Dr. Derek Pallandi

During long‑term offender sentencing proceedings, the defence sought to qualify a psychotherapist as an expert in the risk assessment of sexual offenders.

The proposed expert had administered certain assessment tools and prepared reports concerning the accused’s treatment and recidivism risk.

The court applied the admissibility criteria for expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and examined the witness’s qualifications, training, and professional background.

The judge concluded that the witness lacked sufficient training and expertise in risk assessment methodology to qualify as an expert in that field.

The witness was permitted to testify about treatment methods and testing used in therapy but was prohibited from providing opinion evidence on the accused’s risk of sexual recidivism.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated a dangerous offender following a conviction for assault with a weapon.

The court reviewed extensive evidence of the offender’s criminal history, including 89 prior convictions and numerous violent offences demonstrating a persistent pattern of aggressive and repetitive violent behaviour.

Psychological assessments placed the offender in high‑risk categories for violent recidivism but indicated potential manageability through intensive supervision and treatment in the community.

The court concluded the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation under ss. 752 and 753 of the Criminal Code were met.

However, satisfied that long‑term supervision could adequately protect the public, the court imposed a two‑year sentence (time served) together with a ten‑year long‑term supervision order rather than an indeterminate sentence.

Following convictions for criminal harassment and breaches of probation, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed the offender’s extensive criminal history including numerous sexual offences, violent offences, and repeated breaches of court orders, as well as psychiatric assessments diagnosing schizophrenia, traumatic brain injury, paraphilias, and substance abuse disorders.

Expert evidence established a high risk of future sexual violence and persistent failure to restrain behaviour.

The court concluded the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were met under both s. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii).

The offender failed to establish that community management would adequately protect the public, and the court imposed a penitentiary sentence followed by long‑term supervision.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing and making available child pornography.

The Crown sought a 36-month sentence with various ancillary orders.

The defence sought 18 months concurrent with probation.

The court imposed a 15-month sentence (15 months on the making available charge and 4 months concurrent on the possession charge) followed by three years probation.

The court balanced the paramount sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence against mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior record, good character, community support, and psychiatric evidence indicating low risk of reoffending.

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the Crown brought a Mohan application seeking to qualify a forensic psychiatrist as an expert to give opinion evidence regarding automatism.

The defence argued that the proposed expert’s methodology lacked reliability and that prior judicial criticism of his opinions should preclude qualification.

The court reviewed the admissibility criteria for expert evidence set out in R. v. Mohan, including relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule, and proper qualification.

While acknowledging some concerns about the expert’s prior reports and methodology, the court found that he possessed sufficient expertise in forensic psychiatry and that automatism is primarily a legal concept closely related to dissociative states recognized in psychiatry.

The expert was therefore qualified to give opinion evidence in forensic psychiatry, including on the issue of automatism.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a mid-trial motion for a mistrial, alleging that defence counsel misled the court and the Crown by failing to disclose an interview with a former co-accused before seeking permission to cross-examine him.

The court found that while defence counsel showed poor judgment in not disclosing the interview, the resulting prejudice to the Crown was minimal and theoretical.

Given the late stage of the trial, the strong forensic evidence, and the Crown's own inappropriate conduct during closing addresses, the court concluded that a mistrial was not justified and dismissed the application.

Following convictions for multiple violent offences including assault with a weapon, threats, forcible confinement, and assaults on police, the Crown applied to have the offender declared a Dangerous Offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

Expert psychiatric evidence established a high risk of violent recidivism, particularly in intimate partner relationships, and demonstrated a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour.

Although the statutory criteria for a Dangerous Offender designation were met, the court accepted expert evidence that intensive institutional treatment followed by community supervision could reasonably manage the offender’s risk.

The court therefore imposed a determinate penitentiary sentence followed by a long-term supervision order rather than an indeterminate sentence.

Parole eligibility was delayed to ensure sufficient institutional programming before release.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender following his guilty pleas to aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record involving violence and breaches of court orders.

Psychiatric evidence established that the offender suffered from anti-social personality disorder and substance abuse disorder, placing him at a high risk to violently re-offend.

The court found that the offender met the statutory criteria for a dangerous offender designation.

However, based on the offender's positive institutional behaviour and rehabilitative efforts since his arrest, the court found he rebutted the presumption of an indeterminate sentence.

The court imposed a fixed sentence of seven years (reduced to one year after pre-sentence custody credit) followed by a ten-year Long-Term Supervision Order.

The Crown brought a motion to admit other discreditable conduct evidence in a prosecution for first degree murder after the defence indicated it may raise not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.

The proposed evidence included prior incidents of violence and jealousy within the accused’s relationship with the deceased, as well as unrelated statements reflecting violent and sexual attitudes.

Applying the balancing test from R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential moral and reasoning prejudice.

Evidence from several witnesses describing prior violent conduct toward the deceased and a jealous reaction toward a third party was admitted as contextual evidence relevant to motive and intent.

Evidence concerning unrelated sexually violent remarks was excluded as insufficiently connected to the alleged offence and highly prejudicial.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible (NCR) on charges of criminal harassment and failing to comply with a recognizance.

On appeal, amicus curiae argued that the trial judge erred by failing to hold a fitness hearing, asserting that the appellant's delusional disorder (erotomania) rendered him unfit to stand trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had properly relied on psychiatric reports confirming the appellant's fitness and that the limited cognitive capacity test was met.

An application to admit fresh psychiatric evidence was also dismissed.

The member, a teacher, faced a discipline hearing for professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a student.

The member engaged in inappropriate electronic communications of a personal and sexual nature with a female student, made inappropriate suggestions to other students, and participated in 'spooning' with students during a school trip.

The member pleaded no contest to the allegations.

The Discipline Committee accepted the joint submission on penalty, finding the member guilty of professional misconduct.

The Committee ordered a reprimand, a 12-month suspension (with a portion postponed if certain conditions are met), and terms including the completion of a boundary course and a psychiatric assessment.

The Committee also ordered the publication of the member's name, finding that the severity of the misconduct outweighed the mitigating factors.

The appellant hospital appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to an individual found not criminally responsible for first degree murder.

The Board had previously adjourned the hearing to obtain an independent psychiatric assessment regarding the individual's past criminal involvement.

Despite the assessment failing to resolve these concerns, the Board's majority granted the absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to an unexplained gap in its reasoning regarding the relevance of the past criminal conduct and its failure to address inadequacies in the proposed treatment plan for monitoring medication compliance.

The appellant, a dual status offender under the authority of the Ontario Review Board, was convicted of manslaughter for killing a fellow inmate.

The Crown applied to have him declared a dangerous offender.

The sentencing judge found the statutory criteria met and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued procedural flaws regarding notice and the Attorney General's consent, and that the judge erred in not exercising residual discretion given the Review Board's concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the procedural requirements were met and the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism justified the dangerous offender designation.