Eli S. Lederman

The defendant physician in a medical malpractice action sought an extension under rr. 53.03(4) and 53.08(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to serve three late expert reports.

The court granted the motion with respect to one report, finding that the unexpected death of the originally retained expert constituted a reasonable explanation for the delay.

However, the court denied the motion for the remaining two reports, holding that trial counsel's admitted inattentiveness to the file and deliberate choice to prioritize other matters did not constitute a reasonable explanation, and that the conjunctive test under the amended r. 53.08(1) required dismissal absent satisfaction of that threshold.

The appellant City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it and ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc. (AMD) jointly and severally liable for damages arising from periodic flooding of the respondent National Steel Car Limited's industrial property caused by wastewater discharge into a clogged drainage channel.

The trial judge awarded compensatory damages of approximately $5.3 million (apportioned equally between the defendants), punitive damages of $400,000 against the City and $500,000 against AMD, and granted a mandatory injunction requiring remediation and maintenance of the channel.

The City appealed on four grounds: (1) the equal apportionment of liability; (2) failure to find mitigation by National; (3) the punitive damages award; and (4) the terms of the injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal except for a clarification to the injunction language.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion to reconsider a previous certification ruling that dismissed the action against Maple Leaf Foods Inc. (MLF) in a class action alleging price-fixing.

The Plaintiffs sought to certify the action against MLF, presenting new evidence including a Second Information to Obtain (ITO), MLF's annual reports, Canada Bread's Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a criminal proceeding, and emails from Canada Bread's files.

MLF opposed the motion and brought cross-motions to exclude the new evidence and strike the Plaintiffs' amended claims.

The court dismissed the Plaintiffs' motion, finding that the 'new evidence' was either not new, inadmissible hearsay, or did not substantively alter the lack of a viable cause of action against MLF.

The court emphasized the principle of finality in litigation, stating that a certification dismissal for lack of cause of action is a final order and cannot be revisited without meeting a strict test for new evidence (Sagaz test), which was not met here.

The court also granted MLF's motion to exclude the evidence and strike the amended statements of claim against MLF.

This decision addresses an evidentiary dispute during a trial regarding the admissibility of post-assessment medical reports through a defendant fact witness, Dr. McPherson.

The defendants sought to introduce reports created after Dr. McPherson's last assessment of the plaintiff, Jeremy Veran, to demonstrate improvement in symptoms.

The plaintiffs objected, arguing Dr. McPherson had not seen these documents and was not an expert witness.

The court ruled that documents not seen or received by Dr. McPherson, and not directly relevant to his care of the plaintiff, could not be introduced through him as a fact witness, even if they were part of the joint book of documents.

The defendants brought a motion to address two issues: the admissibility of opinions in two plaintiff expert reports (Miyanji and Levin) and the admissibility of evidence from five lay witnesses.

The court ruled that portions of the Miyanji and Levin reports that did not respond to specific "Defence Expert Reports" or introduced new standard of care issues were inadmissible due to late service and lack of reasonable explanation.

The motion to exclude the lay witnesses was dismissed as premature, with the court stating that the admissibility of their evidence, particularly any opinion evidence, should be assessed at the time it is tendered at trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking several orders before trial, including dismissal of claims against certain defendants, leave to amend their statement of claim, preliminary determination of jury questions, and exclusion of expert evidence.

The court granted the dismissal of claims against the "Released Defendants" without costs, as it was previously agreed upon.

Leave was granted to file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, as the proposed amendments were extensive and did not remove admissions.

The court also determined the format for jury questions, largely adopting the plaintiffs' approach for damages and requiring explanations for answers, emphasizing standard of care and "but for" causation.

The issue of expert evidence was adjourned to a later date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to preclude the defendants from introducing evidence from fifteen expert reports served late in a medical malpractice action.

The court considered the admissibility under Rule 53.08, assessing whether there was a reasonable explanation for the late service and if granting leave would cause irreparable prejudice or undue delay.

The court allowed some reports as supplementary or responding reports, finding a general reasonable explanation for delay due to discovery issues and prior party understanding.

However, it excluded a vocational report that introduced new scenarios without prior notice and a neuropsychological report, reiterating a previous ruling that no neuropsychological impairment issue was pleaded or supported by evidence, and its introduction would cause significant prejudice and necessitate trial adjournment.

Canada Bread Company Limited pleaded guilty to four counts of price-fixing under the Competition Act.

The offences involved agreements with Weston Food Canada Inc. to increase wholesale fresh commercial bread prices, impacting millions of consumers.

The court accepted a joint submission for a total fine of $50 million, allocated across the four counts.

The decision considered aggravating factors such as high planning and coordination, and mitigating factors including the company's cooperation with the Competition Bureau, change in ownership, and implementation of a compliance program.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives, ensuring the fine was significant enough to eliminate profit and not merely a "cost of doing business."

The Court of Appeal heard motions to quash an appeal from a trial judge's order approving a sale process for a family business.

The court found the approval order to be interlocutory, serving as a mechanism to implement remedies from the trial judgment, and thus not determining substantive issues.

The correct appeal route for such an order is to the Divisional Court with leave.

Consequently, the motions to quash the appeal were allowed, and the appellants were granted an extension to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The plaintiff, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., sought court approval under s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, to discontinue a proposed class action against the defendants on a with-prejudice and without-costs basis.

The action, alleging secondary and primary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act, was commenced to preserve claims while a Norwich application was pending.

Following the denial of the Norwich application by Justice Pattillo and its confirmation on appeal, the plaintiff determined the action was no longer viable.

The court approved the discontinuance, finding it was for a proper purpose and would not prejudice putative class members who were unaware of the action.

The plaintiff's request to suspend the discontinuance for 60 days to allow for potential class member action was denied, as no purpose would be served by giving notice or suspending the discontinuance.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal concerning a share purchase agreement with earn-out milestones.

The appellants, former shareholders, alleged breach of contract and the duty of good faith by the respondent's predecessor, Origin House, particularly regarding a delayed transaction closing date impacting milestone payments.

The respondent cross-appealed the lower court's finding of a breach of the duty of honest performance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that a finding of breach of the duty of honest performance does not create a legal presumption of loss without an evidentiary foundation of lost opportunity.

The court allowed the cross-appeal, finding a palpable and overriding error in the lower court's determination that the appellants were unaware of the delayed closing date, thereby setting aside the finding of a breach of the duty of honest performance.

The appellant, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its application for a Norwich order and the quashing of a Rule 39.03 notice of examination.

The appellant, a shareholder of Ceridian HCM Holding Inc., sought pre-action discovery regarding the alleged undervaluation of LifeWorks Corporation Ltd. shares during Ceridian's 2018 distribution and subsequent sale to Morneau Shepell.

The application judge dismissed the Norwich order, finding it unnecessary and not in the interests of justice, and quashed the notice of examination as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision that the appellant had sufficient information to commence its class action and that the Norwich order was not sought for a legitimate purpose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, ALYU Inc., appealed a lower court decision regarding the interpretation of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for commercial units.

ALYU argued that the estimated measurements in the APS should not include a proportional amount of common elements.

The application judge had interpreted the APS to include common elements, dismissing ALYU's application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the contractual interpretation.

The court affirmed that the BOMA 1996 Standard, referenced in the APS, requires the unit area to be "grossed-up" to account for common areas, and that the interpretation aligned with the parties' mutual objective intentions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicants sought damages under a share purchase agreement for revenue and license milestone payments, and a working capital adjustment for tax credits.

The court interpreted the SPA provisions, including the "Unearned Milestone Payment Commitment" in the event of an Indirect Sale Transaction, and considered the purchaser's duty of good faith.

The court dismissed claims for milestone payments, finding the contract terms unambiguous and no actionable breach of good faith regarding impediments to earning milestones.

However, the court found a breach of the duty of honest performance for failing to disclose a delay in the closing date of the Indirect Sale Transaction, but no damages flowed from this breach as the applicants could not prove a lost opportunity.

The applicants were awarded the SR&ED tax credits without deduction for consultant fees.

The applicant sought a Norwich order for pre-action discovery against the respondents to obtain documents relating to a corporate distribution and subsequent acquisition.

The respondents brought motions to quash a notice of examination and for a sealing order over confidential tax information.

The court dismissed the application for a Norwich order, finding the applicant had sufficient information to commence its claims and lacked a legitimate objective.

The court granted the sealing order to protect highly sensitive tax information and quashed the notice of examination as an abuse of process.

Costs decision following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction and the dismissal of the defendant XTM's cross-motion for summary judgment.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to either party.

The court awarded net partial indemnity costs of $25,000 to XTM.

The court also awarded partial indemnity costs of $15,000 to amicus curiae representing the self-represented defendants, and $3,982.69 for disbursements incurred directly by the self-represented defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a mandatory interlocutory injunction against its former Chief Technology Officer and a competitor, seeking the return or destruction of alleged confidential information.

The competitor brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against it.

The court dismissed the injunction motion, finding the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the order, largely due to a 22-month delay in pursuing the motion.

The court also dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the competitor's knowing involvement and the causation of the plaintiff's loss of a major client.

The applicant condominium corporation sought to amend its Declaration under section 109 of the Condominium Act, 1998, to address issues concerning wood-burning fireplaces and chimney flues.

Specifically, it requested amendments to designate chimney flues as exclusive use common elements, to shift the responsibility for their maintenance and repair from the corporation to the unit owners, and to redefine unit boundaries to include the entire length of the chimney flues.

The court granted the order to amend the Declaration to specify the chimney flues as exclusive use common elements, finding an error in the original Declaration's omission to specify such elements.

However, the court dismissed the requests to alter the maintenance and repair obligations, concluding there was no error or inconsistency in the existing mutual duties, and rejected the proposed redefinition of unit boundaries, finding the current description unambiguous.

The Master awarded substantial indemnity costs against the plaintiff, Long Term Recovery Limited (LTR), in favour of the defendants, David Ted Bolden and Antoinette Arian Bolden, following the defendants' successful motion to set aside default judgment.

The court found LTR's opposition to the motion to be aggressive, overly technical, and unreasonable, especially given the low threshold for setting aside default judgment and the defendants' bona fide attempts to retain counsel.

The decision emphasized promoting access to justice and deterring unreasonable interlocutory positions through higher costs awards.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of Luciano Sammut's application for adverse possession.

The respondent, Heather McGhee Peggs, sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the application was commenced to interfere with her property sale.

The court found no reprehensible conduct by the applicant to warrant substantial indemnity costs and determined that Rule 49.10 did not apply to the respondent's offer to settle as the applicant's claim failed.

Considering the importance of the boundary issue, the complexity, and comparable counsel time, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $32,267.53, inclusive of disbursements and HST, to be paid by the applicant.