Joseph W. Bovard

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident in which a complainant alleged that a man grabbed her buttocks outside an apartment building on Sherbourne Street in Toronto at approximately 3:30-4:00 a.m.

The complainant followed the alleged assailant to a convenience store and identified him on surveillance video.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant's eyewitness identification.

The court acquitted the accused, finding that despite the complainant's detailed account and her absolute certainty, the cumulative frailties of her evidence, including inconsistencies regarding the assailant's build, the colour and design of his t-shirt, and the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification evidence, left the court in reasonable doubt as to the accused's identity as the perpetrator.

The Crown sought to adduce two statements made by the defendant during a motor vehicle accident investigation: (1) that a parked car was not present when she parked, and (2) that damage to her vehicle was sustained six months prior.

The defendant challenged the voluntariness of these statements, arguing she felt obligated to answer police questions.

The court conducted a voir dire and found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that both statements were made voluntarily and admitted them into evidence.

The Crown applied to have Courtney Carter declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence under section 753(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour.

Carter pleaded guilty to ten charges including aggravated assault with a meat cleaver, mischief to public property, possession of weapons, carrying a concealed weapon, and multiple breaches of probation.

The court found that Carter met all statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation, including a serious personal injury offence, a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour demonstrating failure to restrain his conduct, a high likelihood of harmful recidivism, and intractable violent conduct.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence of detention in a penitentiary.

The accused, an Indigenous woman, applied for bail on 23 charges, including multiple counts of theft under $5000 from LCBO stores, possession of property obtained by crime, and several firearms offences.

The bail hearing was a reverse onus situation due to the accused allegedly committing indictable offences while on release and possessing firearms while under a prohibition order.

The court considered the Gladue factors but found the proposed release plan and surety inadequate.

The court ordered the accused's detention on both the secondary ground, citing a substantial likelihood of reoffending, and the tertiary ground, emphasizing the gravity of the firearms offences and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was charged with 'Over 80' and impaired driving after his truck collided with a pole.

The trial judge found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired driving due to the officer's unreliable and contradictory evidence, resulting in a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court also found a breach of section 10(b) because the police refused to allow the accused to call his lawyer at the roadside despite having his phone and the opportunity to do so.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

Without the breath readings, and finding the toxicologist's report insufficient, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed all charges.

The Crown sought to commit the accused to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry on charges including conspiracy to commit assault, aggravated assault, sexual assault, and breach of recognizance.

The court applied the Sheppard test to determine if there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty.

Finding that the circumstantial evidence could reasonably support an inference of guilt, the court committed both accused to stand trial on all contested charges.

The defendant applied for $5,000 in costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 7 rights due to the late disclosure of a witness statement which caused a trial adjournment.

The court found that the late disclosure was the result of an inadvertent administrative error by Crown staff, not a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards expected of the prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, holding that no s. 7 breach occurred and that costs are not an appropriate remedy for inadvertent disclosure errors or trial adjournments.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges were impaired driving and "Over 80." The gross delay from the laying of the Information on July 18, 2016 to the projected conclusion of trial on November 6, 2018 was 27 months and 20 days.

After deducting defence delay and delay attributable to exceptional circumstances, the remaining delay was 22.25 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court by 4.25 months.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and granted the application, staying the charges.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control, over 80 care or control, and possession of crack cocaine following a police investigation that began when officers observed him and a woman in a truck in a laneway.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: an unjustified flashlight search violating section 8; an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds violating section 8; and multiple violations of the right to counsel under section 10(b), including delayed notification of rights, questioning after invocation of counsel, and failure to re-advise on a new charge.

The court excluded all evidence and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The applicant, an international student, pleaded guilty to assaulting his intimate partner and was granted a conditional discharge with 12 months of probation.

The probation order included a boundary condition prohibiting him from being within 100 meters of the victim, who attended the same college.

The applicant brought an application to vary the boundary condition to allow him to attend classes, arguing a change in circumstances as the victim refused to provide written consent for contact.

The court found a change in circumstances but dismissed the application, holding that the boundary condition under s. 732.1(2)(a.1) of the Criminal Code is a compulsory condition, and the court only has jurisdiction to vary optional conditions under s. 732.2(3).

This is a preliminary inquiry decision determining whether the accused should be committed to stand trial on first-degree murder or second-degree murder charges.

The Crown alleged that the accused planned and deliberately murdered the victim by shooting him in the head.

The Crown's primary evidence was surveillance video showing the accused entering the victim's apartment with a gun pointed at the victim's back.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence existed for second-degree murder but contested first-degree murder.

The court found that while the surveillance video evidence of the gun was significant, when considered in the context of all evidence—including the accused allowing the victim to leave the apartment briefly, the absence of evidence of animus between the parties, and the lack of evidence of a struggle—the evidence did not support a reasonable inference of planning and deliberation required for first-degree murder.

The court discharged the accused on first-degree murder but committed him to stand trial on second-degree murder.

The accused was charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought an application under section 276.1 of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual relationship with the accused and her sexual activity with third parties.

The court conducted a hearing under section 276.2 to determine admissibility.

The court granted the application only to the extent that the defence could adduce evidence that the complainant and accused had met during a specific period to exchange sex for crack cocaine or money, as this was necessary context for understanding their relationship.

The court denied the application regarding evidence of specific prior sexual encounters between the parties and all evidence regarding the complainant's sexual activity with third parties.

The application record was sealed to protect the complainant's privacy and dignity.

The Crown applied for an assessment order under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to determine whether the accused, who pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, was suffering from a mental disorder rendering him exempt from criminal responsibility.

The defence agreed the accused suffered from a mental disorder but opposed the application.

The court found that while the accused understood the nature and quality of his act, there were reasonable grounds to doubt his criminal responsibility regarding whether he understood the act was morally wrong.

The court granted the assessment order limited to the moral wrongfulness prong of the s. 16(1) test.

The accused was charged with sexual assault simpliciter and being a person in authority to touch a young person for a sexual purpose.

The complainant, a 16-year-old high school student, alleged that the accused, her employer at a pharmacy, grabbed her buttocks over her skirt during her first day of work.

The accused denied the allegation, claiming the complainant fabricated the charge after he terminated her employment due to a disturbance caused by her boyfriend.

The court found that while the complainant's evidence was generally well-delivered, there were inconsistencies regarding the boyfriend's presence in the pharmacy.

The accused's evidence, though at times unusual, raised reasonable doubt.

The court acquitted on all charges.

Appeal of sentences imposed on a corporation and two directors for violations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act following the death of a worker who fell from an elevated order picker platform.

The trial judge imposed fines of $125,000 on each count against the corporation and 25 days intermittent incarceration on each director.

The appellants challenged the sentences as excessive.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and substantially reduced the sentences, finding that imprisonment was inappropriate for first-time offenders in regulatory matters and that the fines were demonstrably unfit and outside the acceptable range for similar offences.

The accused was tried on two counts of attempted fraud over $5,000, two counts of possession of property obtained by indictable offence, and four counts of breaching recognizance conditions.

The Crown alleged the accused knowingly participated in a scheme to deposit stolen cheques into a trust account.

The accused maintained he did not know the cheques were stolen and was not involved in any fraudulent scheme.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the fraud and possession charges, acquitting on counts 1-4.

The court found the accused guilty of breaching recognizance conditions related to possession of financial instruments (counts 7-8), but acquitted on the house arrest breach charges (counts 5-6) as the bank visits fell within the work exemption.

The appellant appealed an acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with an Order to Comply issued under the Building Code Act.

The respondent, a property owner, had leased commercial premises to a tenant who performed unauthorized construction.

The respondent received an order to comply but argued it did not apply to them as the landlord.

The trial court acquitted the respondent based on lack of collateral attack and due diligence.

On appeal, the court found the respondent was engaged in an impermissible collateral attack but upheld the acquittal based on the trial court's finding of due diligence, which was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The accused was charged with "over 80" (impaired driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit).

The trial focused on whether police breached the accused's Charter rights during the breath testing procedure.

The court found that a police officer assaulted the accused while he was in custody and handcuffed to a bench, attempting to force him to speak to his girlfriend.

The court determined this constituted a serious breach of the accused's section 7 Charter rights (security of the person).

The court further found that the police failed to properly investigate or report the allegation of assault.

Consequently, the court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine and one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana.

Police officers conducted a warrantless detention and search of the accused's vehicle based on suspicion arising from the manner in which the vehicle was parked.

The court found that the detention was arbitrary, lacking reasonable suspicion, and that the subsequent search was tainted by the unlawful detention.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the Charter breaches and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The accused was charged with "over 80" and impaired driving following a RIDE spot check.

The defence brought a Charter motion arguing that police breached the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The accused, a Vietnamese immigrant with limited English proficiency, was not provided with an interpreter despite "special circumstances" indicating he could not meaningfully understand his rights to counsel.

The court found the police breached the accused's Charter rights by failing to obtain interpreter services through the CanTalk system.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found the accused not guilty of impaired driving on the merits, as the evidence of impairment was insufficient.