John J. Adair

This appeal concerns a financial dispute among adult siblings over entitlement to distributions from a valuable investment in a residential development in Oakville, Ontario.

The investment, originally a 10% interest in the Lower Fourth Joint Venture purchased by the father in 1969, was held by the mother in trust for three children in equal shares.

The daughter disclaimed her interest for tax reasons.

When distributions began in 2014, they were deposited into bank accounts opened in the mother's name.

The central issue was whether the mother held the distributions as bare trustee for the daughter or whether the daughter had received only individual gifts.

The Court of Appeal found that a bare trust existed over the bank account contents for the benefit of both the daughter and one son in equal shares, reversing the trial judge's finding that the mother held the funds beneficially.

Galleria Centre Inc. ("Galleria") applied for an order under s. 207 of the Business Corporations Act ("OBCA") to wind up a co-tenancy agreement or compel Terracap Galleria Centre Inc. ("Terracap") to purchase its interest in a condominium development project.

Terracap cross-applied for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the OBCA, alleging Galleria's refusal to participate was oppressive, and sought to purchase the property on just terms, with proceeds distributed according to the co-tenancy agreement.

The court dismissed Galleria's application, finding its "expectations" were not reasonable and that the co-tenancy agreement provided a mechanism for ending the relationship, rendering s. 207 unnecessary.

Terracap's claim for an oppression remedy was also dismissed, as Galleria's conduct, while potentially a breach of contract, was not oppressive given that contractual remedies were available.

However, Terracap's cross-application was allowed in part, with the court ordering the parties' disengagement to occur in accordance with Article 18 of the Co-Tenancy Agreement, which included the liquidation of assets and the application of Terracap's preferential distribution right.

The appellant, Richard Smith, appealed an arbitral award that set aside a paragraph of Minutes of Settlement due to his failure to make full disclosure of significant stock option income.

The Arbitrator found that Mr. Smith's disclosure created "information asymmetry" by not clearly presenting the $1.1 million stock option income in his financial statements and affidavits, despite it appearing on attached pay stubs.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Arbitrator's finding that Mr. Smith did not fulfill his positive duty of full and honest disclosure, as required by Rick v. Brandsema.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments that the Arbitrator made palpable and overriding errors of fact or erred in law by relieving the respondent of her duty to inquire, emphasizing that the onus to inquire only shifts after complete and unambiguous disclosure.

Appeal from a motion judge's decision ordering release of a cryopreserved in vitro embryo to the respondent ex-wife for her reproductive use.

The motion judge applied contract and property law principles to conclude the embryo should be released based on the parties' prior contractual agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and its regulations establish a consent-based model, not a contract-based model.

The parties remain "donors" under the regulations despite divorce, and the appellant retained the right to withdraw his consent under section 14(3) of the Consent Regulations.

The court found that consent cannot be frozen in time and that the statutory protections cannot be contracted away.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a prior proceeding.

The court reviewed submissions and applied Rule 57.01, concluding that costs should be assessed on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs' argument to reduce the defendant's costs due to a lack of a formal offer to settle was rejected, as the defendant had not yet received full document production (subject emails) at the time a settlement offer might have been made.

The court drew a negative inference from the plaintiffs' failure to produce their own bill of costs.

The defendant 2075750 Ontario Inc. was awarded partial indemnity costs for pleadings and productions, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, totaling $135,221.65.

Miriam Stein, 90, has a feeding tube.

Her three daughters, Helen Brunswick, Frieda Oren, and Gloria Stein, were joint attorneys for personal care.

Gloria opposed the feeding tube, while Helen and Frieda supported it.

They entered into "Minutes of Settlement" for a geriatric assessment to guide decisions on the feeding tube.

When the tube needed replacement, they disagreed.

Gloria resigned as attorney for personal care, believing the Minutes would protect her position.

Helen and Frieda proceeded with the replacement.

Gloria subsequently sought to enforce the Minutes for a specific assessment.

The court found the Minutes were not a legally binding agreement, lacking offer, acceptance, consideration, and certainty of terms, and became moot upon Gloria's resignation.

The court dismissed Gloria's motion and application, and exempted Helen and Frieda from consulting Gloria on matters related to Miriam's feeding tube due to irreconcilable differences.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment order requiring it to pay HST to the respondent supplier.

The central issue was whether a supplier can issue invoices disclosing HST payable after the supply transaction has occurred, or whether such disclosure must be made at the time of the transaction to comply with section 223(1) of the Excise Tax Act.

The respondent sold unrefined gold to the appellant over a two-year period without collecting or remitting HST.

After a CRA audit, the respondent issued invoices months later demanding payment of the HST.

The court held that section 223(1) is silent on timing and permits post-transaction invoices, affirming the summary judgment.

The appellants appealed a judgment in a motor vehicle accident case where the trial judge admitted liability just before trial and the matter proceeded as a damages assessment before a jury.

The appellants contended that the trial judge failed to address transgressions by respondent's counsel, unfairly summarized evidence in jury instructions, and displayed reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's conduct was fair and balanced, that many complaints were not objected to at trial, and that the allegations of bias did not meet the high threshold required to displace the presumption of judicial impartiality.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from an unsuccessful and untimely motion brought by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing a litigation guardian for her mother, Ida Rubin.

The court found Ms. Werner's proposed motion to be an obstructionist tactic, lacking merit, and brought in breach of a scheduling order.

Due to Ms. Werner's reprehensible litigation conduct, the court awarded full indemnity costs against her to the applicant and litigation guardian.

Additionally, costs were awarded to other parties (Morris Rubin and The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company) from the estate, with these amounts to be allocated solely to Ms. Werner's share.

Joseph Pernica, litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, sought a case conference regarding his status amidst upcoming motions.

The endorsement addresses a purported motion by Sarah Werner to vary an order appointing Pernica as litigation guardian for Ida Rubin, arguing Pernica exceeded his mandate by obtaining Ida Rubin's banking records and challenging Ida Rubin's capacity.

The court declined to schedule Ms. Werner's motion, finding she lacked standing under Rules 59.06 and 7.06(1)(b).

The court affirmed Pernica's role as litigation guardian and provided specific directions for any future motion by Ida Rubin herself to remove the litigation guardian, emphasizing the need for transparency, personal affidavit, and attendance in open court for cross-examination due to the risk of abuse in ex parte proceedings.

The court also declined to stay the case, emphasizing the need for information sharing for mediation and a mechanism for fund distribution.

This appeal concerns the assessment of damages for sexual assault in a civil action.

The respondent, a physician, alleged that the appellant, a colleague and friend, sexually assaulted her at her home in 1999.

The trial judge found the assault proven and awarded general damages of $175,000, punitive damages of $25,000, pre-judgment interest, and costs.

The appellant appealed, challenging the non-pecuniary damages award and the punitive damages award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's assessment of damages or her decision to award punitive damages.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's dismissal of an appeal.

The respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, citing the nature of the underlying allegations and the trial judge's findings.

The appellants argued for costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale, finding that while substantial indemnity costs were appropriate at trial due to the appellants' conduct, there was no principled basis to impose such costs for the appeal itself.

The appellants had a right to appeal and raised legitimate issues.

This appeal concerns a serious and sustained Internet defamation campaign orchestrated by the appellant Rabinowitz against the respondent Rutman, a Toronto chartered accountant and businessman.

Rabinowitz admitted liability for defamatory statements posted on the Internet alleging tax fraud, theft, and cheating.

The trial judge found the appellants Bergman and Artcraft Company Inc. jointly and severally liable for the defamation.

The trial judge awarded $200,000 in general damages, $200,000 in aggravated damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages against Rabinowitz, and $50,000 in punitive damages against Bergman.

The appellants appealed on grounds of liability and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on concerted action liability, vicarious liability of the corporation, and the quantum of damages awarded.

An employee appealed a judgment regarding vesting of stock options under an employment contract.

The application judge found that a sale of substantially all of the company's assets to Lexmark constituted a triggering event causing the employee's unvested options to vest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision on all grounds, finding that the Option Plan was binding, the sale constituted a triggering event, the employee properly exercised the options, the employee reasonably did not mitigate by seeking employment with Lexmark, and the requirement to purchase options through a holding company was appropriate.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal decision dated June 30, 2017.

The appellants (Iranian government entities) appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most appeals but allowed appeals in actions commenced by certain respondents, striking those actions.

The court awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the appellants' argument that no costs should be awarded due to novel issues and declining to award substantial indemnity costs or costs to respondents whose actions were struck.

Appeal from a trial judgment concerning a dispute between a former unmarried couple over property rights in development properties.

The trial judge found that a property development agreement (PDA) existed between the parties despite a cohabitation agreement containing broad waivers of property rights.

The trial judge set aside the cohabitation agreement as it applied to the development properties under section 56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act, finding that neither party understood the consequences of the agreement regarding their property development venture.

The trial judge awarded the respondent $3,325,000 plus interest and costs.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: the trial judge erred in setting aside the agreement only as to development properties; in not setting aside the entire agreement including the spousal support waiver; and in calculating the amount owing under the PDA.

The appellant appealed a Master's order that dismissed its action for delay under Rule 11.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Master had found that the appellant intentionally delayed obtaining an order to continue following a corporate reorganization to insulate its assets from the respondent's counterclaim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Master misapprehended the evidence and erred in applying the test for dismissal.

The Court held that a dismissal under Rule 11.03 requires a showing of prejudice related to the failure to obtain the order to continue, which the respondent failed to demonstrate.

The dismissal of the action was set aside, though the Master's refusal to vary the flawed 2015 order to continue was upheld, with leave for the appellant to requisition a fresh order.

Three brothers engaged in a protracted dispute over the proceeds and operations of their family farming and construction businesses.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendant owed significant sums for personal expenses improperly charged to the company and imbalances in shareholder loan accounts.

The court found the company's records unreliable and ordered a formal accounting for the loan accounts and gas expenses.

Most other claims and counterclaims were dismissed as unproven or statute-barred under the Limitations Act, though one plaintiff was ordered to repay misappropriated fire insurance and sawmill proceeds.

An appeal and cross-appeal concerning a contractual dispute between two friends and their respective companies regarding an employment agreement.

The trial judge found that an oral employment agreement was reached in October 2003 between Mark Couper and Vitaquest International LLC, and that Vitaquest repudiated the agreement in early March 2005.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's finding that Couper was entitled to damages equivalent to base pay for the period October 2003 to March 2005.

The respondent cross-appealed on the issue of whether he was entitled to a US$5 million payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings.

The appellants (Iran and related entities) appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice recognizing and enforcing U.S. judgments obtained by victims of terrorism against Iran for its sponsorship of terrorist attacks.

The respondents sought to enforce these judgments in Ontario under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA) and amendments to the State Immunity Act (SIA).

Iran challenged the recognition and enforcement of the judgments on multiple grounds, including arguments regarding state immunity, the temporal scope of the JVTA, proof requirements, limitation periods, jurisdiction, public policy, diplomatic immunity, and the appropriateness of costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Iran's appeal, save for judgments arising from terrorist attacks that occurred prior to January 1, 1985, which could not be enforced under the JVTA.