Thaddeus J. Ofiara

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from a group altercation outside a restaurant.

At trial, the judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he was engaged in a consensual two-punch fight or acting in self-defence, instead accepting the Crown witnesses' evidence that the appellant and his friends engaged in a one-sided attack on the complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, and erred in assessing reliability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the credibility findings were reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a breath demand and obstructing a peace officer by falsely identifying himself.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging unreasonable delay and in finding no breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge properly attributed significant portions of the delay to defence conduct, including a late disclosure motion and shifting defence strategy, and reasonably concluded that the overall delay did not violate the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court also found no breach of the right to counsel, as police attempted to contact counsel of choice and the accused was permitted to consult duty counsel while awaiting a potential return call.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for committing an indecent act and dangerous driving.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of the indecent act based on a perceived legal presumption that intent to act wilfully arises when the act is seen by another person.

The appeal court found this to be a legal error, as no such presumption exists, and ordered a new trial on the indecent act charge.

The appeal against the dangerous driving conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's driving in heavy fog was a marked departure from the standard of care.