Gary W. Tranmer

The applicant, Steven Forster, sought a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid and relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter, challenging the validity of his 1988 dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued jurisdictional errors by the trial court, including lack of notice, unlawful psychiatric remand, absence from court, and the trial judge's failure to exercise discretion.

The respondent, Attorney General of Canada, moved to strike the application, arguing it was a collateral attack on a decision previously appealed and that the court should decline habeas corpus jurisdiction where an appellate route was available.

The court found that the challenges raised by the applicant were available to him during his 1995 appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had upheld the indeterminate sentence and implicitly the dangerous offender finding.

Distinguishing the case from precedents like *R. v. Gamble* and *Gallichon v. Canada*, where applicants challenged ongoing deprivation of liberty due to changes in law, the court concluded that Forster's application was an attempt to circumvent appeal rights already exercised.

The respondent's motion to dismiss the application was granted.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship for adoption of the child A.P.E. The mother, as appellant, presented fresh evidence of improved parenting and a new support plan.

The court found that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to apply the full two-pronged test for summary judgment as outlined in Hryniak v. Mauldin, and by not considering less disruptive alternatives to Crown wardship.

The appeal was granted, the Crown wardship order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

The court also directed the Children's Aid Society to renew access and engage in concurrent planning.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, arguing it failed to disclose a cause of action for ownership or vesting of cottage land.

The court found the statement of claim did not sufficiently plead the requirements for a gift, nor did it allege trust, proprietary estoppel, unjust enrichment, or detrimental reliance.

Given the pleadings, particularly the deceased's stated intention not to convey due to tax liability, the court concluded it was plain, obvious, and beyond doubt that the plaintiffs' claims could not succeed as pleaded.

The defendants' motion was granted.

The appellant, Ming Ning Karl Zhao, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault.

He raised three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's psychological state, and an unreasonable verdict for unlawful confinement.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds, finding that while the trial judge's comments were at times inappropriate, they did not demonstrate bias.

The court also concluded there was no material misapprehension of evidence and that the evidence supported the unlawful confinement conviction.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for general damages, a catastrophic impairment designation, and income replacement benefits arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims for general damages and catastrophic impairment, finding no evidence to support the bad faith claim and no expert evidence establishing that the plaintiff met the statutory definition of catastrophic impairment.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding income replacement benefits, finding that conflicting medical evidence about whether the plaintiff's seizure disorder and cognitive decline were caused by the accident or a pre-existing condition created a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff, a former insurance producer, sued DLK Insurance Brokers Ltd. and its partners for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, claiming he was promised an ownership interest in the business.

The defendants denied any such agreement and counterclaimed for a deficit in the plaintiff's commissions and damages for soliciting clients after his resignation.

The court found the plaintiff not credible, dismissed his claims for lack of a proven contract or unjust enrichment, and also dismissed the defendants' counterclaims for the commission deficit (due to forgiveness) and lost business (due to insufficient evidence of solicitation by the plaintiff alone).

Following an appeal, the successful respondent sought costs.

The court considered the respondent's reasonable offers to settle, which were less favourable than the final outcome, alongside the Rule 57 factors.

Finding the claimed amount of $8,218.80 excessive, the court fixed costs at $6,500 for fees plus HST and $386.46 for disbursements.

The appellant, Andrew Wilby, a police officer, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving.

The conviction arose from an incident where he drove his police cruiser onto a sidewalk, colliding with a fleeing suspect, Cammalleri, during an apprehension attempt.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by using speculation, applying a harsher standard of scrutiny to defence evidence, and rendering an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court found that the trial judge was entitled to reject certain defence evidence and draw inferences that logically flowed from the accepted facts, including that the appellant deliberately drove onto the sidewalk to obstruct the suspect's path.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or the application of the dangerous driving test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge a correctional decision to transfer him from Millhaven Institution (maximum security, segregation) to Stony Mountain Institution (maximum security, general population).

The applicant argued that the proposed transfer would significantly reduce his residual liberty by impacting family contact, access to support organizations, and likely leading to renewed segregation.

The court found no factual basis for these claims, noting a lack of evidence regarding family visits, the speculative nature of lost support, and mere speculation concerning future segregation.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate a deprivation of residual liberty required for habeas corpus relief, as the transfer was considered a lateral move not amounting to a substantial change in incarceration conditions.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, David Simms, appealed a Small Claims Court decision that found him liable for damages.

The appeal raised four issues: whether the trial judge erred in finding the appellant's conduct was motivated by revenge for his son, whether the judge erred in rejecting the defence of self-defence, and appeals against the awards of punitive damages ($3000) and general damages ($5000).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on any of the issues, as they were supported by evidence.

The defendant, Imperial Oil Ltd., moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (Valco Instruments Canada Corporation) action for damages in negligence and nuisance due to petroleum hydrocarbon (PHC) migration.

Imperial Oil argued the claim was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, having been discovered in 2001 or 2006, and that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding continuing nuisance.

The court found the claim for initial damages was discovered in 2006, making it statute-barred by October 2008.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding continuing nuisance, specifically whether there has been ongoing migration of PHCs from the defendant's property to the plaintiff's property since November 4, 2009, and the extent of resulting damages.

The motion for summary judgment was granted in part, dismissing the initial claim but allowing the continuing nuisance claim to proceed to trial.

Following a motion to vary an order concerning their mother's care and estate, the parties made submissions on costs.

The court found that the moving parties (two of the siblings) engaged in unreasonable litigation conduct that unnecessarily lengthened and delayed the proceedings.

Costs were awarded to the Public Guardian and Trustee, Section 3 counsel, BMO Trust Company, and the responding siblings.

To sanction the moving parties' conduct while recognizing the estate's ability to pay, the court ordered the costs to be paid from the mother's estate, with 50% of those costs to be set off against the moving parties' future inheritance.

The moving parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

The applicant sought a declaration that all of his concurrent sentences for multiple drug trafficking and proceeds offences were eligible for accelerated parole review (APR) despite the repeal of the APR regime on March 28, 2011.

Some offences occurred before the repeal date while others occurred afterward.

The court considered the interaction of s. 11(i) of the Charter with the repeal of APR and the authorities interpreting eligibility for offenders whose conduct straddled the repeal date.

The court held that although APR may theoretically apply to offences committed before the repeal, it could not be extended to later offences simply because they were sentenced together.

On the facts, the repeal did not increase the applicant’s incarceration period because the later offences independently required longer incarceration.

A federal inmate brought an application for habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from medium to maximum security and transfer to another institution.

The applicant argued that correctional authorities breached procedural fairness by withholding information relied upon in the transfer decision and that the decision was unreasonable.

The court reviewed the disclosure process under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the principles set out in Mission Institution v. Khela.

After reviewing a sealed affidavit explaining the withheld information and the reliability of confidential sources, the court found that the correctional authorities lawfully invoked s. 27(3) and disclosed sufficient summaries to allow the applicant to meet the case against him.

The court further held that the transfer decision fell within the range of reasonable outcomes supported by the evidentiary record.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a sentence in a maximum security institution, applied for a writ of habeas corpus after his request to transfer to a medium security institution was denied.

The warden maintained his maximum security classification despite a psychological assessment and Security Reclassification Scale indicating medium security.

The court dismissed the application, holding that maintaining an existing security classification does not constitute a deprivation of liberty, and therefore habeas corpus is not available.

The applicant, Tammy Hilda Amey, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

She was charged jointly with two co-accused in relation to a cocaine trafficking operation.

The total delay was 31 months.

The court found that 11 months of the delay was attributable to the unavailability of a co-accused's counsel, which did not breach the applicant's rights as the Crown was not yet obliged to sever her charges.

The remaining 8.5 months of Crown and institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

Finding no actual prejudice, the court dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of making decisions regarding admission to a care facility.

She argued the Board erred in law and fact, including by allegedly applying a best interests test rather than the statutory capacity test.

The court reviewed the Board’s decision under a reasonableness standard and applied the governing principles from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding capacity to consent.

The court found the Board properly articulated and applied the legal test and that its conclusion that the appellant lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of leaving the care facility was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

An inmate brought an application for habeas corpus challenging the Correctional Service of Canada's decision to reclassify and transfer him from a medium security institution to a maximum security institution.

The inmate argued the decision lacked legislative authority under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and violated s. 7 of the Charter as arbitrary and grossly disproportionate.

The court reviewed the administrative record and applied the reasonableness framework set out in Mission Institution v. Khela, emphasizing deference to prison authorities in matters affecting institutional security.

The court found the decision was justified by repeated inappropriate conduct toward correctional staff and aggressive behaviour during a segregation escort.

The transfer decision was held to fall within the range of acceptable outcomes supported by the evidence and governing legislation.

The applicants sought a variance of a restraint order under s. 462.34(4)(c) of the Criminal Code to permit the release of restrained funds for reasonable living and legal expenses while facing fraud and proceeds of crime charges.

The court reviewed the statutory criteria requiring proof that the applicants had an interest in the funds, lacked other assets or means, and that no other person appeared entitled to the property.

The Crown challenged the sufficiency and accuracy of the applicants’ financial disclosure, pointing to unexplained withdrawals and assets exceeding $895,000.

The court found the applicants failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that they lacked other available assets or means.

The application to vary the restraint order was dismissed.

Following a summary judgment motion in a civil action, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought costs of $12,026.10 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court found that the hourly rates were within the parameters of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but reduced excessive time claimed for preparation of summary judgment motion materials.

The court fixed a fair and reasonable costs award of $10,000 inclusive for the action and the summary judgment motion.