Dennis R. O'Connor

The Chippewas of Mnjikaning First Nation (MFN) appealed the dismissal of its action claiming a 35% share of net profits from Casino Rama.

MFN argued that its selection as the host site for the casino created a binding contract with Ontario based on its submitted proposal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the site selection process did not constitute a binding tender or RFP process for revenue sharing, and that revenue sharing was intended to be negotiated separately among all First Nations.

The Court also rejected MFN's arguments regarding breach of fiduciary duty, misapprehension of the Aboriginal context, and reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the trial judge's interventions.

The appellant was rendered a tetraplegic after diving into shallow water at a provincial park and striking his head.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant was contributorily negligent, failed to prove he hit a sandbar rather than the lake bottom, and that the sandbars were not a hazard under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge made fundamentally inconsistent findings on factual causation, disregarded relevant expert and eyewitness evidence, and misapprehended the evidence regarding the absence of previous injuries at the park.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, unlawful confinement, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

The Crown alleged she acted as an aider or formed a common intention with the principals under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury instructions were confusing and failed to explain the essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the instructions failed to link the general principles of party liability to the specific offences charged and improperly commingled the alternative grounds of liability.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed an order regarding the compellability of two witnesses and the disclosure of certain memoranda, asserting public interest immunity and deliberative secrecy under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that while certain paragraphs of one memorandum contained statements of fact not covered by deliberative secrecy, the trial judge erred in finding the public interest in disclosure outweighed deliberative secrecy for the remaining information.

The court restricted the scope of questioning and excluded another memorandum from evidence entirely.

The appellant, a judgment creditor of the respondent husband, appealed an order dismissing her motion to enforce her judgment against the proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home.

The appellant had loaned money to the husband, part of which was used to pay down the mortgage.

The motion judge held that under s. 4 of the Creditors' Relief Act, outstanding child support arrears took priority over the appellant's claim against the husband's share of the proceeds.

The motion judge also dismissed the appellant's unjust enrichment claim against the respondent wife's share, finding a juridical reason for the enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision and dismissed the appeal, declining to consider a new argument for an equitable lien.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that a conditional sentence should have been granted and that the trial judge overemphasized deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant posed a danger to the community was supported by the evidence.

The court held that the trial judge did not overemphasize specific and general deterrence given the serious and frightening nature of the offences.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's refusal to set aside an earlier order, the ruling that rule 11.02 did not apply, and the decision to strike their pleadings for non-compliance with a previous order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decisions given the unexplained three-month delay in bringing the motion and the appellants' extensive delays in the action.

Following a successful appeal that dismissed the respondent's class action claim, the appellants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, administering the class proceedings fund, argued against a costs award under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, claiming the case involved novel issues and public interest.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the case merely applied existing Supreme Court precedent.

Costs were awarded to the appellants, fixed at $55,000 for the appeal and $125,000 for the action.

The appellant seized collateral from a third party who had purchased it from the debtor, arguing its security interest attached upon possession under s. 11(2)(b) of the Personal Property Security Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the seizure did not constitute possession sufficient for attachment under s. 11(1) to defeat the third party's interests, as the appellant did not have a signed security agreement prior to the seizure.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an easement claim based on the doctrine of Lost Modern Grant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in limiting the relevant 20-year period to the time before the property's conversion to the Land Titles system in 2001.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law but found the error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The sole witness relied upon by the appellant was deemed unreliable, and the evidence was insufficient to establish the required 20 years of open and continuous use.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking portions of their statement of claim against the respondents, which included claims related to religious indoctrination at a private school.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there is no tort of religious indoctrination and that certain claims were non-justiciable.

However, the Court granted the appellants leave to amend their pleadings to clarify a theory of breach of fiduciary duty based on the respondents' alleged failure to educate the students in accordance with Anglican faith and values.

The Court also restored several paragraphs that had been struck for being redundant, irrelevant, or argumentative.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a claim of civil conspiracy against a respondent solicitor.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the pleaded facts provided no foundation for the claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim against a defendant law firm.

The respondent conceded the motion judge erred in concluding the claim did not plead a cause of action, as the claim pleaded 'knowing assistance' in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the motion judge's order, and granted the appellant leave to amend the statement of claim to provide sufficient particulars regarding the law firm's actual knowledge of the trust and participation in the breach.

The appellant, an unsuccessful prospective purchaser of the debtor's assets, sought to appeal an order appointing an interim receiver and approving the sale of the debtor's assets to another party.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the appellant lacked standing.

The court reaffirmed that an unsuccessful bidder does not have a legal or proprietary right in the property being sold and therefore does not have a direct interest sufficient to challenge a sale approval order.

The appellants appealed a contempt order and the penalty imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even excluding the alleged hearsay evidence, there was ample evidence to support the findings of contempt.

The court also upheld the penalty, characterizing it as moderate in the circumstances, and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order referring a solicitor's account for assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion, as the motion judge had identified sufficient reasons to establish special circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after striking his wife in the head multiple times with a heavy mortar.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the definition of 'recklessness' under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code and erred in admitting the deceased's ante-mortem statements regarding his prior abusive conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in the recharge on recklessness, the error was sandwiched between correct instructions and did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The court also upheld the admission of the hearsay statements, finding they met the threshold reliability test and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The Crown appealed an order requiring it to pay $18,000 in costs to nine respondents who were arrested during a major gang takedown.

The respondents had been detained for more than 24 hours without a bail hearing and were remanded for periods exceeding the statutory limit, prompting them to bring habeas corpus applications.

The application judge found systemic failures by the Crown to prepare for the mass arrests, resulting in breaches of the respondents' Charter rights, and awarded costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's failure to ensure adequate court resources for the predictable influx of detainees constituted a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards, justifying the exceptional remedy of costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded restricted firearm and being present in a motor vehicle with a firearm.

He was arrested during a fake drug deal where he and two others intended to rob an undercover officer.

The trial judge found him guilty as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of common intention to rob but applied the Kienapple principle to stay the less serious firearms charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual abuse of a child, arguing the trial judge erred in accepting the complainant's evidence due to inconsistencies, relying on a prior child pornography conviction, and inferring a prior denial was an attempt to protect the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge appropriately evaluated the evidence, properly used the prior conviction to show sexual interest and opportunity, and reasonably inferred the complainant's prior denial was to protect the appellant given their close relationship.