David G. Stinson

Following dismissal of an application under ss. 134 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998 challenging the validity of proxy votes and the election of a condominium board, the successful respondent corporation sought substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant unit owner argued that each party should bear their own costs or alternatively that she should receive partial indemnity costs under rule 57.01(2).

The court held that although the corporation was successful on the merits, deficiencies in the corporation’s record‑keeping contributed to the confusion surrounding voter eligibility and gave rise to the litigation.

Given the legitimate governance concerns raised by the applicant and the broader interest of unit owners, it would be unfair to require her to pay the corporation’s costs.

However, the applicant was also not entitled to costs because she continued the application after receiving information that her complaint would not affect the election result and declined a without‑costs withdrawal offer.

The plaintiff claimed that she transferred ownership of a cleaning services franchise to the defendant temporarily, with an agreement that it would be returned after six months.

The defendant maintained that the transfer was permanent and that the only agreement was that he would provide work opportunities to the plaintiff and her sons in the future.

After assessing conflicting testimony, documentary evidence, and credibility of witnesses, the court preferred the defendant’s version of events.

The court found that the transfer was intended to be permanent and that there was no agreement requiring the defendant to return the franchise.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish unjust enrichment or breach of agreement.

The plaintiffs requested that the court settle and issue a formal order reflecting an earlier endorsement that imposed interim injunctive terms restraining the defendants from disseminating defamatory allegations pending the disposition of an injunction motion.

The defendant argued that the earlier endorsement had become stale because a contemplated cross‑motion had not been argued and other events had intervened.

The court rejected that submission, finding the delay in advancing the cross‑motion was entirely attributable to the defendants and that the interim terms were not contingent on the cross‑motion being heard on a particular date.

The court held that the defendants could not benefit from their own failure to advance the motion and that the plaintiffs remained entitled to have the order formally issued.

The judge therefore signed the draft order reflecting the earlier endorsement.

Competing motions for summary judgment arose from a failed real estate transaction involving a vacant residential lot.

The purchasers claimed the parties had reached a binding agreement of purchase and sale and sought specific performance and damages.

The vendors argued their counter‑offer contained an express irrevocability deadline and was never accepted before expiry.

The court applied basic contract principles of offer and acceptance, holding that the vendors’ amended document constituted a counter‑offer that lapsed when the purchasers failed to communicate acceptance within the stated time.

As no meeting of the minds occurred, no enforceable agreement existed and the purchasers’ action was dismissed.

The moving parties brought Rule 21 motions seeking to stay or dismiss a counter-application alleging a wide-ranging conspiracy involving numerous judges, lawyers, public officials, and institutions.

The applicants alleged systemic corruption, crimes against humanity, and other misconduct within the Ontario justice system, and sought extensive relief including billions of dollars in damages.

The court found the allegations to be patently incredible, scandalous, and incapable of proof, concluding that the proceeding had no reasonable prospect of success and constituted an abuse of process.

Applying Rule 21.01(3)(c) and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to control abusive litigation, the court permanently stayed the counter-application.

The decision emphasized the court’s role in preventing vexatious proceedings from consuming judicial resources.

Following a successful civil claim in which the plaintiff was awarded $30,000 in damages, the court considered the plaintiff’s claim for costs.

The self-represented plaintiff sought $10,500 in fees for 300 hours of work and $629 in disbursements.

The court applied the principles governing costs awards to self-represented litigants, requiring proof that the litigant both performed work ordinarily done by a lawyer and incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity.

As the plaintiff was retired and provided no evidence of lost remunerative activity, the court held that no fee award was available.

However, the claimed disbursements were reasonable and were allowed.

Following a partial summary judgment decision granting rescission under s. 6 of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, the court addressed costs of the motion.

Although the moving party achieved partial success, the court declined to award costs immediately.

The court noted uncertainty regarding the quantum of damages to be determined on a reference and the potential impact of competing Rule 49 settlement offers.

Given ongoing issues including quantification of damages, unresolved liability of another defendant, a counterclaim, and a third‑party claim, the court held it would be inappropriate to determine costs at this stage.

The issue of liability, scale, and quantum of costs for the motion was therefore reserved to the trial judge ultimately disposing of the matter.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant cardiologist following the sudden death of a 36-year-old man who collapsed after completing a half-marathon.

The deceased had severe aortic stenosis.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant failed to properly advise the deceased against strenuous exercise.

The court ruled that hearsay statements by the deceased regarding the doctor's advice were inadmissible for lack of threshold reliability.

The court accepted the defendant's evidence that he had advised the deceased against distance running and warned him of the risk of sudden death.

The court found the defendant met the standard of care and dismissed the action.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund appealed an arbitrator’s decision finding that an injured motorcyclist was not principally dependent on his parents for financial support under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator had concluded that during the 12 months preceding the accident the claimant’s employment income exceeded 51% of his financial needs, applying the dependency framework from Miller v. Safeco and subsequent arbitral jurisprudence.

The appellant argued the arbitrator misapplied the dependency factors and improperly confined the analysis to the year preceding the accident.

The court held that the determination of dependency involved mixed fact and law and was reviewable on a reasonableness standard.

Finding the arbitrator’s use of the 12‑month timeframe and the 51% dependency test reasonable and consistent with established jurisprudence, the court dismissed the appeal.

The defendants brought a motion for directions seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a mental examination to determine whether she was a person under a legal disability requiring representation by a litigation guardian.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act to compel a mental examination in the context of Rule 7 proceedings.

The court held that it does have jurisdiction to order such an examination and that doing so would not violate s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, given the procedural safeguards governing such orders.

However, because the plaintiff expressed willingness to undergo a voluntary assessment and provide an updated report addressing her litigation capacity, the court declined to order a compulsory examination at that stage.

The defendants’ motion was adjourned pending the plaintiff’s completion of the voluntary assessment and anticipated motion to continue the proceeding without a litigation guardian.

A condominium unit owner applied under ss. 134 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998 to annul the results of a requisitioned owners’ meeting that removed the board of directors.

The applicant alleged the meeting chair improperly permitted proxies from owners allegedly in arrears contrary to s. 49(1) of the Act and argued the process was oppressive and unfairly prejudicial.

The court held that the chair of the meeting was the proper authority to determine the eligibility of disputed proxies and found no bad faith in her rulings.

After reviewing the evidence regarding disputed proxies, the court concluded that at most three votes were improperly counted, insufficient to affect the outcome of the removal vote.

The meeting was properly conducted and the applicant failed to establish non‑compliance with the Act or oppression.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress based on two incidents: the defendant’s alleged failure to notify him of their father’s deteriorating medical condition before death, and the defendant’s exclusion of him from participation in the planning and conduct of their father’s funeral.

The court held that the alleged omission to communicate the father’s condition constituted inaction and could not ground the intentional tort alleged.

The court further held that disputes about participation in funeral arrangements and intra‑familial grievances of this nature are not appropriate for judicial adjudication and do not give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress.

The statement of claim was therefore dismissed.

The parties entered into an oral joint venture to redevelop a residential property, with profits to be shared equally after completion and sale.

After disputes arose during construction, the defendant excluded the plaintiff from the project, refused to acknowledge the plaintiff’s interest in the property, obtained a second mortgage without notice, and ultimately sold the unfinished property without the plaintiff’s consent.

The court found the arrangement constituted a partnership under the Partnerships Act and that the defendant’s conduct amounted to a repudiation and breach of the partnership agreement.

The plaintiff was therefore justified in ceasing further financial contributions after being excluded from the project.

Liability was determined in Phase 1, with damages and accounting to be addressed in a subsequent phase.

A dispute arose between owners of adjacent apartment buildings concerning access to a shared outdoor swimming pool and a garbage disposal facility located on the defendants’ property.

The plaintiff asserted that it held easement rights permitting continued use of the facilities based on the original design and joint development of the properties in the late 1960s.

The defendants argued the plaintiff had only a revocable licence and counterclaimed for trespass arising from construction activities on their land.

The court held that the evidence established an implied easement arising from the common intention of the original developers when the lands were severed and developed as a single complex.

The plaintiff therefore retained enforceable easement rights over the defendants’ land for both facilities, and the defendants’ trespass claim failed because the impugned acts were committed by independent contractors without the plaintiff’s control.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim or alternatively to stay the action pending the outcome of related Federal Court litigation concerning damages arising from delayed market entry of a generic pharmaceutical product.

Although the defendants ultimately focused their submissions on striking the claim, the court considered whether a temporary stay should be imposed under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found substantial overlap between the Ontario action and the Federal Court proceedings, including factual background and issues related to calculation of damages arising from the delayed entry of the generic drug.

A stay would prevent duplication of judicial resources and reduce the risk of inconsistent findings, while causing no significant prejudice to the plaintiff beyond delay.

The court therefore exercised its discretion to stay the action pending the outcome of the appeal in the Federal Court proceedings and any further appeals.

Following a trial judgment awarding the plaintiffs damages and dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ request for costs.

The plaintiffs had served a Rule 49 offer to settle that was more favourable than the judgment ultimately obtained.

Applying Rule 49.10(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held the plaintiffs were entitled to partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

In determining quantum under Rule 57.01, the court considered proportionality, the defendant’s large and largely unsuccessful counterclaim, the conduct of the litigation, and the reasonableness of counsel’s rates and disbursements.

The court reduced the requested costs and fixed a total award payable by the defendant.

Following a lengthy commercial dispute involving allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, misuse of confidential information, wrongful dismissal, and fraudulent conveyances, the court determined the allocation and scale of costs arising from two trials and related proceedings.

The litigation involved numerous parties and mixed results, with certain defendants fully successful and others partially liable.

The court concluded that the complexity of the litigation and the magnitude of the claimed costs warranted referral of most quantification issues to an assessment officer under Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded in several instances, including where unproven allegations of fraud or serious misconduct had been advanced, while partial indemnity costs applied to others depending on conduct and settlement offers.

The court also considered the appropriateness of Bullock and Sanderson orders in allocating responsibility among defendants.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order for the plaintiff to attend additional defence medical examinations and to strike the impending trial date.

The plaintiffs raised a preliminary objection that the defendants required leave under Rule 48.04(1) because the action had been set down for trial.

The court dismissed the preliminary objection, finding the defendants had not consented to the action being placed on the trial list.

On the substantive issue, the court dismissed the motion for further medical examinations, holding that the defendants failed to provide sufficient medical or factual evidence to justify the request under Rule 33.02(2) and the Bonello principles.

The defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of portions of an oppression remedy claim on the basis that certain alleged acts were statute‑barred.

The claim arose from a long‑running business dispute in which the plaintiff alleged that the individual defendant conducted the affairs of several corporations in a manner oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff’s interests.

The court held that the alleged acts formed part of a complex factual matrix concerning the parties’ ongoing business relationship and that determining when the limitation period began to run required detailed factual findings.

Because a full appreciation of the evidence could not be achieved on the motion record, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The motion was dismissed and the issues were left for determination at trial.

Following the dismissal of two civil actions against a bank, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had commenced proceedings seeking damages and banking records relating to a decades‑old workers’ compensation payment.

The defendant bank had successfully moved to dismiss the actions for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the defendant was the successful party and entitled to costs, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the bank had forced the litigation by failing to advise them of alternative procedural mechanisms to obtain records.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis and reduced for proportionality due to overlap between the two proceedings.