Janet M. Simmons

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and manslaughter in relation to the deaths of two sisters.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge made several evidentiary errors, including admitting frail eyewitness non-identification evidence, excluding evidence of the co-accused's motive and prior bad acts, admitting hearsay statements of the deceased, and failing to properly instruct the jury on the defence theory regarding the co-accused's prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

Following the release of the court's endorsement in the appeals, counsel for the respondents wrote to the court concerning the disposition of the agreed upon costs.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum awarding costs of $14,000 to the estate trustee and another $14,000 to the bank, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The parties were common law spouses who separated after 23 years.

The trial judge awarded the respondent lump sum spousal support of $135,000, finding that the appellant had hidden assets and there was a real risk he would not pay periodic support.

The appellant appealed, arguing that lump sum support should only be awarded in very unusual circumstances based on prior case law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the court's discretion to award lump sum support is not restricted to rare cases, and upheld the trial judge's decision based on the appellant's non-disclosure and the need for a clean break.

The respondents obtained summary judgment in the Louisiana Bankruptcy Court against the appellants on personal guarantees.

The respondents applied to enforce the judgments in Ontario.

The appellants argued the Louisiana Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The motion judge dismissed this argument, noting the appellants had raised the issue in Louisiana and failed to appeal the foreign court's ruling that it had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was not open to the appellants to re-litigate the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in Ontario after participating in the foreign proceedings and failing to appeal the jurisdictional ruling.

The mother appealed a decision granting Crown wardship with no access for her two younger children.

The trial judge had differentiated the situation of the older children, who were given a chance to reintegrate with the mother, from the younger children, who were doing well in foster care and had no alternative placement if reintegration failed.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's individual assessment of the best interests of each child and upheld the disposition of Crown wardship with no access.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy and in excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy while babysitting at the premises.

However, the court found the trial judge failed to make clear findings on police misconduct and the impact of the breach on the accused's Charter interests under the pre-Grant Collins test.

As the court could not conduct the required Grant analysis, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the trial judge gave only conclusory reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and made no comments about the complainant's evidence on Counts 1 and 2.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in drawing inferences from video evidence regarding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's blow significantly contributed to the victim's rupture was amply supported by the record.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for possession for the purpose of trafficking in slightly more than a pound of cocaine.

The Court of Appeal noted that the normal range for a first-time offender in such cases is 5 to 8 years, and the sentence imposed fell below this norm.

However, due to unusual circumstances involving fairness concerns regarding how the respondent was persuaded to plead and litigation risks, the court declined to intervene and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent's bail hearing was delayed by four days due to an illegal strike by correctional officers.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding the delay and the strike shocked the conscience of the community.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the stay, holding that the illegal strike was not state misconduct, the delay was brief, and there was no evidence of actual prejudice to the respondent.

The youth pleaded guilty to offences arising from two armed robberies where a co-offender used a sawed-off shotgun.

The sentencing judge declined the Crown's application to designate the offences as serious violent offences (SVO) under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, finding an insufficient nexus between the youth's actions as a party and the serious psychological harm suffered by the victims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the standard criminal law test for causation applies to the SVO definition and that the youth's conduct was a significant contributing cause of the harm.

The SVO designation was made for the second set of offences, rendering the deferred custody sentence illegal, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The appellant, a social worker, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault involving two former patients.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that consent was vitiated by an abuse of trust, that the trial judge's interventions compromised trial fairness, and that improper use was made of a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence and that the trial was fair.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding the costs of an appeal.

The court awarded the respondents costs in the total amount of $60,000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes, to be divided $35,000 to the respondent corporation and $25,000 to the individual respondents.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and breach of recognizance, arguing the trial judge erred by using evidence from a voir dire in the trial proper.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly used the voir dire evidence to bolster his assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed sentence in a case involving prolonged sexual abuse of three child victims by a family member in a position of trust.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of two years' imprisonment plus probation, despite stating that a three-year custodial sentence would otherwise be appropriate.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentence failed to adequately reflect denunciation and deterrence, marked a departure from the governing case law, and was manifestly unfit in the context of multiple victims.

The appeal was allowed and a global sentence of four years' imprisonment was substituted, with the remaining orders continuing except for probation.

The appellant appealed from two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his detention at a minimum security unit.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in failing to grant him an absolute or conditional discharge, asserting he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board did not improperly shift the burden of proof and that its conclusion regarding the appellant's threat to public safety was reasonable based on the expert evidence.

The Court also held that a conditional discharge was not realistic given the appellant's failure to comply with hospital conditions.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a robbery conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle by failing to advert to pre-sentence custody in her reasons.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by 80 days.

The appellants, residents of Ecuador, brought negligence actions against Copper Mesa Mining Corporation, its directors, and the TSX defendants for alleged human rights abuses committed by security forces in connection with a mining project in Ecuador.

The appellants claimed the TSX defendants owed a duty of care not to list Copper Mesa's shares, and the directors owed a duty to avoid acts contributing to the abuses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision to strike the claims under Rule 21.01(1)(b), finding that the pleadings failed to establish the requisite foreseeability and proximity under the Cooper-Anns test to ground a novel duty of care.

The respondent pled guilty to aggravated assault and was convicted of assault with a weapon after striking one victim with a beer bottle and another with a sword at a house party.

The trial judge imposed a six-month conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that while a conditional sentence was open to the trial judge, the duration and terms were wholly inadequate to address denunciation and general deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and the conditional sentence was increased to two years less seven days, with house arrest for the first seven months.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with criminal negligence causing death while street racing.

The young person acted as the 'flag man' to start a street race that resulted in the death of one of the drivers.

The trial judge had granted a directed verdict of acquittal, finding the young person's participation insufficient to cause death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to properly consider party liability under section 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court clarified that the mens rea for an aider to criminal negligence causing death requires intentional assistance of the negligent conduct with knowledge of the principal's intentions, and objective foresight that bodily harm would result.