David G. Stinson

The plaintiff supplier brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment of outstanding invoices for wholesale jewelry sold to the corporate defendant and enforcement of alleged personal guarantees by the individual defendants.

The defendants argued that returned merchandise and diamonds supplied to the plaintiff eliminated the debt and that factual disputes required a trial.

Applying the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 and the guidance in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court weighed the evidence and made credibility findings on the paper record.

The court rejected the principal defendant's evidence, found the return inventory had been properly credited at original sale prices, accepted a limited credit for diamonds, and held that the corporate defendant remained indebted.

The court also found an enforceable oral personal guarantee by one individual defendant but not by the others.

The plaintiff was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an underinsured driver.

The plaintiff's employer's fleet insurance policy, issued by the defendant insurer through a broker, did not include OPCF 44R (Family Protection Coverage).

The plaintiff sued the insurer, alleging it owed a duty of care to advise on the need for such coverage, similar to a broker, and that it was vicariously liable for the broker's failure to do so.

The insurer moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the insurer did not owe a duty to advise the insured on coverage gaps, as it conducted risk assessments solely for underwriting purposes, and that the broker was not acting as the insurer's agent.

An Ontario mining company sued numerous foreign engineering firms and engineers for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract following a landslide that closed a gold mine in Costa Rica.

The moving defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Ontario court.

Applying the framework from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court considered whether presumptive connecting factors established a real and substantial connection with Ontario.

The court held that neither alleged reliance on advice in Ontario, damages suffered in Ontario, nor business connections through related companies established sufficient jurisdictional ties.

Any connection to Ontario was tenuous, as the engineering services, alleged wrongdoing, and resulting physical damage occurred primarily in Costa Rica and the United States.

The court concluded that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and therefore declined to assume jurisdiction over the moving defendants.

The defendants moved to stay the plaintiffs' action for wrongful dismissal and oppression under the CBCA, arguing the dispute was subject to a broad arbitration clause in a unanimous shareholders agreement.

The plaintiffs argued the arbitration clause did not cover employment matters and that forcing arbitration would be oppressive.

The court applied the Mantini test, found the arbitration clause was broad enough to cover the dispute, and held that proceeding to arbitration would not be oppressive as all remedies sought could be pursued there.

The motion to stay the action was granted.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action and success of the defendants’ counterclaim, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiff had engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against neighbouring defendants and pursued unfounded allegations during the litigation.

The court held that the conduct before and during the proceeding constituted reprehensible conduct justifying an award of substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed substantial indemnity costs in favour of the defendants, with a small reduction in relation to a withdrawn counterclaim.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the death of Frederick Fowlow, who died from a detached vascular graft four days after undergoing an axillofemoral bypass surgery performed by the defendant surgeon.

The plaintiffs alleged the surgeon was negligent for using a graft that the manufacturer expressly warned was not recommended for that specific procedure.

The court found that the surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to read the manufacturer's instructions, using the non-recommended graft, and failing to inform the patient of the manufacturer's warning.

However, the action was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to prove causation; there was insufficient evidence to establish that the detachment of the graft was caused by the type of graft used rather than being a known inherent risk of the procedure.

The defendant employer brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the plaintiff’s human rights claim from an amended statement of claim arising from his termination following public statements about the Syrian conflict.

The defendant argued the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the alleged dismissal was based on political opinion, which is not a protected ground under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The court held that, accepting the pleaded facts as true, it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiff’s views could not constitute a creed linked to protected grounds such as religion or place of origin.

Accordingly, the human rights claim was allowed to proceed.

However, certain paragraphs of the pleading were struck under Rule 25.11 as irrelevant and prejudicial to a fair trial.

The plaintiff tax consulting firm sued a corporate client, its president, and its investors for unpaid fees relating to successful SR&ED tax credit applications.

The plaintiff alleged that the investors gave oral assurances to the president that they would pay the plaintiff's fees, which the president relayed to the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the claims for breach of contract and misrepresentation against the investors, finding the president's evidence regarding the oral assurances to be not credible.

The court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding no benefit was received by the investors and that the corporate veil provided a juristic reason for any benefit retained.

Default judgment was granted against the corporate client.

Following a complex motion regarding insurance coverage for asbestos claims where the plaintiff was unsuccessful, the successful defendant insurers sought their costs.

The plaintiff argued for a reduction based on divided success on factual issues and refusal to admit facts.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding the defendants were the clear winners and their refusal to admit facts was not unreasonable.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants, making some reductions to specific bills for duplication of effort among multiple counsel, totaling approximately $546,887.

The applicant sought dependant support from the estate of his late common-law spouse.

Although he proved he was a dependant, his claim was ultimately dismissed because the respondent executor distributed all estate assets before the application was commenced and raised a limitation period defence late in the proceedings.

The respondent sought costs of $127,872.01.

The court awarded costs to the respondent but reduced the fees by 50% because the respondent's failure to make timely disclosure about the lack of estate assets unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings.

Costs decision following two motions in an employment action alleging constructive dismissal and entitlement to a bonus.

The defendant successfully moved to set aside a noting in default and successfully resisted the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion concerning whether a bonus should be paid entirely in cash or partially through restricted share units.

The court found that plaintiff’s counsel improperly refused to consent to setting aside the noting in default, unnecessarily increasing litigation costs.

Substantial indemnity costs of $9,500 were awarded for the motion to set aside the noting in default.

Partial indemnity costs of $20,000 were awarded for the summary judgment motion.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs totalling $143,891.09.

The plaintiff did not dispute liability for costs, the hours spent, the disbursements, or the hourly rates, but argued that proportionality required a reduction of professional fees to $75,000.

The court applied the governing principles of reasonableness and proportionality in assessing costs under rule 57.01(1).

Considering the five‑day trial, the complexity of the litigation, the parties’ settlement offers, and reasonable expectations, the court found the defendants’ claimed fees excessive.

Costs were fixed at $80,000 in fees plus $40,533.09 in disbursements.

Following a prior order dismissing the plaintiff’s action for delay, the court addressed written submissions on costs brought by the successful moving defendants.

The defendants sought recovery of both the motion costs and the costs of the action, with some defendants requesting substantial indemnity costs.

The court confirmed that costs were payable but declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding that while the plaintiff’s delay warranted dismissal of the action, it did not justify punitive costs.

The court reduced the amounts claimed as excessive and awarded partial indemnity costs in reduced sums reflecting reasonableness and the limited complexity of the motion and proceedings.

The defendants brought motions in two mortgage enforcement proceedings seeking broad relief including setting aside a prior summary judgment, vacating writs of execution and notices of garnishment, and reopening mortgage accounting.

At the hearing, newly retained counsel for the defendants sought an adjournment after acknowledging that the motion materials were unfocused and procedurally unsuitable for many of the issues raised.

The court granted an adjournment in order to narrow the issues, limiting any future motion to whether the mortgage judgment had been satisfied and whether enforcement steps such as writs and garnishments should be lifted.

A related motion in a second mortgage matter was also adjourned, with the court observing that the issues were more appropriately addressed through the mortgage costs assessment process.

Costs were awarded against the moving parties for the unnecessary expense caused by their broad motion materials and subsequent adjournment request.

Self-represented plaintiffs sought costs after successfully defending a summary judgment motion.

They claimed compensation for their own time spent litigating as well as disbursements and legal advice obtained from counsel.

The court applied the principles governing costs for self-represented litigants, requiring proof of opportunity cost demonstrating that remunerative activity was foregone.

As no evidence of lost income or opportunities was provided, the court declined to award costs for the litigants’ personal time.

However, the court allowed recovery of actual out-of-pocket legal expenses and disbursements and declined to set off earlier reserved costs due to defence counsel’s disregard of page limits imposed by the court.

Following a successful appeal from a master's order, the court was required to determine costs both for the appeal and for the underlying motion before the master.

The parties had agreed that costs of the appeal would be fixed at $5,000 but disputed whether that agreement encompassed the costs of the earlier motion.

The court held that the agreement related only to the appeal and that the master's prior costs disposition had been set aside when the order was reversed on appeal.

Considering the partial indemnity costs outline, the complexity of the motion, and the reasonableness principle governing costs, the court fixed additional costs of $3,000 for the motion before the master.

Following the withdrawal of a complex summary judgment motion brought by several defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

The defendants argued that no costs should be ordered or that costs should be reserved to the trial judge, relying in part on recent appellate guidance regarding summary judgment motions.

The court held that the ordinary rule applies: when a motion is withdrawn, the responding party is generally entitled to costs.

Given the significant effort required to respond to the motion, including multiple affidavits and cross-examinations, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff was awarded $17,500 inclusive of disbursements and GST, payable within 30 days.

The applicant landlord brought an application for a declaration that the respondent tenant's option to terminate its commercial lease had expired before it was exercised.

The dispute centered on the correct 'Commencement Date' of the lease, which dictated the termination window.

The landlord relied on a registered notice of lease stating the date was October 27, 2005, while the tenant argued the lease terms dictated November 14, 2005.

The court held that the lease's express language established November 14, 2005 as the Commencement Date, and the erroneous notice of lease did not amend the contract.

The court also rejected the landlord's equitable estoppel argument, noting the landlord had actual notice of the lease terms prior to purchasing the property.

The tenant's notice of termination was deemed effective.

The plaintiff contractor sued the defendant owner for approximately $17,000 in unpaid services related to a house renovation project.

The defendant counterclaimed for approximately $90,000, alleging overcharging, incomplete work, and defective construction, including a deviation from the cathedral ceiling design.

The court found that the plaintiff had completed over 90% of the contracted work and was entitled to payment for work performed and agreed extras.

The court rejected the defendant's claim of fundamental breach, finding the ceiling deviation immaterial, but awarded the defendant minor damages for delay and minor deviations.

The plaintiff was awarded a net sum of $15,960.37.

The applicant landlord sought leave to appeal an arbitrator's decision which found that the respondent tenant was justified in terminating its commercial lease and ceasing rent payments due to a fundamental breach by the landlord regarding a dangerous sub-ceiling.

The Superior Court of Justice granted leave to appeal, finding that the arbitrator's failure to interpret the lease agreement to determine the allocation of repair responsibilities and failure to apply the established legal test for fundamental breach constituted errors of law.

The court set aside the arbitrator's decision and remitted the matter to a new arbitrator for a rehearing.