Dennis R. O'Connor

The parties appealed and cross-appealed a Superior Court decision that varied an arbitrator's award regarding child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal judge's decision, finding that the arbitrator erred in his application of the D.B.S. factors for retroactive child support, misunderstood the tax implications of retroactive lump sum spousal support, and failed to properly analyze whether post-separation income increases were related to the marriage.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal fixed at $7,500, inclusive of disbursements and HST, as well as the costs of the motion below fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed a trial decision granting the respondent sole custody of their three-year-old child, granting the appellant supervised access, and issuing a five-year restraining order against him.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing to adjourn the trial and by precluding him from calling his treating psychiatrist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to proceed given the child's best interests and the length of the proceedings.

The Court also held that the appellant failed to comply with the Family Law Rules for expert witnesses, and the psychiatrist's evidence would not have altered the overwhelming evidence supporting sole custody and supervised access.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim for non-earner benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule as statute-barred.

The appellant argued the limitation period under s. 281.1 of the Insurance Act had not begun because the insurer failed to provide the required OCF-9 form with its notice of refusal.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual finding that the insurer had provided the proper notice to the appellant's lawyer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences involving two child victims at a licensed daycare in his home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions and no misapprehension of evidence.

The court also upheld the sentence as fit and within the appropriate range, noting the appellant's position of trust.

The appellant appealed three convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in her credibility findings, that parts of the trial transcript were missing, and that the assault by gesture charge was not made out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully considered the evidence and made findings open to her.

The court also held that the missing transcript portions did not affect the grounds of appeal and that the assault by gesture charge was supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs fixed in the amount of $15,000, all inclusive.

Following the release of the court's reasons, the parties made further written submissions on the issue of costs in the proceedings below.

The court awarded the appellant $7,500 for the appeal and $4,250 for the Divisional Court, reflecting her success on one of the two issues dealt with by that court.

No costs were awarded for the initial motion due to mixed success.

Total costs of $11,750 were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant law firm appealed an order fixing its fees for representing a person under a disability in a personal injury action.

The law firm had entered into a contingency fee agreement with the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The motion judge disregarded the agreement and fixed fees based on time spent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by failing to apply the two-part test from Raphael Partners v. Lam to determine whether the contingency fee agreement was fair and reasonable under s. 24 of the Solicitors Act.

The matter was remitted to a motion judge to assess the reasonableness of the agreement.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action to discharge a debenture registered against their land.

The trial judge had found that while the ten-year limitation period under the Limitations Act had expired, equitable considerations prevented the appellants from succeeding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by deciding the case on equitable grounds that were neither pleaded nor argued.

Furthermore, the Court held that equitable considerations cannot trump the clear statutory language of sections 4 and 15 of the Limitations Act, which extinguish the right and title to land after ten years.

The debenture was ordered discharged.

The appellant transferred over $780,000 to an offshore account after a non-dissipation order was made in a matrimonial proceeding, claiming it was to repay a legitimate pre-separation debt.

The motion judge found the appellant in contempt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the contempt finding, holding that the motion judge erred by failing to make specific findings regarding the legitimacy of the debt and its impact on the equalization of net family property.

The respondent was granted liberty to bring a renewed motion for contempt where these issues could be properly determined.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that found a reasonable apprehension of bias regarding the adjudicator appointed for a police disciplinary hearing.

After leave to appeal was granted, the respondent officer retired, which by operation of the Police Services Act ended the disciplinary proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the substratum of the dispute had disappeared and the issues did not raise questions of broad public importance.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision finding that work performed on the leased premises constituted leasehold improvements rather than structural repairs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding, noting the premises were taken on an 'as is' basis and the tenant failed to obtain the landlord's approval as required by the lease.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant association appealed a decision finding that the process for renewing the appointments of Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court does not infringe the principles of judicial independence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Valente.

The Court held that a reasonable and well-informed observer would conclude that the Deputy Judges and the Small Claims Court are sufficiently independent, as the renewal discretion rests with senior judicial officers rather than the Executive.

The appellant Noteholders appealed orders approving a bridge loan, a $36 million DIP financing facility, and a Management Incentive Plan (MIP) for the respondent debtor under the CCAA.

The debtor's principal asset was a $3.4 billion arbitration claim against Venezuela.

The Noteholders argued the DIP financing, which could outlast the CCAA protection period and granted the lender a 35% interest in the arbitration proceeds, was effectively an arrangement requiring creditor approval.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the supervising judge reasonably exercised his broad discretion under s. 11.2 of the CCAA to approve the financing necessary to pursue the arbitration, and that the financing did not constitute a plan of arrangement.

The applicant sought leave to appeal several convictions under a city by-law.

Her previous motions to extend the time to appeal had been dismissed.

She brought another motion to set aside the convictions but failed to appear on time due to a traffic delay, resulting in the motion being dismissed.

The Court of Appeal accepted her explanation for the delay but dismissed the application for leave to appeal, noting the motion was well beyond the time for appealing, earlier attempts were unsuccessful, and there was no fresh evidence to warrant interference.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding that its directors and officers insurance policy provided coverage for defence costs incurred by the respondent in an OSC proceeding.

The respondent had previously given notice of potential claims to a prior insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that, viewed objectively, the parties intended the new policy to cover the prior acts referred to in the notice up to the first $5 million of the policy limits.

The court found that the insurer had waived the carve-out provisions in the application and that general exclusion clauses did not override the specific agreement for prior acts coverage.

The appeal and cross-appeal on costs were dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a decision granting the respondent employee post-retirement health and welfare benefits.

The employee had worked for the employer for nearly 32 years, transitioning from part-time to full-time.

The employer's HR department had informed the employee in writing that her part-time service would be commuted and she would qualify for benefits if she worked an additional three years, which she did.

Upon termination due to restructuring, the employer denied the benefits, claiming the HR information was an error.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that a binding contractual agreement had been reached between the parties entitling the employee to the benefits.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was not an 'owner' as defined in the Condominium Act and therefore lacked standing to bring the application.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to pay the fees and disbursements of an equitable receiver.

A prior court order had provided that if the appellant paid the outstanding judgment by a certain date, any further equitable receivership costs would be to the account of another party.

The appellant satisfied the judgment by the deadline, but the order under appeal erroneously included costs incurred after that date.

The respondent agreed the order was in error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the relevant paragraph of the order, and referred the matter back to the motion judge for reassessment.