John Sopinka

The accused was convicted of sexual assault at trial but acquitted on appeal by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the conviction for the reasons given by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal from a conviction for sexual touching and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision to order a new trial.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal and quashed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision.

As the Crown did not request a new trial in the event of a dismissal, the acquittal was upheld.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that evidence obtained during an open-space search violated their rights under section 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada assumed, without deciding, that the search was unreasonable.

However, the Court upheld the Court of Appeal's finding that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, as president and chairman of the appellant corporation, ruled at an annual shareholders' meeting that certain proxy votes could only be used to vote for the management slate of directors, based on the advice of corporate counsel.

This ruling was later overturned in court, and costs were awarded against the respondent.

The respondent sought indemnification from the corporation for his legal costs under s. 136(1) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was entitled to indemnification because he acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, particularly by reasonably relying on the advice of corporate counsel.

The appellants and respondents disputed ownership of a five-foot strip of land due to a historical surveying error.

The respondents claimed title under the Registry Act, arguing that title searches need only go back forty years, which allowed them to rely on their predecessors' title and ignore the appellants' 1941 registered claim.

The trial judge ruled in favour of the appellants, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal in their entirety.

The accused was convicted of incest and sexual touching after confessing to police.

The complainant, his daughter, also gave a statement to police detailing the abuse, but recanted at trial.

The accused also recanted his confession at trial.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could compare the similarities between the two statements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the complainant's prior inconsistent statement was substantively admissible for the truth of its contents because the striking similarities between her statement and the accused's confession provided the necessary threshold of reliability under the principled approach to hearsay.

The respondent, a police officer, was forced to retire at age 60 pursuant to a mandatory retirement policy in the collective agreement.

He filed a human rights complaint alleging age discrimination.

The Board of Inquiry found the policy was not a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) because the employer lacked a sincerely held belief in its necessity at the time of adoption, and because individual accommodation was possible.

The Divisional Court and Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the subjective element of the BFOR test can be satisfied where a policy is adopted in good faith through collective bargaining without ulterior motives.

The Court also held that the objective element does not require individual accommodation where a general rule is reasonably necessary and individual testing is impractical.

The mandatory retirement policy was justified as a BFOR.

The appellant contracted HIV from an artificial insemination procedure performed by the respondent physician in 1985.

The appellant sued for negligence and breach of implied warranty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the physician could not be found negligent for failing to know of the risk of HIV transmission through AI at that time, as it was not standard medical knowledge.

The Court also held that a jury cannot find a standard medical practice negligent unless it is fraught with obvious risks.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Sale of Goods Act and common law implied warranties do not apply to contracts primarily for medical services involving biological materials like semen.

Finally, the Court affirmed that the rough upper limit on non-pecuniary damages applies and that trial judges should instruct juries on this limit when appropriate.

The appellant, a citizen of China, sought Convention refugee status claiming a well-founded fear of persecution by forced sterilization for violating China's one-child policy, and for his pro-democracy political opinions.

The Immigration and Refugee Board rejected his claim, finding that forced sterilization was a general population policy, not persecution.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while forced sterilization might constitute persecution of a particular social group, the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that his fear of forced sterilization was objectively well-founded on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant was tried in Canada for assisting in a prison escape based on statements she made to United States police in the U.S. The trial judge excluded one statement because the U.S. police did not give a second right-to-counsel warning when the interrogation shifted focus, which would be required under the Canadian Charter.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the Charter did not apply.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Charter does not apply to foreign authorities acting outside Canada, and the admission of the evidence obtained in compliance with U.S. law did not render the trial unfair.

The appeal concerned whether Saskatchewan workers' compensation legislation permitting a board to recover unpaid assessments from a principal contractor, coupled with a right of indemnity and set-off against monies otherwise payable to a bankrupt contractor, conflicted with the federal bankruptcy priority scheme.

The majority held that the combined operation of s. 133(1) and s. 133(3) effectively secured the board's claim against the bankrupt estate and thereby reordered priorities fixed by s. 136 of the Bankruptcy Act.

Applying division of powers and paramountcy principles, the Court concluded the provision was inapplicable in bankruptcy to that extent.

The appeal was dismissed, with a four-judge dissent concluding the provincial provisions were complementary to the bankruptcy regime and preserved by s. 97(3).

The appellant, a tenured professor, sued the University of Regina for breach of contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal.

The Court set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and entered judgment in favour of the appellant in the amount of $208,872.66, with costs throughout.

The appellant, a lawyer, initiated a fee-for-referral scheme with police officers.

When the Law Society investigated the allegations, the appellant submitted false statutory declarations from the officers and clients to conceal the scheme.

He was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice.

On appeal, he argued that a Law Society investigation does not constitute the 'course of justice' under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code, and challenged the admission of wiretap evidence and the statutory declarations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'course of justice' includes investigations by statutory disciplinary tribunals, the wiretap evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the false declarations were not protected by solicitor-client privilege as they were created to further a crime.

The appellant was attacked by a gang while driving his van and was shot, resulting in severe injuries.

He applied for no-fault benefits under his automobile insurance policy, which covered injuries caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, use, or operation of a vehicle.

The insurer denied the claim, and the lower courts upheld the denial, finding the van was merely the situs of the attack.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, establishing a two-part test of purpose and causal link.

The Court found that the shooting was not random but resulted from an attempt to gain entry to the van, thus satisfying the causal connection requirement.

The parties divorced and entered into a separation agreement providing for spousal and child support.

The respondent later applied to vary the support orders under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, arguing that the appellant's cohabitation with a new partner and the child's independence constituted material changes in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application regarding spousal support, finding the cohabitation was foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal reduced spousal support based on a presumption of self-sufficiency.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's order for spousal support, as the cohabitation was known at the time of the agreement and did not constitute a material change.

Child support was cancelled as the child was now married and independent.

Constitutional appeals challenging federal tobacco advertising and labelling restrictions.

The Court held that Parliament had authority under the criminal law power to legislate in relation to tobacco advertising, promotion, and warning requirements aimed at protecting public health.

A majority further held that the impugned advertising ban, trademark restrictions, and unattributed package warning provisions infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were not justified under s. 1 because the government failed to demonstrate minimal impairment.

Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 of the Act were declared of no force or effect.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine after selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer.

At trial, the appellant raised an alibi defence, claiming he was at home with his mother at the time of the offence.

The trial judge found that the alibi had not been adequately disclosed to the police, as the mother's statements at the police station were disjointed and focused on the time of arrest rather than the time of the offence.

Consequently, the trial judge drew an adverse inference against the alibi evidence and convicted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that proper disclosure of an alibi requires adequacy and timeliness to permit meaningful police investigation.

The majority found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the mother's statements lacked sufficient detail and coherence to constitute adequate disclosure.

The appellant purchased a parcel of land for the purpose of reselling it at a profit, constituting an adventure in the nature of trade.

The property substantially decreased in value, and the appellant sought to deduct the decline in fair market value as a business loss under s. 10(1) of the Income Tax Act.

The Minister disallowed the deduction, and the lower courts upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that on a plain reading of the Act, the appellant's venture was a 'business' and the property was 'inventory', entitling him to use the inventory valuation method to recognize a business loss in the taxation years prior to disposition.

The accused was charged with driving while prohibited under the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that the combined effect of ss. 92 and 94(1) created an absolute liability offence punishable by imprisonment, violating s. 7 of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court and the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the offence is one of absolute liability because the prohibition is automatic and without notice, effectively removing the defence of due diligence.

However, the Court found no Charter violation because s. 4.1 of the provincial Offence Act precludes imprisonment for absolute liability offences.

A new trial was not ordered due to the unfairness to the accused.