B. and blacked out.

C.B. testified she awoke to find J.B. sexually assaulting her.

The Crown relied heavily on C.B.'s testimony, while the defence challenged her credibility and reliability due to intoxication and delayed reporting.

The court found C.B.'s evidence regarding the sexual assault credible and reliable, despite her intoxication and initial disbelief, partly due to J.B.'s subsequent actions (asking about pregnancy).

However, the court found the evidence regarding the death threats, primarily from C.B.'s mother (X.B.), to be vague, imprecise, and unreliable.

The appellants, David Kaczmarek and Terrell Sullivan, appealed their convictions for sexual assault and Mr. Sullivan also appealed his sentence.

The trial judge had found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication and did not agree to the sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of incapacity, rejecting arguments that the judge erred in the order of findings, equated lack of memory with incapacity, or reversed the burden of proof.

Mr. Kaczmarek's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his counsel prevented him from testifying, was also dismissed, as the court found counsel's advice was sound and the decision not to testify was ultimately Mr. Kaczmarek's.

Mr. Sullivan's sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming that continuing sexual activity after consent is withdrawn is not less morally blameworthy than engaging in sexual activity with someone who never consented or lacked capacity.

The appellant, Daniel Debassige, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The appeal raised five grounds, primarily alleging errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the statutory partial defence of provocation, the effect of intoxication on the fault element for murder, the review of the defence position, and the W.(D.) instruction.

The appellant also argued that the jury's verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the conviction.

The court found that while there was an error in applying the amended provocation standard retrospectively, it was harmless given the nature of the alleged provocative conduct.

The jury instructions on intoxication, defence position, and W.(D.) were deemed adequate when viewed functionally and in context.

The verdict was found to be reasonable based on the circumstantial and admission evidence.

The accused, Linda Ceasor, was charged with attempted murder, dangerous use of a knife, and threatening bodily harm.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the cumulative effect of alcohol consumption, emotional distress (due to her son's incarceration), and the nature of the assault.

The defence argued that these factors negated specific intent, proposing conviction for lesser included offenses.

The court found that the combination of intoxication and emotional distress overrode her capacity for critical thought, leading to a misconceived purpose rather than an intent to kill.

She was acquitted of attempted murder and convicted of assault with a weapon and threatening bodily harm, with a judicial stay on the dangerous use of a knife charge.

Cameron Bakker was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury.

This decision provides written reasons for five pre-trial and trial rulings: (1) the Crown's application to introduce the accused's prior statement about street fights (dismissed due to voluntariness concerns and prejudicial effect outweighing probative value); (2) defence counsel's attempt to introduce hearsay through Crown witnesses (restricted as improper); (3) defence counsel's application to exclude members of the public from the courtroom during a witness's testimony (partially granted to exclude specific intimidating individuals, not the general public); (4) defence counsel's request for a jury charge on the defence of accident (declined due to lack of an air of reality); and (5) the response to a jury question regarding the definition of a reasonable person and the relevance of intoxication in self-defence and objective foreseeability for manslaughter (intoxication deemed irrelevant to these objective standards).