Gary W. Tranmer

The accused, a registered massage therapist, was charged with sexual assault after allegedly touching a client's vaginal area during a treatment session.

The Crown argued the touching was sexual and non-consensual, while the accused claimed he was performing a legitimate therapeutic adjustment of the pubic symphysis.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the touching was sexual in nature, leading to an acquittal on the sexual assault charge.

However, the court found that the accused failed to obtain informed consent to touch the complainant's pubic bone area, resulting in a conviction for common assault.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the respondent's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The respondent was initially arrested for driving while prohibited, but the officer subsequently began an impaired driving investigation without informing the respondent of the change in focus and delayed providing rights to counsel for four and a half minutes while asking incriminating questions.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error of law in the trial judge's findings of Charter breaches and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a life sentence, sought habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from minimum to medium security and his involuntary transfer to a medium-security institution.

The transfer was based on his inappropriate interactions with administrative staff, accessing restricted areas, and possession of a contraband cell phone.

The court applied the reasonableness standard of review from Vavilov and found the Warden's decision was justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The court also reviewed a sealed affidavit and concluded the respondent met its procedural fairness and disclosure obligations under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of offences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, applied to adduce fresh evidence on his summary conviction appeal.

The proposed evidence included various documents and correspondence related to his bankruptcy proceedings.

The court applied the Palmer test and dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence either did not meet the criteria for admission, was not fresh, or raised new Charter issues that should have been litigated at trial.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(a) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, who commenced the action while residing in Ontario, were subsequently posted to Colorado due to the husband's military service.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' move was not a free choice to avoid a costs order, and they retained exigible assets in Ontario, including an RRSP and federal wages.

The court also found the action was not frivolous or vexatious.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, sought to confirm his right to a trial by judge and jury.

The Crown argued that the accused must be tried by judge alone because the Crown had not expressly consented to the accused's re-election to a jury trial at the assignment court.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the Crown's conduct at the assignment court, where the Crown Attorney actively participated in scheduling a jury trial without objection, constituted a clear and unequivocal waiver of the procedural requirement for express consent.

The court confirmed the accused's right to a trial by judge and jury.

The applicant, a federal inmate, sought an order in the nature of habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from minimum to medium security and his involuntary transfer.

He argued that the decision was unlawful due to procedural unfairness, specifically regarding the withholding of information.

The court, applying the principles from Mission Institution v. Khela, found that the prison authorities had met their onus to prove that the decision was procedurally fair and reasonable.

The authorities had reasonable grounds to withhold certain information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to protect safety and security, and the disclosed information, along with the sealed affidavit, supported the reliability of sources and the lawfulness of the decision.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim and add parties.

The defendants consented to the amendments but sought costs thrown away for steps already taken, including preparing the original statement of defence and securing productions.

The court dismissed the claim for costs thrown away, finding that the motion was not a last-minute application and the steps taken were not redundant or useless.

The court noted that the defendants could claim these costs at trial if successful.

The appellant appealed his conviction for wilfully killing a dog without lawful excuse.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by placing the burden on the accused to prove lawful excuse on a balance of probabilities.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the error engaged fundamental principles of criminal law and that the case against the accused was not so overwhelming that a properly instructed jury would have inevitably convicted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The court addressed a jurisdictional question regarding whether a judge sitting alone could hear and decide the issue of not criminally responsible (NCR) after a jury had returned a verdict of manslaughter and been discharged.

Both Crown and defence counsel jointly submitted that the judge had such jurisdiction, arguing it was supported by inherent court powers, trial fairness, and fundamental justice principles, and would avoid further delays and appeals.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it was supported in law and consistent with public interest and the principles of fundamental justice.

The applicant, an inmate serving a life sentence, was granted three unescorted temporary absences (UTAs) by the Parole Board of Canada.

After completing two, his third UTA was cancelled because the designated halfway house withdrew its support.

The applicant sought a writ of habeas corpus to compel the third UTA.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not suffered a deprivation of liberty because the prerequisite condition for his release was never fulfilled.

Furthermore, the court declined jurisdiction because the Corrections and Conditional Release Act provides a complete and comprehensive statutory regime for reviewing such administrative decisions.

The applicant, Timothy Allan Wood, challenged the decision of the acting Warden of Joyceville Institution to reclassify him to medium security risk and involuntarily transfer him to Collins Bay, a medium security institution, via an application for habeas corpus.

The court found a critical inconsistency between the correctional authorities' claim of relying on "believed reliable source information" and testimony that no reliability assessment was conducted for inmate sources.

Citing *Mission Institution v. Khela*, the court determined that the record did not meet the principles for reliable evidence, rendering the reclassification and transfer decision unlawful.

The application was granted.

The applicant, identifying as Grand Chief of the Kinakwii indigenous people, brought a habeas corpus application seeking to stay ongoing Criminal Code proceedings and discharge his bail recognizance.

He argued that due to a broader indigenous land claim, he is not subject to the laws of Canada.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the pending land claim does not negate the jurisdiction of the Criminal Code over alleged criminal activity in Canada, and the Crown met its onus to prove the deprivation of liberty was lawful.

The applicant, an inmate, challenged the Warden's decision to reclassify him from medium to maximum security and involuntarily transfer him, via an application for habeas corpus.

The applicant argued the decisions were unreasonable and procedurally unfair due to insufficient disclosure and improper gisting of information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and Commissioner's Directive 701.

The court reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that the prison authorities strictly complied with disclosure obligations and procedural fairness principles as outlined in Mission Institution v. Khela.

The court also found the reclassification and transfer decision to be reasonable, falling within the range of acceptable outcomes and supported by the record, deferring to the expertise of prison authorities.

The application for habeas corpus was dismissed.

Braebury Development Corporation appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding two issues: the proration of an insurance premium and the validity of a steel audit report used to justify a price reduction in a purchase agreement.

The appeal court dismissed both grounds of appeal.

It found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision to prorate the insurance premium.

On the steel audit issue, the court affirmed that the "Christmas Steel Report" did not constitute a "thorough audit" as required by the purchase agreement, and therefore, Braebury was not entitled to the claimed price reduction.

The plaintiff moved for leave to deliver and file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim to add the Ottawa Police Services Board as a defendant and expand on allegations against the RCMP.

The defendants opposed the amendment and alternatively moved to strike portions of it for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted leave to amend the claim, finding no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

However, the court struck several paragraphs of the proposed amended claim, including a statute-barred claim against the police board and Charter claims unsupported by pleaded facts, while allowing claims for negligent investigation and harassment to proceed.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for assaulting her two children.

On appeal, she argued that the trial judge erred by admitting a letter she wrote to her daughter, by applying different standards to the credibility assessments of the accused and the complainant, and by misapplying the W. (D.) test.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the trial judge applied the correct test for admitting the letter, did not apply different standards to credibility, and correctly applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the totality of the evidence rather than treating the case as a mere credibility contest.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80', arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when police failed to facilitate contact with his lawyer of choice at the roadside.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by focusing solely on the appellant's due diligence without first determining whether the police had fulfilled their initial implementation duties under s. 10(b).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, a dangerous offender serving an indeterminate sentence, brought an application for habeas corpus to challenge his involuntary transfer from Bath Institution to Collins Bay Institution.

The transfer occurred after prison authorities discovered he was involved in an inappropriate relationship with the prison chaplain.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that the transfer between two medium-security institutions constituted a significant reduction in his residual liberty.

This decision addresses costs following a successful motion by the defendants.

The defendants sought costs, but their Rule 49 offer was not strictly compliant with timing requirements.

The court found the time expended by the defendants' counsel to be excessive.

Ultimately, the court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs, fixed at $3,300.00 for fees plus HST and $507.66 for disbursements, emphasizing the importance of reasonable expectations and a fit and just award.