Intoxication

The accused was on trial for sexual assault and sexual contact against A.B., and sexual assault against C.D. The court found that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

For the charges involving A.B., the evidence was deemed insufficient as the term "sexual relation" was ambiguous and lacked specific details, preventing the court from making an independent assessment of the facts.

For the charge involving C.D., despite her testimony, her severe intoxication at the time of the alleged incident and potential involuntary collusion with A.B. (who admitted not knowing exactly what happened) raised a reasonable doubt regarding the reliability of her account.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The defendant, Enrique Humberto Martinez-Reynosa, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on a sexual assault count at the close of the Crown's case.

The defence argued insufficient circumstantial evidence of lack of consent or capacity to consent.

The Crown contended the evidence could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the complainant's prior disinterest in the accused, her high level of intoxication leading to a blackout, her post-event confusion and distress, and the accused's own statements, to allow the jury to consider the count.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The appellant, M.J., appealed his conviction on one count of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference, as well as a 15-month custodial sentence.

The appeal grounds included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence, material misapprehension of evidence, failure to instruct on the meaning of beyond a reasonable doubt, and an unreasonable verdict.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were owed deference, there was no material misapprehension of evidence, the standard of proof was properly applied, and the verdict was reasonable.

The court also found the imposed sentence was not demonstrably unfit, considering the aggravating factors and the need for denunciation and deterrence in sexual offense cases involving a position of trust.

The accused, Mr. Verma, was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the complainant, JB, consented to sexual activity, specifically focusing on her capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainant, another witness (Ms. Morriseau), and the accused.

The court found that the complainant was too intoxicated to have the capacity to consent to sexual activity, rejecting the accused's version of events.

While some alleged sexual touchings were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to the complainant's fragmented memory, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused inserted his penis into the complainant's mouth to achieve an erection and engaged in vaginal intercourse, despite her lack of capacity to consent.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, I.F.L., was charged with sexual assault on his wife.

The complainant testified that the accused, while intoxicated, sexually assaulted her in their guest room, an incident corroborated by her mother.

The defence argued fabrication due to ongoing family law disputes and highlighted inconsistencies and a 13-month delay in reporting.

The court applied the R. v. W.D. framework for credibility, finding the accused's testimony not credible or truthful, and accepting the complainant's and her mother's evidence as credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies and the delayed report.

The court found the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a finding of guilt.

The appellants, convicted of sexual assault, appealed their convictions.

They argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's memory gaps due to intoxication, reversing the burden of proof, and failing to consider an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's analysis of consent and memory gaps was reasonable, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the exculpatory statement lacked probative value regarding the complainant's subjective consent.

The appellant, Jesse Wabegijig, appealed his convictions, including sexual assault, arguing he acted in a state of parasomnia or extreme intoxication akin to automatism, rendering him not criminally responsible on account of a mental disorder (NCRMD).

The defence presented expert evidence and the appellant testified.

The Crown maintained the appellant was highly intoxicated but not to the point of involuntary conduct, calling its own expert.

The trial judge rejected the defence, preferring the Crown's expert evidence and finding the appellant's testimony not credible on certain issues.

The trial judge also found insufficient evidence for intoxication-induced automatism.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge and upholding her assessment of witness credibility and the weight of expert evidence.

The accused, P.L., was charged with sexual exploitation and sexual assault involving his 16-year-old great-niece, G.F. The incident occurred at P.L.'s home after G.F. had consumed alcohol.

The court found P.L. not guilty of sexual exploitation, as the Crown failed to prove a position of trust or authority or dependency.

However, P.L. was found guilty of sexual assault based on G.F.'s credible testimony, corroborated by DNA evidence and physical bruising, establishing that sexual activity occurred without G.F.'s consent while she was intoxicated and vulnerable.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, robbery, and fraud.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault and fraud.

For the robbery charge, the court found the accused guilty of the lesser included offence of theft under five thousand dollars, as the timing between the theft and the subsequent sexual assault was unclear, preventing a finding of "immediate" connection required for robbery.

The decision involved a detailed analysis of consent in sexual assault cases, the reliability of witness testimony given intoxication and memory gaps, and the application of reasonable doubt principles.

Darren Roth was charged with assault with a weapon (bottle), assault with a weapon (glass), and aggravated assault arising from a bar fight.

The second count was withdrawn by Crown counsel.

The court found the self-defence claim lacked an "air of reality" as the accused's subjective belief of threat was not reasonably held.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon (bottle) and the included offence of assault causing bodily harm, but not guilty of aggravated assault, as the complainant's injuries did not meet the threshold for wounding, maiming, disfigurement, or endangering life.

The appellant, David Loucks, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The appeal was based on four grounds: the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's testimony, the failure to admit photographic evidence, the failure to properly scrutinize the complainant's intoxication, and the failure to appreciate the significance of the lack of blood in the home.

The appellate court found that a minor misapprehension of evidence regarding a thumb injury was peripheral to the trial judge's reasoning and did not warrant intervention.

While the exclusion of photographic evidence was an error, it did not amount to a miscarriage of justice as the conviction was based on other credible evidence.

The trial judge was found to have appropriately considered the complainant's intoxication.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction.

The accused, Shevon McKitty and Celdon Parris-Thompson, were charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, R.H., had incomplete memory due to blackouts from intoxication but clearly expressed non-consent to sexual intercourse.

The court found that R.H. did not lack the capacity to consent to any sexual contact but explicitly withheld consent for sexual intercourse.

McKitty was found guilty of sexual assault for engaging in intercourse after R.H.'s clear non-consent.

Parris-Thompson was found guilty of sexual assault for physically pressing into R.H. and attempting penetration despite her verbal and physical resistance.

Neither accused was found to be a party to the other's offence.

The accused, G.D., was charged with two counts of sexual assault against two teenage male complainants, PT and WV, occurring between 1997 and 2001.

The Crown sought to admit evidence from each count as similar act evidence for the other.

The court found both complainants credible and reliable, despite their substance abuse and the passage of time, noting specific details and corroboration from other witnesses and the accused's own testimony.

The accused's denials were found evasive, self-serving, and unbelievable.

The court granted the Crown's application for similar act evidence, finding a distinctive pattern of conduct.

The judge concluded that the Crown proved the essential elements of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt for both counts, leading to findings of guilt.

The defendant, Nima Alamouti, was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant, M.P., by anal intercourse without consent.

The trial involved conflicting accounts of the events, particularly regarding the nature of the sexual activity and the complainant's consent.

The court considered the credibility of both the complainant and the defendant, as well as corroborating evidence from a third-party witness.

Ultimately, the court found inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and the defendant's reaction, leading to a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's guilt.

The plaintiff, Dias, brought a motion to amend her statement of claim to substitute David Kealey for "John Doe" and to plead particulars of negligence.

Kealey opposed, arguing the proposed amendments introduced a new, time-barred cause of action and that the original pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against him.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for striking pleadings, finding that the original statement of claim, read generously, contained a sufficient factual matrix to support a negligence claim against Kealey, particularly given allegations of his intoxication leading to injury.

The court dismissed Kealey's motion to strike and granted Dias's motion to amend.

J.C. was charged with sexual assault and voyeurism (Counts 1 & 2) and extortion and sexual assault (Counts 3 & 4).

The court acquitted J.C. on Counts 1 and 2, finding insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant, H.D., was incapable of consenting or that the video was made surreptitiously.

However, the court convicted J.C. on Counts 3 and 4, finding that he extorted sexual favours from H.D. by threatening to post a compromising video online, and that H.D. did not consent to subsequent sexual acts due to duress and power imbalance.

The defendant, Festus Samuel, was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the sexual activity occurred with the complainant's consent, focusing on the reliability of her evidence.

The complainant, an 18-year-old with limited alcohol experience, consumed alcohol and experienced blurred vision and motor impairment.

Her testimony regarding non-consent was challenged due to inconsistencies, particularly concerning a prior sexual encounter with a co-accused and details of the events.

While her distress upon returning home was compelling, the court found her evidence of non-consent not sufficiently reliable to meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused, C.L., was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, P.J., became severely intoxicated and unconscious at a party hosted by C.L. She testified to blacking out and having fragmented memories of sexual activity with C.L., to which she did not consent.

C.L. claimed P.J. consented and participated.

The court found P.J. was incapable of consenting due to extreme intoxication and unconsciousness, and that C.L. was reckless and wilfully blind to her lack of consent.

C.L. was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused, Anthony Magiri, brought an application seeking a declaration that section 273.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, which states "no consent is obtained...where...the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity," is void for vagueness and violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the term "incapable" in relation to consent is not vague and has been consistently interpreted in jurisprudence.

The court emphasized that capacity is implicit in the concept of voluntary agreement for sexual activity and that the jurisprudence does not show fundamental conflict regarding the concept of capacity, even in cases involving intoxication.

The accused, Ghyslain Hebert, was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was consent to sexual intercourse with the complainant, R.B. The court found the complainant's evidence credible, noting the accused's "boundary issues" and the complainant's actions being driven by fear rather than consent.

The defense of honest but mistaken belief in consent was rejected as the accused's actions (tearing clothing, telling the complainant to "shut up") were inconsistent with a reasonable belief in consent.

The Crown proved both the physical and mental elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to a finding of guilty.