Janet Simmons

The appellant failed to pay support arrears and post security as previously ordered by the court as a condition of hearing the appeal.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on consent with agreed costs of $27,500.

The court ordered that $15,000 of the costs award be included as a support order under s. 1(1)(g) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 2005, making it enforceable as a support order.

The appellant husband moved to lift a stay of his appeal from a contempt order in a matrimonial proceeding.

The stay order required him to fulfill three conditions, including providing an up-to-date financial statement and information about his living arrangements in the Bahamas.

The Court of Appeal found that his compliance was piecemeal, vague, selective, and incomplete, and that much of what he asserted lacked credibility.

The motion to lift the stay was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The parties agreed on the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent costs fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to sue a litigation committee for defamation regarding a report sent to s. 38 litigation participants.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the words were not defamatory and were protected by qualified privilege.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence that the report was sent to non-participants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the fresh evidence application, upholding the finding that the words were not defamatory and noting the appellant had no reputation to protect among the recipients.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing its motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to properly assess the merits of the 'wrong defendant' defence, the potential counterclaim for rent and breach of trademark, and the prejudice arising from the seizure of the trademark.

The default judgment and noting of default were set aside on conditions, including the payment of costs and the return of the trademark.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion requesting the court refuse to hear the appellant's appeal due to his failure to comply with trial orders regarding spousal support and security.

The Court of Appeal held that where an appellant wishes to be relieved of trial obligations pending appeal, the proper approach is to bring a stay motion.

The court adjourned the appeal, ordering that it would not be heard until the appellant paid the support arrears and posted the required security.

The moving party sought to dismiss the responding party's appeal of a family law judgment.

The responding party had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was denied leave to continue the appeal under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The responding party argued that the court should dispense with the leave requirement under rule 2.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that rule 2.03 only permits dispensing with compliance with the Rules, not statutory requirements.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant was convicted of a provincial offence for failing to comply with an order to remedy building code deficiencies and fined $12,000.

He appealed to the Ontario Court of Justice but failed to order all transcripts and requested an adjournment on the hearing date.

The appeal judge refused the adjournment and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the appeal judge had inherent jurisdiction to control the court's process and deny the adjournment due to the appellant's manifest delay.

The Court also confirmed that a decision to refuse an adjournment and dismiss an appeal is a 'judgment' that may be appealed to the Court of Appeal with leave under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The respondent obtained a money judgment against the appellant and secured an order compelling him to attend an examination in aid of execution with specified documents.

The day before the examination, the appellant made an assignment in bankruptcy.

He attended the examination but brought a Notice of Stay of Proceedings instead of the documents.

The motion judge allowed the respondent's contempt motion to proceed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the examination was stayed by section 69.3 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act upon the bankruptcy, and therefore the failure to bring documents could not found contempt.

The appellant was wrongfully dismissed after 14 years of employment.

The motion judge awarded a 17-month reasonable notice period but denied damages for lost bonuses, finding the bonus plan required 'active employment'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in principle by focusing on whether the 'active employment' term was ambiguous rather than whether it unambiguously limited the appellant's common law right to damages.

The Court found the term did not oust the common law entitlement and awarded the appellant damages for the bonuses he would have earned during the notice period.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario determined the quantum of costs.

The appellant was awarded agreed-upon costs of $12,860.70 for the original motion and $20,000 for the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter for shooting his brother.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and by allowing the jury to consider the lack of bruising on the deceased's wrist without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the self-defence instructions properly conveyed the requirement of a defensive purpose, and concluding there was no realistic possibility the jury improperly speculated about the bruising evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence after the Court of Appeal previously quashed one of his two convictions for attempted possession of a firearm.

The appellant sought a reduction of his sentence to time served and a reduction of the victim fine surcharge.

The Crown agreed to the surcharge reduction but opposed reducing the three-year probation term.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge treated the attempt to possess two guns as an aggravating feature for the entire sentence, not just the custodial portion.

Consequently, the court varied the sentence for the remaining conviction by reducing the probation period from three years to two years and the victim fine surcharge from $400 to $200.

The appellant law firm previously represented the plaintiffs in a personal injury action and obtained a judgment for $206,000 in unpaid legal fees.

A subsequent settlement approval judge, reviewing the settlement for a plaintiff under disability, reduced the appellant's fees to $102,500 in a partial judgment.

The appellant moved under Rule 59.06(2)(c) to vary the partial judgment to accord with the earlier $206,000 judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding Rule 59.06(2)(c) does not authorize a judge to choose between conflicting Superior Court orders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and declined to allow the appellant to amend its motion to seek relief under Rule 37.14 due to unexplained delay and an inadequate evidentiary record.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant Estate successfully defended the respondent's claim for a one-half interest in a property, the court determined the costs for the proceedings in the court below.

The Estate sought partial indemnity costs of $169,508.

The court reduced this amount by $30,000 to account for two unsuccessful motions brought by the Estate during the litigation.

Costs were fixed at $134,478.68 payable by the respondent to the Estate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences, including assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement against his former girlfriend, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by mischaracterizing defence evidence as an alibi, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and over-relying on similar fact and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in characterizing certain evidence as an alibi, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the curative proviso applied.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding the trial judge reasonably assessed the psychiatric evidence and the appellant's risk to re-offend.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and breach of probation arising from a drug transaction.

The trial judge had stayed an aggravated assault charge under the Kienapple principle.

The Court of Appeal quashed the robbery conviction but applied section 686(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code to dismiss the appeal by lifting the stay and entering a conviction for aggravated assault.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's self-defence claim, finding that stabbing the victim eight times was disproportionate to the threat.

The weapons dangerous conviction was stayed, and the matter was remitted for sentencing on the aggravated assault conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of attempting to possess a firearm without a licence.

The convictions were based entirely on text messages exchanged with a co-worker who was found smuggling firearms.

The Court of Appeal found that while one text message supported a reasonable inference of a prior agreement to obtain a firearm, the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's responses of 'Ok ok' to price quotes constituted agreements to purchase two specific firearms was unreasonable, especially since those specific firearms were not found in the co-worker's possession.

The appeal was allowed in part, and one of the two convictions was quashed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful confinement and sentenced to 32 months' imprisonment.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the strong Crown case, which included a 911 call recording.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the 32-month sentence was lenient given the premeditated nature of the abduction and confinement.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault causing bodily harm, which was entered following a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found the plea was invalid and not unequivocal due to shifting facts presented by the Crown, the appellant's statements suggesting a lack of mens rea, and indications she pleaded guilty primarily to be released from jail where she was allegedly denied HIV medication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.