David G. Stinson

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment under two mortgages and possession of the mortgaged property following alleged default.

The defendants argued that the lender failed to advance construction funds in accordance with the financing agreement, causing construction delays, increased costs, and inability to make interest payments.

The court held that the evidentiary record raised multiple factual disputes concerning the lender’s obligations to advance funds, the causes of construction delays and cost overruns, and the parties’ respective responsibilities under the loan agreement.

These issues required a detailed factual assessment that could only be resolved at trial.

The motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former executive who resigned and claimed constructive dismissal, brought a motion for summary judgment for his unpaid 2011 bonus.

The parties agreed on the bonus amount, and the bank paid two-thirds in cash prior to the motion.

The issue was whether the bank could pay the remaining one-third in restricted share units (RSUs) as per its past practice and the governing plan, or if the plaintiff was entitled to cash.

The court held that the plan did not prohibit the bank from granting RSUs to a former employee, and the plaintiff was not entitled to demand the remaining balance in cash.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion alleging contempt by the defendants for failing to comply with prior procedural directions, seeking to strike an affidavit sworn by defence counsel, remove the defendants’ law firm due to an alleged conflict of interest, and compel disclosure based on a prior criminal court proceeding.

The court held that the defendants’ failure to comply with earlier procedural directions resulted from oversight rather than deliberate or calculated disobedience and therefore did not constitute contempt.

The court rejected the alleged conflict of interest, finding the plaintiff failed to establish that any confidential consultation with the defendants’ law firm had occurred.

The court further held that any disclosure obligations arising from the earlier criminal proceeding had expired when that prosecution ended and were not binding on the defendants in the civil action.

The motion was dismissed and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

The applicant sought dependant’s support from a deceased partner’s estate under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act after being found to be the deceased’s common law spouse.

The application was commenced more than six months after the issuance of the certificate of appointment of estate trustee, engaging the limitation in s. 61 of the Act.

The applicant argued that jointly held real estate had been severed prior to death and remained part of the estate for support purposes.

The court held the evidence did not establish severance of the joint tenancies, meaning the properties passed to the surviving joint tenant by right of survivorship.

Because all estate assets had been distributed before the application was commenced and no assets remained, the court declined to extend the limitation period and dismissed the support claim.

The appellant appealed a master's order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her notice of action and statement of claim to add a private clinic as a defendant in a medical malpractice action despite the expiry of the presumptive two‑year limitation period.

The court considered whether pleadings and correspondence from the hospital constituted a triggering event under the discoverability provisions of s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the hospital’s defence and cross‑claim, which alleged that treatment occurred in a private clinic, clearly pointed to another potential defendant and triggered the limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in identifying the clinic despite available information and prolonged inaction by counsel.

The master erred in law by allowing the amendment while leaving the limitation issue to be determined later.

Following an earlier order approving the sale of a significant estate asset and directing production of estate documents, the court determined competing claims for costs in estate litigation.

A beneficiary and former co-trustee sought full indemnity costs payable from the estate after supporting the estate trustee during litigation in obtaining approval of the property sale and production of estate records.

The court held that although estate litigation does not routinely justify costs payable from the estate, the beneficiary’s participation was helpful to the administration of the estate and contributed to a successful outcome benefiting all beneficiaries.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the beneficiary from the estate.

A former co-trustee who resisted document production and failed to cooperate in the sale process was denied costs and ordered to bear his own legal expenses.

Following the dismissal of a cross-motion challenging the basis for a trusteeship order, the successful party sought costs.

The responding party opposed the request and alleged misconduct by the moving party and its counsel, including an alleged violation of s. 49.53 of the Law Society Act.

The court held that the statutory provision relied upon was inapplicable and that the allegations of impropriety were unsupported by evidence and largely repeated arguments already rejected.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the successful party, with a reduction to disallow the unnecessary attendance of a second counsel.

Following a motor vehicle accident jury trial resulting in a modest judgment after statutory deductions and collateral benefit credits, the court addressed liability for costs.

The defendant insurer argued that its Rule 49 offer to settle should trigger cost consequences because the plaintiff recovered significantly less than the offer.

The court held that the offer was ambiguous due to unexplained references to provisions of the Insurance Act and therefore could not trigger Rule 49 cost consequences.

Applying Rule 57.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the recovery fell within the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction and determined that neither party should receive costs.

The moving defendants sought dismissal of a civil action for delay under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, arising from a 2003 real estate transaction and alleging solicitor’s negligence and unpaid purchase funds, had remained largely inactive for over seven years.

The court found the delay to be inordinate and inexcusable, particularly given the plaintiff’s failure to advance the case despite prior administrative dismissal and reinstatement with directions to schedule a case conference.

Prejudice was established due to the death of a key participant and witness whose testimony was central to the disputed arrangements between the parties.

Balancing the plaintiff’s right to proceed against the defendants’ right to a fair trial, the court concluded that the defendants’ ability to defend the action had been irreparably compromised.

The plaintiff alleged unjust enrichment after the defendants adopted a name she proposed in a response to a request for proposals for retail space at a casino complex.

The plaintiff asserted that she created the phrase used for the retail area and that the defendants later adopted it after rejecting her proposal.

The court found that the phrase originated from the historical and cultural terminology of the First Nation and was not an original creation of the plaintiff.

It also held that the name provided no financial or commercial benefit to the defendants and was offered gratuitously during the proposal process.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish enrichment, deprivation, or absence of juristic reason as required for unjust enrichment.