Janet Simmons

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody at a rate of 1.5:1.

Following a review of the sentencing transcript, it was revealed that the original joint submission did not account for the appellant's lost eligibility for early release.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Summers, the Crown conceded that the appellant was entitled to the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the appellant 806 days of pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant sought to initiate a private prosecution against Hydro One Networks.

After a Justice of the Peace declined to permit the prosecution, a Superior Court judge converted the appeal to an application for mandamus but declined to grant relief.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and brought a motion seeking an interim order requiring Hydro One Networks to deliver hydro bills, an order under s. 683 of the Criminal Code for witnesses to testify, and other procedural relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no legal basis for the interim order and no basis established for the s. 683 order, but provided directions on time limits for oral submissions on the appeal.

The appellant applied to rescind an order dismissing his appeal of a dangerous driving conviction as abandoned, and to set aside his guilty plea on the basis that he was misinformed by trial counsel regarding the length of his licence suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, noting that the guilty plea was part of a broader plea bargain involving other charges.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant applying to set aside all of his convictions, as the interests of justice require a full consideration of the entire plea bargain.

The appellant pleaded guilty to mischief and criminal harassment after distributing degrading emails and a naked photograph of his former intimate partner and a former co-worker.

He appealed his sentence of 90 days intermittent imprisonment and a suspended sentence, seeking a conditional discharge and introducing fresh evidence of rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the appellant's positive prospects and time served, a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the serious nature of the offences and the need for denunciation.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to bring a section 11(b) Charter application for delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Court also held that the appellant failed to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, as a section 11(b) application would not have had a reasonable chance of success given the periods of defence delay.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice declining to entertain its s. 24(1) Charter application based on post-trial delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion, as the appellant had already raised the s. 11(b) Charter issue in an appeal to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court under the Provincial Offences Act.

The defendant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing its third-party claim for contribution and indemnity against a geotechnical consultant.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim after finding that the plaintiff's counsel made admissions during the hearing that the plaintiff had no claim against the consultant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error because counsel's statements were qualified and did not constitute a binding admission that no claim existed.

The dismissal of the third and fourth party claims was set aside.

The appellant appealed a threshold ruling and costs order made by the trial judge in a motor vehicle accident action.

The appellant abandoned the appeal of the threshold ruling but argued the trial judge erred in departing from the usual costs consequences after the plaintiff obtained a judgment less favourable than the appellant's offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the trial judge's departure from the rule.

The Court set aside the order of no costs post-offer and awarded the appellant $70,000 in costs, to be set off against the $135,000 awarded to the respondent for pre-offer costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless use of a firearm.

The trial judge found he fired a gun to scare a dog in a rural area but made no findings on how the gun was fired.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, finding that without findings on the manner the rifle was used or the trajectory of the projectile, the conviction could not be sustained.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The respondent contractor hired the appellant for epoxy flooring based on a sketch with inaccurate elevations.

When the appellant discovered the error and sought a price increase, the respondent refused, leading to a breach of contract claim and a counterclaim for lost profits.

The trial judge found for the appellant, but the Divisional Court overturned the decision on its own initiative, applying the doctrine of common mistake.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by deciding the case on unpleaded grounds and misapplying the doctrine of common mistake, as the mistake was the respondent's fault.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to change his child and spousal support obligations.

The parties' separation agreement and divorce order imputed the appellant's income at $200,000, with no variation unless his income changed by more than 10%.

The appellant argued his support should be based on his line 150 income.

The motion judge found the appellant had transferred an income-producing asset to his common-law spouse to remove income that would properly be used to calculate support, and thus failed to demonstrate a change in income.

The Court of Appeal found no error and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision recognizing and enforcing two judgments from the High Court of Singapore: an equitable order regarding shares and a subsequent monetary order.

The appellant argued the monetary order superseded the equitable order, the equitable order was ambiguous, and the application judge erred in awarding postjudgment interest and continuing an interlocutory injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the equitable order was final and enforceable, and that postjudgment interest was properly awarded under the Courts of Justice Act based on the foreign jurisdiction's rate.

The appellant sold land to the City with an agreement that the City would build a road extension to the appellant's remaining lands along a specific route.

The City later discovered it could not build the road as agreed due to environmental assessment requirements for a rail spur, and admitted breach of contract.

The appellant sought a permanent injunction to compel the agreed route and prevent the rail spur.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding damages were an adequate remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the appellant failed to plead damages in the alternative.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondent for an allegedly unfair tender process relating to a commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that all four bids in the first tender process were non-compliant and that the respondent was justified in ordering a second round, which the appellant chose not to participate in.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, applying the palpable and overriding error standard to the motion judge's fact-finding under Rule 20, and found no error in the fairness and good faith analysis.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a robbery charge.

At trial, the Crown had requested a conviction for the lesser included offence of assault.

The trial judge concluded that because the information did not particularize the manner in which the robbery was alleged to have been committed, the accused could not be convicted of assault.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error of law.

However, because the trial judge did not make the factual findings necessary to support a finding of guilt for assault, a substituted conviction was not available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Crown failed to establish with a reasonable degree of certainty that the verdict would not necessarily have been the same had the error not been made.

The appellant's second degree murder conviction was previously set aside by the Court of Appeal and a manslaughter conviction was substituted.

The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the substituted manslaughter conviction.

Considering the appellant's level of culpability as a non-physical participant in the fatal stabbing, his youth, and the time he had already served in custody, the Court imposed a sentence of one day of imprisonment in addition to time served, plus one year of probation.