F. Bruce Fitzpatrick

The mortgagee brought a motion for interim mortgage payments on a valid commercial vendor take-back mortgage of approximately $2.7 million arising from the purchase of a tourist lodge.

The moving party sought $15,000 per month commencing August 2025 until trial.

The court ordered the responding parties to pay $12,000 per month commencing February 2026, finding that contractual obligations in commercial contracts are not to be lightly ignored, that the mortgagee was suffering significant economic consequences from non-payment, and that the responding parties failed to provide current financial information to support their claim of hardship.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a temporary order permitting relocation of the child from Thunder Bay to Kenora, Ontario.

The applicant opposed the motion.

The court found that the respondent, as the primary care parent with sole decision-making authority, met the burden of proof under section 16.93(2) of the Divorce Act.

The court authorized the relocation, finding it was in the child's best interests based on the respondent's improved economic circumstances, the child's young age and adaptability, the manageable distance between the two locations, and the respondent's willingness to facilitate the applicant's parenting time.

The court suspended child support obligations pending further agreement or court order and awarded costs to the respondent.

The respondent brought a motion seeking eleven heads of relief in a family law matter involving spousal support, pension and life insurance designations, return of property, and divorce.

The parties cohabited from January 2017, married July 14, 2017, and separated January 7, 2021.

An interim separation agreement dated March 1, 2022 required the respondent to pay $362 per month in spousal support.

The court suspended the spousal support obligation effective October 1, 2025, finding a material change in circumstances based on the duration of support paid relative to the length of the marriage.

The court also revoked the requirement to maintain the applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary on the life insurance policy but maintained the pension beneficiary designation.

The court denied several other relief items and ordered updated financial disclosure by October 24, 2025, with a trial management conference by December 31, 2025.

No costs were awarded.

The Crown brought a forfeiture application pursuant to section 771 of the Criminal Code following the accused's breach of his recognizance of bail.

The accused had pled guilty to three serious drugs and weapons charges and was released on strict conditions, including wearing a GPS monitoring bracelet and residing with his surety.

The accused knowingly removed his GPS bracelet and absconded from his surety.

The court found the accused's conduct constituted a flagrant disregard for the terms of release and ordered forfeiture of the full $200,000 pledged by the accused and the full $50,000 pledged by the surety.

In a family law trial following the separation of a common law couple of over 22 years with three children, the court dismissed the applicant's claim for repayment of an alleged $14,000 loan made to the respondent in September 2018.

The applicant sought repayment plus prejudgment interest, while the respondent denied the funds were a loan and claimed he had provided construction supplies and services in excess of that amount.

After resolving all other outstanding issues including retroactive child and spousal support and section 7 expenses, the court found the applicant had not met her burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that the transaction constituted an enforceable loan.

The court determined the funds were instead a transfer for consideration, representing compensation for the respondent's labour and materials provided for the applicant's business ventures.

During a family law trial, the applicant sought to introduce a handwritten document as evidence of a loan obligation.

The respondent objected on the basis of settlement privilege.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The court found that the document constituted an offer to settle a family law dispute and was therefore inadmissible under Rule 18(8)(b) of the Family Law Rules, which provides that settlement offers shall not be mentioned to the judge until all issues in dispute except costs have been dealt with.

The court also found that the document did not constitute an admission of the alleged debt, as it merely stated an amount would be paid at a particular time without acknowledging liability.

In this family law motion for summary judgment, the respondent father sought a declaration and final order enforcing an alleged binding settlement agreement based on a letter offer sent by the applicant mother in November 2022.

The applicant cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing no binding settlement existed.

The court found that the letter offer was not available for acceptance because: (1) the respondent's counter-offer in December 2022 terminated the original offer under common law contract principles; (2) the letter offer was implicitly time-limited; (3) the letter offer was incomplete, lacking express child support provisions; (4) the applicant had withdrawn the offer through subsequent correspondence; and (5) the respondent attempted to impose additional material terms less favourable to the applicant.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion and granted summary judgment to the applicant, finding no genuine issue requiring trial.

The applicant brought two motions: (1) seeking interim injunctive relief including orders to restrain respondents from acting as directors, restricting access to corporate bank accounts, preserving corporate records, freezing personal assets, granting administrator-level access to corporate systems, and obtaining a Norwich order for bank records; and (2) seeking leave to commence a derivative action under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The motions arose from an oppression remedy application concerning a cannabis retail business.

The court dismissed both motions, finding the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud or misappropriation, did not demonstrate irreparable harm, and failed to satisfy the balance of convenience test.

The court converted the application to an action and imposed a litigation timetable.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal upholding the respondent Commission's Cost of Production Formula for chicken pricing.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal failed to adequately explain its preference for certain expert evidence over others, rendering its reasons conclusory and inadequate.

The application was allowed, the Tribunal's decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.

The applicant sought an order under section 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act to validate a 'pour-over' clause in the deceased's will, which directed the residue of her estate to an inter vivos trust.

The deceased resided in Minnesota, where such clauses are valid, but owned property in Ontario.

The court dismissed the application, holding that pour-over clauses are invalid under Ontario common law and that section 21.1 is intended to cure defects in form, not substantive invalidity.

The defendant, Wilco Contractors Superior Inc., brought a motion to transfer a breach of contract action commenced by Don Anderson Haulage Limited (DAHL) from Newmarket to Thunder Bay.

The court considered the nine factors under Rule 13.01.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the majority of the factors, including the location of the events, damages, and convenience of witnesses, favoured a transfer to Thunder Bay.

The motion was granted, and the action was ordered transferred.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis, with written submissions on costs to follow.

The respondent father brought a motion for contempt against the applicant mother, alleging she failed to facilitate parenting time as required by a recent consent final parenting order.

The court found the mother in contempt for two of the three missed visits, rejecting her argument that her sole decision-making authority allowed her to cancel visits based on the child's expressed anxiety.

The court declined to order further remedies beyond a declaration of contempt and a partial costs award of $2,000, emphasizing the need to end the cycle of constant litigation.

This is a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiff, Kathleen Joanne O’Brien, alleged negligent treatment by the defendant, Dr. Jasjit Lochab, an orthopaedic surgeon, following a hip fracture and subsequent surgery in December 2018.

The parties agreed on damages, leaving liability as the sole issue.

The court found that Dr. Lochab met the standard of care in his choice and use of implant, as well as in his post-operative instructions.

The action was dismissed, with costs awarded to the defendant.

The court dismissed a motion for partial summary judgment brought by Caroline Manon Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute involving Browns Clearwater West Lodge Inc. and related parties.

The court found that the motion did not meet the criteria for partial summary judgment, as it would not make the litigation cheaper, faster, or avoid inconsistent findings.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce a notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management issues.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment brought by Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute.

The court found that the motion did not advance the litigation and that the issues, including the right to set off and the meaning of the contract, required a trial.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce the notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management going forward.

This endorsement addresses an uncontested motion to change a spousal support order.

The respondent, Otto Budziak, sought to terminate his spousal support obligations and recalculate or eliminate arrears.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to a significant reduction in Mr. Budziak’s income and terminated his ongoing support obligation effective March 1, 2025.

However, the court declined to address arrears or withdraw the order from the Family Responsibility Office without further evidence and proper procedure.

The matter of arrears was adjourned, and the applicant, Audrey Duval, was to be served with this endorsement and any new materials.

The accused, Stephan Parr and Amy Rose-Podnar, brought mid-trial applications to exclude certain evidence in their first-degree murder trial.

Ms. Rose-Podnar sought to exclude seven text messages exchanged with a co-accused, Kaveh Lozoomi-Gamroodi, after the murder.

Both accused jointly sought to exclude testimony regarding the timing and number of phone calls between themselves and Dennis Crupi, the owner of a vehicle linked to the murder scene, around the time Crupi was being interviewed by police.

The court granted both applications, finding that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, as its admission would invite impermissible speculation and inferences of bad character, potentially forcing the accused to testify to provide context.

Following a trial where both the plaintiffs' claim and the defendant's counterclaim were dismissed, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had made two global offers to settle that were not accepted by the defendant.

Although the offers did not strictly comply with Rule 49.10, the court considered them under Rule 57.01 and section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant should have accepted the reasonable offers and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs $80,657.12 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

This ruling addresses a question of law during a criminal trial for manslaughter, specifically whether the actions of one of the accused, Mr. Parr, constituted an attempted robbery or mere preparation.

The Crown argued for attempted robbery as a third route to manslaughter conviction.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Cline, R. v. Root, and R. v. Deutsch, found that Mr. Parr's actions, including covering his hand to avoid fingerprints and remaining with an accomplice in the building, were indicative of an attempted robbery, not mere preparation.

The ruling allows this theory to be included in the jury charge.

The accused, Elmi Ibrahim and Samatar Hamadu, brought an application to quash a search warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for premises at 2646 Victoria Ave East, Thunder Bay.

They argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds and contained misrepresentations regarding the primary residence of a key subject, 'Easy'.

The court, applying the Garofoli process, found that the redacted ITO, when read as a whole and considering the affiant's experience and corroborated confidential informant information, provided sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the location.

The court dismissed the application to quash the warrant, ruling the evidence admissible at trial.