Dennis R. O'Connor

The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking offences and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

Much of the evidence was derived from wiretaps.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Garofoli application to exclude the wiretap evidence under s. 8 of the Charter, alleging the supporting affidavit was misleading.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police acted in good faith and that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The Court of Appeal previously dismissed the appeal with costs.

In this costs endorsement, the court fixed the costs of the respondents Ivandaeva Total Image Salon Inc. and Denis Ivandaev.

Noting that their counsel provided very little assistance on the central issue of the appeal, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale fixed at $3,000 inclusive of disbursements, plus GST.

The respondent Elena Ivandaeva did not participate and was not awarded costs.

The respondent was charged with criminal harassment based on an information that was a nullity, as the alleged offence date predated the enactment of the criminal harassment provisions.

She was released on a recognizance with non-communication conditions, which she subsequently breached, leading to convictions for failing to comply and failing to appear.

A summary conviction appeal judge quashed the convictions, reasoning that the nullity of the underlying information rendered the release order a nullity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the rule of law requires court orders to be obeyed until they are set aside through due process, even if the underlying information is a nullity.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy related to the illegal entry of individuals into Canada.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting intercepted communications obtained pursuant to Ontario wiretap authorizations that relied on evidence from a Quebec authorization.

The appellant Kullman also argued that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements of his co-conspirator under the Carter approach, arguing it did not meet the necessity and reliability criteria established in Starr.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no jurisdictional defects in the wiretap authorizations and holding that the traditional co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule survives the principled approach established in Starr.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

During deliberations, the jury requested a playback of a specific portion of the appellant's testimony.

The trial judge refused the request, expressing confusion and instructing the jury to continue discussing.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to respond directly to the jury's question and denying them a review of evidence central to the appellant's credibility.

The convictions for the cocaine offences were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages for injuries suffered when he was struck as a pedestrian by an unidentified motor vehicle.

The trial judge found the accident occurred in a vacant parking lot, not on a public highway, and therefore the reverse onus provision under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act did not apply.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant failed to prove the accident happened on a highway and that negligence could not be inferred from the injuries alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents $485,000 for economic loss.

The appellants argued they were denied a fair trial due to a lengthy delay in the delivery of the judgment, that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review, and that the trial judge erred in the standard of proof for calculating lost business profits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no active prejudice from the delay, sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions, and no error in the estimation of economic loss based on the evidence presented.

The respondents appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board after the City of London failed to address their applications for zoning amendments and site plan approval for two apartment buildings.

The Board allowed the appeal in part, approving one building instead of two.

The City appealed to the Divisional Court, which dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the Divisional Court erred in applying a patent unreasonableness standard of review rather than correctness or reasonableness, the result was correct.

The Court also rejected the City's argument that it was denied natural justice, finding that section 88 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act provided adequate notice that the Board could grant partial relief.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding retroactive child support.

The trial judge had concluded there was no evidence that a portion of the respondent's personal injury settlement was attributable to income replacement.

The Divisional Court found this was an error, as correspondence and statutory accident benefits clearly indicated some amount was for income loss.

To avoid further expense, the court fixed retroactive child support at $10,000.

The self-represented applicant filed a notice of motion to review an order refusing leave to extend the time for bringing an appeal, but failed to perfect the motion.

The respondents sought to have the motion dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal declined to dismiss the motion, noting the lack of time limits in the Rules for perfecting such a motion, the applicant's unrepresented status, and the respondents' failure to bring a formal motion to dismiss.

The court scheduled the motion for a full hearing and set strict deadlines for perfection.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 4 months.

The appellant had confined his former girlfriend in the trunk of her car, bound her, and placed a plastic bag and canvas bag over her head secured with duct tape.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions regarding the use of the plastic bag and the appellant's subjective intent to kill were supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the threat conviction, noting it did not require proof of a weapon.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly considered the aggravating factors, including the domestic context and breach of bail.

The appellant, an engineering student, sued the respondent university for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation regarding the transferability of its two-year program to other Ontario universities.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and denied class certification, finding that the appellant's failure to complete one elective course meant he had not met a 'condition precedent' to rely on the representations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was framed in tort, not contract, and therefore no condition precedent applied.

The summary judgment was set aside, and the certification motion was remitted to the Superior Court.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of six drug-related offences, including conspiracy to traffic cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, the W.(D.) credibility framework, the separation of counts, and the definition of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals on the first three grounds, finding the charge as a whole was sufficient.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the possession count, finding the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that responsibility for a bedroom was sufficient for possession of drugs found in an adjacent cupboard and ceiling.

A new trial was ordered for that count, and the global sentence was reduced from seven to six years.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action for failing to pay previously ordered costs and security for costs.

The appellant argued there were procedural deficiencies in how the dismissal order was obtained.

The Court of Appeal found no procedural defects, noting the appellant had been expressly warned that failure to comply by the deadline would result in dismissal without further notice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding her entitlement to Indian status, alleging the Registrar unconstitutionally presumed her unknown paternal grandfather was not an Indian.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Registrar simply applied the Indian Act and did not employ the alleged presumption.

The Court noted the appellant could still challenge the constitutionality of the Indian Act and the Registrar's decision in separate proceedings.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring that the sale of Hydro One shares by the Crown contravened s. 48(1) of the Electricity Act.

Before the appeal was heard, the government withdrew the public offering and enacted new legislation repealing s. 48(1) and expressly authorizing the sale of the shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the legal and factual foundation of the dispute had disappeared and that the circumstances did not justify an exception to the general rule against hearing moot appeals.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that the respondents were entitled to a prescriptive easement over a 66-foot wide road on the appellants' land.

The Court of Appeal found that while the respondents were entitled to an easement, the prescriptive right must be confined to the land continuously used, which did not exceed 25 feet in width.

The appeal was allowed, varying the judgment to limit the easement to the boundaries of the existing roadway, to be determined by a new survey prepared at the respondents' expense.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual touching of his five-year-old stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately warn himself about the frailties of the child's evidence, erred in relying on confirmatory evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding an undisclosed interaction between the Crown and the complainant's mother outside the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and credibility.

The application to admit fresh evidence was dismissed as it did not meet the Babinski test for admission based on non-disclosure.

The appellant's previous counsel was removed from the record shortly before trial, and the appellant was warned the trial would proceed peremptorily.

On the trial date, the appellant sought an adjournment to obtain new counsel and review disclosure, which the trial judge refused.

During the trial, the appellant applied for prohibition and a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to a fair trial was infringed.

The applications judge denied the application, and the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that prerogative remedies should not be sought during a trial and the normal remedy is an appeal at the end of the trial.

The Court also denied the appellant's request to be represented by a non-lawyer agent.

The respondent real estate agent obtained an offer to purchase a property, which triggered a right of first refusal by the vendor's minority shareholders.

The minority shareholders purchased the property, and the appellant brokerage received the commission.

The trial judge found that under the Independent Contractor Agreement and the custom of the trade, the respondent was entitled to 50% of the commission.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissed the appellants' argument regarding unjust enrichment against another agent, and upheld the trial judge's costs order.

The appeal was dismissed.