Jill D. Makepeace

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against his stepdaughter following a jury trial.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the central issues, the position of the defence, and the evidence of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's instructions were inadequate, failed to address the defence's position that the conduct never occurred, and did not properly separate the multiple counts in the indictment.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences arising from two home invasions involving the collection of drug debts, during which one victim was beaten and another was shot.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on unsavoury witnesses and flawed eyewitness identification, and lacked authority to convict him of aggravated assault on an unparticularized attempted murder charge.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider his Aboriginal status under Gladue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, amending the indictment to include the means of the assault to uphold the aggravated assault conviction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence remained fit despite the trial judge's failure to expressly apply s. 718.2(e).

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor student.

He argued that the trial judge unfairly and illogically rejected the alibi evidence provided by his wife, which would have exonerated him.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a solid evidentiary basis for the trial judge's adverse credibility findings regarding the wife, noting her history of deceit and bizarre behaviour.

The court concluded that the trial judge did not subject the evidence to an unreasonably high standard of scrutiny and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and theft under $5,000 after stabbing his father at least 50 times.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 15 years.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's rolled up instruction to the jury was deficient and that the 15-year parole ineligibility period was harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge exemplary and thorough in instructing the jury to consider all evidence regarding the appellant's state of mind.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the appellant's character, lack of remorse, and the extreme brutality of the offence in determining the period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant, a high school math teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a 16-year-old student.

He argued the trial judge erred by treating a cross-examination question as evidence, failing to address improbabilities in the complainant's evidence, and attaching no weight to his good character evidence.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that any error regarding the cross-examination question was harmless, the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable and supported by the evidence, and the trial judge did not err in her treatment of the character evidence given the private nature of the offences.

The accused, an OPP officer, was charged with attempted murder, arson, and administering a noxious substance after a fire broke out in her daughter-in-law's bedroom.

The Crown alleged the accused drugged the victim's drink with diphenhydramine during a visit to discuss a bitter custody dispute, then set fire to the bedroom closet once the victim was asleep.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and expert evidence regarding the fire's origin and the toxicology results.

The accused was found guilty of arson and administering a noxious substance, but acquitted of attempted murder as the specific intent to kill was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault following a judge-alone trial.

During the trial, the judge convened an in-chambers conference with counsel, excluding the appellant, where the judge commented negatively on the appellant's testimony and encouraged a plea resolution.

On appeal, the court found that the appellant's right to be present during the whole of his trial under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code was violated, as the discussion affected his vital interests.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, holding that the trial judge's comments compromised the appearance of judicial impartiality.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant mother was convicted of child abduction under s. 282(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after taking her two children to Singapore for seven months, depriving the father of his court-ordered access.

The trial judge imposed a 12-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge made no errors in concluding the mother intended to deprive the father of access.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and substituted an absolute discharge, noting the hardship a criminal record would cause the appellant's professional travel and the fact she had already served her conditional sentence.

The appellant challenged convictions for multiple historical sexual offences against several boys, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, applied uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence witnesses, relied on material not in evidence, and thereby rendered the trial unfair.

The court held that any errors were minor, not material to the reasoning process, and did not undermine trial fairness or the convictions.

The court also rejected challenges to the dismissal of stay applications based on destroyed police records and alleged abuse of process arising from the earlier investigation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the five-year global sentence was upheld as fit notwithstanding one conceded sentencing error.

The court further ordered sex offender registration under SOIRA.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple charges relating to residential break and enters with a sexual element and was declared a long-term offender.

He appealed the trial judge's calculation of his parole ineligibility period.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by including pre-sentence custody and an unlisted offence in the calculation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the period of parole ineligibility to 6 years and 9 months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and uttering a death threat, as well as his six-year sentence for attempted murder.

The Crown conceded the aggravated assault conviction violated the Kienapple principle, and it was stayed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for attempted murder, finding the trial judge correctly refused to leave self-defence with the jury as there was no objective air of reality to the defence given the pre-emptive nature of the machete attack.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's subjective fear was not a mitigating factor and the six-year sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen, was sought for extradition by the United States on charges of conspiracy to import marijuana and money laundering.

The Minister of Justice issued an Authority to Proceed for the Canadian offences of importing a controlled substance and possession of property obtained by crime.

After the applicant consented to committal, the Minister ordered his surrender on the U.S. conspiracy charges and declined to seek assurances regarding sentencing standards.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the surrender order must align with the Canadian offences in the committal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, applying the Supreme Court's conduct-based approach to double criminality, which does not require alignment between the surrender order and the extradition order.

The appellant challenged both a conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident between inmates in a correctional facility and a subsequent dangerous offender designation resulting in an indeterminate sentence.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and held there was no basis to disturb the credibility findings.

The ineffective assistance claim failed because, even assuming incompetence, no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was established.

On sentence, the court held that a long-term offender determination does not displace ordinary sentencing principles for the predicate offence and upheld the finding that the appellant met the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation and could not be managed in the community by less intrusive means.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on a psychiatrist convicted of two counts of sexual assault against a patient.

The offences occurred over a nine-year period and involved a significant breach of trust, as the offender exploited the patient's vulnerabilities and later orchestrated a cover-up.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by discounting the victim impact statement due to a pending civil suit and by failing to treat the breach of trust as an aggravating factor.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to two years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault against his spouse.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's assessment of credibility, as the case turned almost entirely on the conflicting testimony of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny, holding the appellant accountable for every inconsistency while glossing over significant contradictions in the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding her statements to police.

The trial judge also misapprehended material parts of the appellant's evidence.

Concluding that the appellant did not receive a fair trial, the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury at the conclusion of the Crown's case, which relied entirely on circumstantial evidence including motive, opportunity, forensic evidence, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by weighing the evidence piecemeal and usurping the function of the jury rather than taking the Crown's case at its highest.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a serious domestic assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misunderstood the Crown's position on sentence and imposed a sentence beyond the proposal without providing reasons.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 15 months, factoring in a 22-month base sentence and 7 months of credit for pretrial custody.