Janet Simmons

The appellant, a high school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a former student.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and erred in assessing credibility.

He also appealed his one-year sentence as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the sentence was fit given the extent of the manipulation and grooming.

The mother transferred title of the family cottage to herself and two of her children as joint tenants, while registering a life interest for her other two children.

After the mother's death, a dispute arose over the nature of the life interest.

The motion judge found that the respondent had an exclusive life interest in the property.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the mother's actual intention was to gift the property to the appellants while granting the respondent a non-exclusive life-time licence to occupy the cottage, consistent with historical family use.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent payment on a mortgage covenant and possession of the mortgaged property, and dismissing her counterclaim.

The respondent, who previously acted as the appellant's lawyer, had made a series of loans to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent proved the mortgage and default, while the appellant's response consisted of bald allegations unsupported by evidence.

The court also found no impropriety in the motion judge issuing a supplementary endorsement to address the counterclaim after receiving correspondence from the respondent's counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms and narcotics offences, arguing that police surveillance violated his s. 8 Charter rights, the initial search warrant was invalid due to misrepresentations, and the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, or that the police conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police surveillance from a distance on neighbouring property did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

While acknowledging minor s. 8 breaches related to delayed reporting and a defective warrant, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) and found no abuse of process, noting the police trespass was not serious and based on erroneous legal advice.

The appellant, Zaka Ullah Khan, appealed the dismissal of his action by way of summary judgment under Rule 20.

His claim was premised on the assertion that his tort action had settled for a higher amount than he received, with the remainder allegedly misappropriated by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that while some factual disputes existed (e.g., signing of release, meeting details), they were not material to the core issue.

The motion judge found no evidence to support the claim of a higher settlement or misappropriation.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, denied leave to appeal the costs award, and denied leave to cross-appeal the costs order.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering detention of a not criminally responsible accused at a forensic psychiatric facility.

The appellant sought conditional discharge with residence at his mother's home.

The Court of Appeal found the Board failed in its inquisitorial duty by not adequately exploring whether safeguards could mitigate concerns about attending physicians' understanding of the appellant's specific delusional disorder, and by relying on an unexplained administrative decision denying residence with his mother without requiring justification.

The appeal was allowed and the matter returned to the Board for re-hearing on an expedited basis.

The appellants sought to appeal a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay an action in favour of arbitration.

The respondents raised a jurisdictional objection based on section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, which provides that there is no appeal from the court's decision on a motion to stay.

The Court of Appeal held that section 7(6) precludes any appeal from a decision on a motion to stay, whether granting or refusing the stay, and therefore dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds without reviewing the motion judge's analysis.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order dismissing his action against the respondents (his former legal counsel) under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

The appellant had alleged that the respondents failed to follow his instructions, misled and deceived him, and failed to provide competent legal services in an unjust dismissal case under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge found that the same issue had been previously determined by Adjudicator Monteith, whose findings were upheld by the Federal Court on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in dismissing the action as an abuse of process and affirming the costs award.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder while using a firearm, arising from a planned drug robbery on July 16, 2005.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two accomplices with significant credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the verdicts were not unreasonable, the cumulative effect of errors in the trial judge's final instructions to the jury—particularly regarding post-offence conduct and the failure to adequately address alternative inferences—required a new trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered appeals from a partial summary judgment granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The parties agreed that the motion judge's refusal to grant a stay of the partial summary judgment constituted an interlocutory order, such that any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal determined that the matter should proceed by way of leave application to the Divisional Court rather than by direct appeal.

The appeals were quashed and the request for transfer was denied.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior discreditable conduct involving other neighbours regarding noise complaints.

The appellant had strangled and slit the throat and wrists of his neighbour following a dispute over alleged noise from her unit.

The trial judge admitted evidence of the appellant's aggressive behaviour toward other neighbours over noise complaints to establish his state of mind and provide context for the interaction with the victim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's careful balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography.

The Crown's case relied on evidence obtained when police reviewed a mirror copy of the appellant's work computer hard drive without a warrant.

The trial judge found a Charter breach under s. 8 but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's conclusion that possession had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis or his conclusion regarding possession based on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's order awarding sole custody of the parties' daughter to the respondent in Nova Scotia and adjusting the respondent's contribution to certain section 7 expenses.

The trial judge had heard evidence over three phases spanning more than two years.

While the respondent sought custody of both children, the trial judge found it was in the daughter's best interests to reside with the respondent in Nova Scotia, considering factors including the presence of both sets of grandparents in Nova Scotia, the daughter's wishes, the Office of the Children's Lawyer's recommendation, and the appellant's greater engagement with the son's hockey career.

The appellant also sought to admit fresh evidence regarding post-judgment access problems and non-payment of support.

Two appellants were convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence arising from a home invasion in Mississauga.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence, cell phone tower records, Blackberry Messenger text messages, and circumstantial inferences to establish identity.

The appellants challenged their convictions on various grounds, including the reasonableness of the verdicts and the admissibility of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction appeals, finding the trial judge properly considered the cumulative effect of the evidence and correctly applied exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Both appellants received nine-year sentences; the Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals but allowed the sentence appeals in part by setting aside victim fine surcharges and adjusting presentence custody credits.

The appellants appealed from an order for sale under the Partition Act.

The Court of Appeal found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as appeals from orders under the Partition Act lie to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company appealed a motion judge's decision that Pembridge Insurance Company of Canada had no duty to defend Dennis Chu and John Chu from claims arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The underlying claim involved allegations that Dennis Chu drove negligently and subsequently engaged in threatening and assaultive conduct toward another driver.

The motion judge found that Pembridge's homeowner policy exclusions for vehicle-related claims and intentional acts precluded coverage.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by making factual findings inappropriate at the duty to defend stage, by failing to apply the proper legal test comparing pleadings to policy language, and by conflating the duty to defend with the duty to indemnify.

The court declared that the Chus were entitled to a defence under Pembridge's homeowner policy.

The appellant appealed a 20-year sentence of imprisonment imposed in 2014 for historical sexual offences committed in 1981 and 1993.

The appellant pleaded guilty to rape, sexual assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, robbery, and uttering death threats.

The sentencing judge imposed consecutive sentences emphasizing the need to separate the offender from society based on his high risk assessment and violent criminal record.

The appellant challenged the sentence on multiple grounds, including claims regarding the weight given to mitigating factors and the impact of pre- and post-sentence solitary confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence entirely fit given the circumstances of the offences, the offender's criminal history, and the sentencing objectives of denunciation and public protection.

The appellant appealed her conviction for attempting to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking and her sentence of 9 years imprisonment (less 36 days credit for pre-trial custody).

The conviction arose from the appellant's pickup of a shipment containing 3.3 kilograms of heroin that had been intercepted at Pearson International Airport and replaced with a control sample by police.

The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of misapprehension of evidence and unreasonableness of verdict, and sought sentence reduction based on alleged errors in principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge's findings of fact and sentencing decision to be reasonable and fit.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim as incomprehensible and non-compliant with Rule 25.06.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in applying Rule 2.1 as a substitute for addressing pleading defects, the appeal was dismissed on the substantive ground that the appellant lacked standing to advance the claim.

The claim concerned errors by lawyers retained by her fiancé and insurance payments owed to him.

Upon the fiancé's death in 2015, any such rights devolved to his estate, not to the appellant personally.

The appellant's assertion that she was the executor of a will was unsupported by evidence.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing their motion seeking a declaration that a default judgment against the respondent Chris Mace survived his bankruptcy under sections 178(1)(d) and 178(1)(h) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellants obtained a default judgment by having the Registrar sign it under Rule 19.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which is limited to claims for "a debt or liquidated demand in money." The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the generic pleadings in the statement of claim were insufficient to establish the type of misconduct required for exemption under section 178(1)(d), and that the motion judge was not required to go beyond the pleadings to make fresh findings of fact.