James A. Ramsay

The landlords appealed and the tenant cross-appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board regarding an illegal lock-out and harassment.

The landlords abandoned their appeal.

On the cross-appeal, the tenant argued the Board erred in law by failing to address his claim for general damages for pain and suffering, despite finding compelling evidence of harassment and illegal lock-out.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the Board's failure to address the claim rendered the decision incapable of appellate review.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal and ordered the landlords to pay $5,000 in general damages.

The tenant appealed orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Board had initially ordered eviction for rent arrears, but upon review, allowed the landlord to withdraw its application after the tenant paid the arrears.

The tenant argued the landlord could not withdraw the application after the hearing started.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law as the Board had granted permission for the withdrawal, and noting the appeal was moot since there was no longer a live controversy between the parties.

The plaintiff sought a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring the defendants to remediate a drainage channel that was allegedly causing flooding on its property.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants had obstructed the channel in breach of a municipal by-law and committed nuisance.

The court found a strong prima facie case but dismissed the motion, holding that the balance of convenience did not favour an injunction given the complexity of the required remediation and that the plaintiff's ten-year delay in seeking relief cast doubt on the prospect of irreparable harm.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering a 15% rent reduction for tenants after the landlord unilaterally removed on-site storage lockers to build new rental units.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's determinations regarding the unreasonableness of the landlord's actions and the quantum of the rent reduction were questions of mixed fact and law, which are not subject to statutory appeal.

The Court also held that the Board did not breach procedural fairness by crafting a global remedy for all affected tenants without requiring each individual tenant to testify.

The appellant insurer appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision which held that Employment Insurance (EI) sickness benefits were not deductible from the respondent's Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the adjudicator erred in law by creating an ambiguity where none existed and by distinguishing sickness benefits from other EI benefits.

The Court held that all EI benefits, including sickness benefits, fall within the definition of gross employment income and must be deducted from IRBs at the rate of 70 per cent.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that upheld the employer's random drug testing policy for safety-sensitive positions at the airport.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable because it departed from established arbitral jurisprudence without justification.

Specifically, the arbitrator upheld the policy without any evidence of a workplace drug problem at the airport, relying instead on evidence from a different case involving a different workplace.

The application for judicial review was granted, the award was set aside, and the grievance was remitted to a new arbitrator.

The plaintiffs, minority shareholders, brought a motion for a mandatory interlocutory injunction seeking reinstatement to the board of directors and an order compelling the corporation to declare dividends.

The plaintiffs had previously sued the corporation and majority shareholders for $7.5 million for conspiracy, fraud, and oppression.

The court dismissed the request for mandatory injunctions, finding the plaintiffs did not establish a strong prima facie case for reinstatement due to their conflict of interest, nor for an immediate dividend distribution while the corporation's liability in the lawsuit remained undetermined.

However, the court granted a non-mandatory injunction preserving the status quo by prohibiting the corporation from expending funds outside the ordinary course of business.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action following the death of their family member from a delayed splenic rupture two weeks after a fall.

The deceased had been treated by the defendant surgeon at the hospital and subsequently cleared to return to work by the defendant family doctor.

The court found that neither doctor breached the standard of care, as objective evidence at the time did not indicate a splenic injury.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, finding it likely that an intervening trauma caused the fatal rupture.

The action was dismissed.

The testatrix executed her will on the back deck of her insurance agency during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicant, the testatrix's daughter and named executrix, sought to prove the will.

The two attesting witnesses, former employees of the testatrix who subsequently worked for the respondent, claimed they did not see the testatrix sign the will.

The court found the attesting witnesses lacked credibility, noting one witness refused to sign an affidavit of execution due to a dispute over severance pay.

The court accepted the applicant's evidence that the will was properly executed in the presence of both witnesses and declared the document to be the valid last will and testament.

The applicant political party sought judicial review of the Chief Electoral Officer's responses to its complaints regarding the exclusion of its candidates from third-party organized election debates.

The applicant argued that the exclusion constituted illegal campaign contributions and violated Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Chief Electoral Officer's disposition of the complaints did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision and did not affect any legal rights or privileges, and therefore was not subject to judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The applicant, a medical resident, was suspended and required to attend a health program.

He unsuccessfully appealed the suspension through the university's internal processes before filing an application with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario alleging discrimination.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as an abuse of process, finding the applicant had unfairly split his case.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review post-Vavilov and upheld the Tribunal's decision, concluding it was not unreasonable to find that duplicative proceedings regarding the same underlying facts were unfair to the university.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring her to pay table amount child support, arguing the judge erred by failing to apply the undue hardship test under section 10(1) of the Child Support Guidelines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly identified the legal test but was unable to apply it due to the appellant's failure to provide sufficient evidence of her income and means.

The court found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish undue hardship.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting the respondent sole decision-making authority over their child.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence and finding a material change in circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that hearsay evidence is admissible on a motion to change under the Family Law Rules, and that compelling evidence, including the child's escalating behavioural crisis and the parents' inability to communicate, supported the finding of a material change.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a temporary order placing his partner's daughter into the care of the children's aid society.

A subsequent temporary order replaced the appealed order, placing the child with her mother under supervision.

The Divisional Court found the appeal legally moot because the controversy over the child's placement had been removed by the subsequent order.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal and dismissed it.

The moving parties sought to set aside an order dismissing their personal injury action on consent, arguing that the primary plaintiff was a person under disability at the time of the settlement and that the settlement was unconscionable.

The court found that the plaintiff had the capacity to understand the information relevant to the settlement and appreciate its consequences, and was therefore not under disability.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the plaintiff had been under disability, the circumstances did not warrant setting aside a final judgment four years later, especially where the defendant settled in good faith and the plaintiffs could not return the settlement funds.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision that lifted a writ of execution against the respondent's property.

The motion judge found that the appellant's collection agent had agreed to settle the entire judgment debt of over $17,000 for a payment of $10,000, which the respondent paid.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law in the motion judge's conclusions regarding the agent's authority to settle and the interpretation of the settlement agreement.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of a non-residential lease.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 to stay proceedings based on an arbitration clause and to strike claims against the individual defendant, Linda Ross, for interference with contractual relations and oppression under the Business Corporations Act.

The plaintiffs cross-moved for a discovery plan.

The court dismissed the motion to stay, interpreting the arbitration clause as applying only to rent for extended terms, not collection of unpaid rent.

The court struck the claim for interference with contractual relations against Linda Ross based on the Said v. Butt doctrine.

The court also struck the oppression remedy claim and personal liability claim against Linda Ross, finding that the pleadings did not establish a basis for piercing the corporate veil or an actionable tort beyond a breach of contract by the corporation.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for a discovery plan was granted.

The court issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

The defendant sought her costs.

The plaintiff argued costs should be denied due to the defendant's conduct giving rise to the litigation.

The court rejected this argument, noting the defendant's conduct in the litigation was appropriate.

Costs were awarded to the defendant in the amount of $2,500 for leave and $5,000 for the appeal, though limited because the co-defendant hospital made the majority of the submissions.

Two groups of landowners appealed the Surveyor General's confirmation of a survey that extended road allowances to the water's edge of Georgian Bay, separating their properties from the beach.

The appellants argued the Surveyor General erred by ignoring a previous Divisional Court decision, misapplying common law principles of accretion, and rejecting estoppel arguments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding the Surveyor General made reasonable findings of fact supported by evidence, including that no accretion had occurred and that the original 1820s survey intended the road allowances to reach the water.

The court held the standard of review was correctness for law and palpable and overriding error for fact, and found no such errors.

The applicant, a person with disabilities, had used specialized transit services unconditionally for 8 years.

The respondent reviewed his eligibility and changed it to conditional, requiring him to use conventional transit for part of his trip accompanied by a personal care assistant at his own expense.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court found the decision unreasonable as it erected a barrier rather than removing one, contrary to the purpose of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act.

The decision was quashed and the applicant's unconditional eligibility was restored.