Joseph W. Bovard

The defendant was charged with assaulting his wife and causing bodily harm on July 20, 2013.

The incident arose from a dispute over whether the defendant should take their seven-year-old son to a Muay Thai class.

The case turned on credibility and reliability of the complainant and defendant's accounts of the altercation.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting that the complainant initiated physical contact by punching him repeatedly in the head and eye while he was kneeling in front of her on the couch, and that he hit her twice to make her stop.

He further claimed that when she later swung a picture frame at him, he pushed her away in self-defence, causing her to fall accidentally.

The complainant's evidence was marked by significant memory gaps, including periods of unconsciousness, and contradictions between her trial testimony and her earlier statement to police.

The court found the defendant's evidence more credible and coherent despite some concerns about his testimony, and acquitted him.

This is a preliminary hearing ruling on committal following charges of sexual offences against a minor.

The accused, a volunteer driver for a foster care agency, was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse involving a 15-year-old foster child under his care.

The central issue was whether the accused was in a position of trust toward the complainant.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on all charges, determining that the accused held a position of trust based on the age difference, the evolution of the relationship, the vulnerable status of the complainant as a foster child, and the circumstances of their contact through the accused's employment.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking orders to restrict the respondent father's contact with the child's dentist and attendance at the child's school.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion seeking custody, increased access, appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, a non-removal order, and addition to the birth certificate.

The court granted the mother's motion regarding dental care and school attendance, restricting the father's contact with the dentist and limiting his school attendance to parent-teacher interviews scheduled separately from the mother's.

The court denied the father's request for custody but granted increased access, including extended weekend access, midweek visits, and summer holiday access.

The court declined to appoint the OCL and noted that adding the father to the birth certificate is a matter for vital statistics.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking to introduce evidence of the respondents' conviction and sentencing for manslaughter of one of their children in a Crown wardship proceeding.

The Society sought to adduce this evidence by way of a 14B motion without an oral hearing.

The respondents opposed, arguing that an oral hearing should be held to permit submissions on the weight to be attached to the convictions.

The court found that sentencing is a distinct process from conviction and dismissed the motion without prejudice, ordering that the matter proceed by way of an oral motion at a scheduled court date to allow the respondents an opportunity to be heard.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired care or control based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's disorientation, admission of drinking, odour of alcohol, and the manner in which the vehicle was parked on a highway.

However, the trial judge found that the officer breached the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) by failing to inform him of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying 16 minutes to administer an Approved Screening Device test.

The trial judge excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

A child protection society sought to reopen a child protection trial after all evidence had been heard but before final submissions were made.

The purpose was to introduce evidence that the respondent parents had been convicted of manslaughter of one of their children.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the evidence was not necessary, that the society lacked diligence, and that reopening would violate their Charter rights.

The court allowed the motion, finding that the evidence was relevant, necessary, and reliable, and that in child protection cases a flexible approach should be adopted when the evidence relates to the best interests of the child.

The offender was sentenced for two counts of sexual touching of his 14-year-old daughter under section 151 of the Criminal Code, one count of inviting his daughter to touch his body with her mouth for a sexual purpose under section 152, one count of sexual intercourse with his daughter under section 155, and one count of breaching a non-contact condition of his recognizance under section 145(3).

The sexual offences occurred between June 18, 2013 and July 30, 2013, with the breach occurring between August 5, 2013 and October 28, 2013.

The offender had a prior criminal history of sexual offences against children dating back to 1987.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years in penitentiary for the sexual offences, minus credit for pre-trial detention, plus 60 days consecutive for the breach of recognizance.

Sentencing decision for dangerous driving causing death.

The accused was convicted after trial of driving at 152 kph (three times the speed limit) while entering a village on a Saturday night during March break, striking and killing a 13-year-old pedestrian.

The Crown sought 18 months incarceration; the defence sought a maximum of six months.

The court imposed nine months incarceration followed by 24 months probation with 175 hours of community service and an 18-month driving prohibition, balancing the gravity of the offense and need for general deterrence against the accused's youth, exemplary background, genuine remorse, and rehabilitation prospects.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood on January 1, 2013.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable and within the two-hour statutory limit.

The court found significant unexplained delays between when the accused was ready to provide samples and when the samples were actually administered, particularly a delay of approximately 51 minutes and 54 seconds before the first test and 1 hour, 14 minutes, and 11 seconds before the second test.

The Crown failed to provide adequate evidence explaining these delays, and the court found the Crown had not discharged its burden of proof.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with assault against his former intimate partner.

The Crown alleged that during an argument in their shared apartment, the accused punched the complainant in the face and stomach.

The accused denied the assault, claiming he only squeezed past the complainant to exit the apartment.

The central issue was the credibility of the witnesses.

The court found the complainant credible and rejected the accused's explanation for a text message in which he apologized for hitting her, finding his claim that he was coerced into a false confession implausible.

The court convicted the accused of assault.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

The victim, a 13-year-old girl, was struck and killed by the accused's vehicle while crossing Airport Road in Caledon, Ontario.

The Crown alleged the accused was speeding; the defence argued the victim's unexpected entry into traffic made the collision inevitable and that the accused's speed did not constitute dangerous driving.

The court found the accused was travelling at 152 KPH in a 50 KPH zone near a residential area and village entrance on a day when pedestrian traffic was reasonably foreseeable.

The court convicted the accused of dangerous driving causing death, finding both actus reus and mens rea established, and that causation was proven despite the victim's unexpected action.

The accused was charged with threatening to kill the complainant on December 14, 2012.

The trial took place in Toronto's Integrated Domestic Violence Court.

The complainant and accused had a former romantic relationship and were engaged in a contentious family court proceeding regarding custody and access to their child.

The complainant alleged that the accused threatened to kill her, that she would explode like a balloon, that he would break her, and that he sent a threatening email.

The court found the complainant's credibility was substantially damaged by her prior false affidavit recanting allegations of assault, the suspicious timing of her allegations coinciding with an unfavorable custody recommendation, and her demonstrated determination to obtain sole custody.

The court found the accused not guilty, holding that the Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a traffic stop.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on observations of poor driving, physical signs of impairment, and the accused's own admission.

However, the court found that the Intoxilyzer technician caused an unreasonable delay by administering breath tests to another person between the accused's first and second breath samples, contrary to the requirement that samples be taken "as soon as practicable" under section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of the over 80 charge.

The court also rejected Charter applications alleging breaches of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) rights, finding the police acted reasonably in all circumstances.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 mL and impaired driving following a traffic stop on October 16, 2011.

The Crown's case relied on an approved screening device test, field sobriety tests, and breath samples from an Intoxilyzer showing readings of 210 mg/100 mL.

The defence challenged whether the accused validly waived his right to counsel under the Charter and whether the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable.

The court found that the accused did not validly waive his right to counsel due to his impaired state and lack of full understanding of his rights, but that the police acted lawfully in delaying the breath tests to allow the accused to speak with duty counsel.

The court convicted on the over 80 charge but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment.

The accused was charged with theft over $5,000 on November 7, 2011, and robbery on December 2, 2011.

At the preliminary hearing, the Crown sought to establish the accused's identity as the perpetrator through a combination of eyewitness testimony identifying distinctive tattoos, surveillance video evidence, officer identification from video stills compared to mug shots, in-dock identification, fingerprint evidence, and circumstantial evidence linking the accused to rental vehicles used in the crimes.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification evidence, particularly the in-dock identification and the chain of custody for surveillance video.

The justice determined that sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to stand trial on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown relied on two breath test results taken at 11:10 p.m. (146 mg/100 mL) and 11:38 p.m. (144 mg/100 mL).

The defence challenged the admissibility of the second test, arguing it was not administered as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found that the 28-minute interval between tests, with 13 minutes unexplained beyond the mandatory 15-minute minimum, breached the statutory requirement.

The Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving the test was taken as soon as practicable, and the accused was acquitted.

Sentencing decision for invitation to sexual touching contrary to s. 152 of the Criminal Code.

The offender, a 22-year-old skate guard, engaged in sexually explicit communications with a 13-year-old girl and sent her an explicit image.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum 14-day sentence under s. 152, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court rejected the Charter challenge and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 14 days incarceration, followed by 12 months probation with conditions including no contact, distance restrictions, and counselling requirements.

A DNA order and 10-year SOIRA order were also imposed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "over 80" following a R.I.D.E. spot check.

The Crown relied on an Approved Screening Device (ASD) breath test failure and subsequent Intoxilyzer breath samples.

The defence challenged whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the ASD result, whether the officer breached the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), and whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The court found that while the officer was entitled to administer the ASD test without delay, he breached the accused's rights by delaying 12 minutes before providing section 10(b) rights and by failing to make the breath demand "as soon as practicable" as required by section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The Crown brought a motion to remove defence counsel for the accused McCreath from the record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The Crown argued that counsel had a prior relationship with the principal Crown witness, Henry, when she acted as duty counsel approximately five years earlier.

The court held a voir dire to determine whether a solicitor-client relationship had existed between counsel and the witness.

The court found that no such relationship arose, as counsel merely acted as a messenger between the witness and his family while serving as duty counsel, without providing legal advice or being engaged in her professional capacity as a lawyer.

The motion was dismissed.

A high school teacher pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a 16-year-old student under section 153(a) of the Criminal Code.

The offender engaged in a six-month sexual relationship with the student, involving fondling, mutual oral sex, masturbation, and digital penetration.

The conduct occurred in multiple locations including vehicles, hotel rooms in Italy, and tents in Kenya.

The offender took advantage of the student's vulnerability following her parents' separation and facilitated her deception of her parents to travel to Italy.

The court sentenced the offender to 14 months imprisonment and three years probation, emphasizing the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.