Kenneth L. Campbell

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to be permitted to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The court dismissed the application, reaffirming the traditional functional approach to courtroom seating.

The judge balanced fair trial interests, including the presumption of innocence, with courtroom security concerns and the need for the jury to clearly observe the accused, especially given that identification was a main issue in the case.

The court emphasized that clear jury instructions can mitigate any perceived prejudice from the accused's placement and noted the accused's significant criminal record and institutional misconduct as legitimate security concerns.

The accused, F.A., was charged with uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, sexual assault, and incest against his biological daughter, S.N. The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony, which detailed the alleged events on New Year's Eve/Day 2019/2020, including a threat, sexual assault, and non-consensual sexual intercourse.

The accused denied all allegations, claiming he was intoxicated and passed out.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness, despite some inconsistencies, and rejected the accused's testimony as incredible.

The court applied the principles from R. v. W.(D.) and found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all three counts.

Mitchell Dubros, a private investigator, was found guilty by a jury of wilfully attempting to obstruct the course of justice.

He was retained by a client's lawyer to gather information on a complainant, Cynthia Mulligan, but instead directly approached Mulligan and her associates, making implied threats to dissuade her from testifying against his client.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, which struck at the heart of the justice system, alongside mitigating factors such as Dubros' lack of criminal record, age, and mental health challenges.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3-3.5 years, while the defence sought a 6-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed an 18-month reformatory imprisonment term, followed by three years of probation, balancing the need for denunciation and general deterrence with the offender's rehabilitative prospects.

The accused, a drug trafficker, was convicted of robbing another drug dealer of MDMA at gunpoint inside a vehicle, during which he shot the victim in the forearm.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence sought four years.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, reduced by pre-sentence custody credit, balancing the gravity of the offences involving a loaded handgun with the youthful offender's rehabilitative efforts.

The Crown sought to introduce historical text messages sent by the accused to his wife, which were obtained by police pursuant to a valid general warrant.

The accused sought to exclude the messages on the basis of spousal privilege under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act and s. 189(6) of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, holding that spousal privilege is a testimonial privilege that protects a spouse from being compelled to testify, but does not render the communications themselves inadmissible when independently and lawfully obtained by police.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level over 80 mgs.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the Intoxilyzer results under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by treating the appellant's acquittal on the companion impaired driving charge as an alternative remedy.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the appeal court concluded the s. 10(b) breach was minor and had minimal impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests.

Given the high reliability and importance of the breath samples, the evidence was admissible.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Shou Chen, was convicted of second-degree murder.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the parole ineligibility period.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, and jury recommendations, as required by the Criminal Code.

Despite the Crown seeking a 12-year parole ineligibility period, the court found a compelling causal link between the accused's late-onset schizophrenia and the offence.

This mental disorder, combined with the accused's lack of prior record and the jury's recommendation for the minimum, led the court to impose the mandatory minimum 10-year parole ineligibility period.

Ancillary orders for a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA databank submission were also made.

The accused, Shou Chen, facing a second-degree murder charge, brought a mistrial application after his forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Mark Pearce, revised his opinion, no longer supporting a "not criminally responsible" (NCRMD) defence on a balance of probabilities.

The defence sought a mistrial to find another expert psychiatrist and secure Legal Aid funding.

The court dismissed the application, holding that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort and was not warranted.

The judge found that the change in expert opinion, partly attributable to defence counsel's delay in providing relevant reports, did not cause actual prejudice or unfairness, as the defence retained strategic options for presenting its case.

The court also noted the case's long history of defence-related delays.

The accused, Shou Chen, facing a second-degree murder charge, objected to the admissibility of recognition/identification evidence from a Crown witness, Mr. Wan Peng Mei.

The Crown sought to have Mr. Mei identify the accused from surveillance video footage based on his prior acquaintance.

The defence argued that the witness was in no better position than the jury due to poor image quality.

The court applied the "prior acquaintance/better position" test, finding that Mr. Mei had significant prior acquaintance with the accused and was in a better position than the jury to identify him from the video, despite the image quality.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, concluding its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice, with appropriate jury instructions to mitigate risks of unreliability.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs.

The trial judge had found that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" due to an unexplained 14-minute delay at the police station.

The appeal court dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming that the trial judge applied the correct legal standard and did not commit a palpable and overriding error in her factual conclusion that the Crown had not met its heavy burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court ruled on the Crown's request to instruct the jury on an alternative theory of first-degree murder under s. 231(6.1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which pertains to murders committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, were charged with first-degree murder in the shooting death of Neeko Mitchell.

The Crown alleged that Dunkley ordered the killing and Tingle lured the victim.

The court determined that the "substantial cause" standard, established in R. v. Harbottle for s. 231(5) of the Code, also applies to s. 231(6.1)(a) due to identical statutory language and legislative history.

Applying this high standard, which requires an "essential, substantial and integral" and usually physical role in the killing, the court found no evidentiary "air of reality" to support that the actions of Tingle or Dunkley met this threshold, as the victim was killed by a lone gunman and their alleged roles were more remote.

Consequently, the jury would not be instructed on this alternative theory of liability.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown alleged Tingle was a party to the planned and deliberate murder of Neeko Mitchell, having lured him from a community centre at the direction of Jermaine Dunkley, where Reshane Hayles-Wilson then shot him.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty.

The ruling reiterated the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the trial judge's role is limited to determining if any evidence could support a conviction, taking the Crown's case at its highest, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

The court also noted that a prior Court of Appeal decision had affirmed the sufficiency of evidence for committal to trial, applying the same legal standard.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to admit the jury verdict from the principal offender's separate trial, where the principal was acquitted of first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown objected to the admissibility of this prior verdict.

The court ruled that a jury verdict from an earlier, separate criminal trial against a principal offender is not admissible in subsequent proceedings against alleged parties to the crime.

This is based on long-standing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which holds that such a verdict is irrelevant and merely represents the opinion of another jury, not binding on the current jury.

This is a mid-trial ruling on the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from David Griffith in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, are charged in connection with the killing of Neeko Mitchell.

Griffith, a friend of the deceased, observed a man make a gesture to Mitchell shortly before his death, which the Crown alleges was Tingle luring Mitchell outside.

Defence counsel argued the evidence was inadmissible opinion and hearsay, and highly prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it fell within the exception for non-expert opinion evidence, was not tendered for a hearsay purpose, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

The accused, Stasky St. Clair, was found guilty of eight offences, including possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm, possession of an over-capacity magazine, two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and two counts of possession of a firearm while prohibited by court orders.

The court imposed a global penitentiary sentence of eight years, reduced to six years, one month, and one week after accounting for 22 months and three weeks of pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing emphasized denunciation and deterrence for serious firearm and drug offences, considering the accused's lengthy criminal record and prior firearm convictions.

The accused was arrested for possession of marijuana after police observed him in a confrontation and smelled fresh marijuana emanating from him and his vehicle.

The accused produced a medical marijuana card, which the arresting officer believed to be fake.

Subsequent searches incident to arrest revealed a loaded handgun in the vehicle and cocaine concealed between the accused's buttocks during a strip search at the station.

The accused brought a pre-trial application alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights and seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, finding the arrest and searches lawful, and alternatively holding that the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) regardless.

The accused, charged with multiple offences including assault and using an imitation firearm, moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on three charges at the close of the Crown's case.

The court granted the motion regarding the assault on Natasha Fridgant due to a lack of evidence, as she failed to adopt her preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the imitation firearm charge, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to potentially convict the accused as a party to the offence under s. 21(1) or s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Michael Lopez, was found guilty by a jury of human trafficking, receiving financial benefit from human trafficking, advertising sexual services, assault with a weapon, threatening death, obstructing justice, and two counts of assault.

He also pled guilty to two counts of breaching a recognizance.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality, and the significant aggravating factors of the prolonged exploitation and violence against a vulnerable complainant, balanced against the accused's rehabilitative efforts during pre-sentence custody.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, reduced to one year further imprisonment after accounting for four years of pre-sentence credit, followed by a three-year probation order with specific conditions.

The applicant, Givan Iusein, sought to stay extradition proceedings to Romania, where he was convicted of murder and sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, from which he fled.

He argued abuse of process based on alleged police violence, torture, sexual assault, an unfair trial, delay in the extradition process, and deliberate attempts by Romanian authorities to mislead Canadian authorities.

The court found that while there was likely some limited police violence immediately after his arrest, the claims of extensive torture, sexual abuse, and unfair trial were largely fabricated and uncorroborated by medical evidence.

The court also found that the applicant's exculpatory statements were not coercively obtained and that he had legal representation and the opportunity to testify at his trial.

The delays in the extradition process were largely attributable to the applicant.

The court dismissed the application to stay, concluding that the high threshold for abuse of process was not met and that alternative remedies were available through the Minister of Justice or civil action.

The applicant was committed for extradition.

The accused, charged with kidnapping and related offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application to exclude evidence obtained from his seized cell phone.

The police conducted an initial cursory search of the phone upon his arrest to locate the kidnapped victim, followed by a comprehensive warrantless search of the downloaded data 12 days later.

The court held that the initial search was justified by exigent circumstances and did not violate s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the subsequent comprehensive search violated s. 8 because exigent circumstances no longer existed and it was not a valid search incident to arrest.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted with reckless disregard for the accused's privacy rights and abused the search warrant process by seeking a second warrant on the eve of trial.