Cynthia Petersen

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action and discharge its construction lien, arguing that the plaintiff corporation contracted using an unregistered business name and failed to disclose its corporate identity.

The plaintiff argued the lapse in registration was inadvertent and the defendants were aware they were dealing with a corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the voluminous and contradictory affidavit evidence raised serious credibility issues that could not be resolved on a summary basis and required a full trial.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon after stabbing his childhood friend during an altercation at his home.

The accused claimed he acted in self-defence after the victim attacked him with a knife.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as implausible and inconsistent, finding that he had a motive based on jealousy and that his after-the-fact conduct of retrieving his passport indicated guilt.

The court accepted the victim's testimony that the attack was unprovoked.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking after being caught with over 7 kilograms of the substance.

The accused admitted the elements of the offence but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he intended to distribute the heroin safely and at cost to addicts to prevent fentanyl overdoses and combat the opioid crisis.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the defence of necessity had no air of reality.

The court held that the perceived danger to addicts was not imminent within the meaning of the jurisprudence, and the accused had reasonable legal alternatives to effect change, such as constitutional challenges or political advocacy.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, charged with drug importation offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging five successive wiretap authorizations.

The Crown objected to his standing to challenge the first authorization, as he was not named and his communications were not intercepted under it.

The court held that the accused lacked standing to challenge the first authorization directly because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, the court ruled he had standing to challenge the subsequent authorizations that did intercept his communications, and in doing so, he could seek to excise information from their supporting ITOs that was allegedly obtained in violation of his co-accused's Charter rights under the first authorization.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against several physicians and a hospital following the plaintiff's development of compartment syndrome after hand surgery.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to substitute the name of one anesthesiologist for another, claiming misnomer.

The proposed defendant anesthesiologist brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the separate action against him as statute-barred.

The court dismissed the misnomer motion, finding the plaintiffs made a strategic decision rather than a true naming error.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts to discover her claim against the anesthesiologist more than two years before commencing the action.

The applicant sought an equalization payment and retroactive child support.

The respondent had declared bankruptcy and was discharged in 2011.

The court held that the equalization claim was a provable claim extinguished by the bankruptcy discharge.

However, child support obligations survive bankruptcy.

The court imputed income to the respondent for the years he lived in Cameroon, finding he was intentionally underemployed.

Child support arrears were fixed at $50,939, and ongoing support was ordered.

Following a seven-day family law trial, the court resolved outstanding monetary issues including equalization of net family property and child support.

The court permitted the respondent to pursue an equalization claim despite deficient pleadings, ordering the applicant to pay $474.50.

The court declined to impute additional income to the applicant for intentional under-employment, finding his reduced hours were due to construction industry conditions and bona fide medical leaves.

Given the new equal shared parenting arrangement, the court applied section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines and ordered the applicant to pay a set-off amount of $341 per month in child support, with section 7 expenses apportioned 70/30.

The defendant, a blogger reporting on municipal affairs, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff, a former municipal administrator, sued over blog posts alleging he was dishonest and incompetent.

The court found the posts related to a matter of public interest but concluded the defamation claim had substantial merit and the defendant's defences could reasonably be rejected.

The court held that the harm to the plaintiff's reputation and employability outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression, and dismissed the motion.

On a pre-trial application in a historical sexual assault and sexual exploitation prosecution, the Crown sought to adduce similar fact evidence from another witness alleging comparable sexual misconduct by the accused during the same period.

Applying the framework in Handy, the court found the proposed evidence highly probative on the actus reus, opportunity, and anticipated innocent-contact or fabrication issues, given the distinctive similarities in victim profile, relationship of trust, location, timing, and manner of the alleged assaults.

The court also found an air of reality to a collusion argument arising from Facebook contact between the complainant and the proposed witness, but concluded on a balance of probabilities that no actual collusion occurred.

Although the evidence carried substantial moral and reasoning prejudice, its probative value sufficiently outweighed that prejudice and the evidence was admitted.

The accused, J.E., brought an application under s.638(1)(f) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause on linguistic competence.

J.E. had previously obtained a s.530(1) order for an English trial, despite English being the predominant official language in the trial region (Brampton).

The Crown opposed the application.

The court denied the application, holding that a s.530 order does not automatically mandate a linguistic competence challenge for cause under s.638(1)(f) without an "air of reality" demonstrating a genuine need.

The court found no such air of reality, emphasizing that the standard jury screening process is sufficient in this context and that the s.530 order was not animated by a genuine language rights concern.

The plaintiff's former solicitors, Lofranco Corriero, brought a motion for a solicitor's charging order under s.34 of the Solicitors Act, seeking a first charge on monies (damages and costs) awarded to the plaintiff at trial, in priority to the defendants' right of set-off for their own costs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that no property or fund existed upon which a charge could be imposed.

The trial judge's final order, after applying statutory deductibles, credits, and Rule 49 cost consequences, resulted in a net payment from the plaintiff to the defendants.

The court emphasized that a solicitor's efforts must result in a net benefit or recovery of property for a charging order to be granted, and that severing the trial judge's order to create a fund would undermine the purpose of Rule 49.10.

The appellant's vehicle was damaged in a motor vehicle accident for which she was not at fault.

Her insurer paid for the repairs, but she brought a Small Claims Court action seeking additional compensation for the diminished value of her vehicle.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the insurer had validly exercised its right to repair the vehicle under section 6.6 of the standard Ontario Auto Policy (OAP) rather than pay for the damage.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's decision, concluding that the insurer's failure to provide formal written notice did not vitiate its election to repair, and that the insurer fulfilled its contractual obligation by paying for the repairs.

The plaintiff, Kathleen Anne Cruikshank, on behalf of the Estate of Ross Gerrard Cruikshank, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for the alleged non-repayment of private loans by the defendants, Randy Kennedy and VLC Global Ministries.

The defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiff's motion and summary judgment in their favour.

The court found that the Consolidated Loan was fully repaid through a combination of cash, cheques, and "contra agreements" for services and housing.

For the Second Loan, the court found the plaintiff's evidence unreliable and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the defendant's credible testimony, concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove outstanding debt.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's motion and action.

Following a 14-day jury trial, the offender, Lincoln Lee Dawkins, was convicted of importing cocaine into Canada and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the large quantity of cocaine (17.34 kg), the nature of the drug, and its concealment in a secure airport washroom.

Mitigating factors included being a first-time offender, strong rehabilitation prospects, exemplary conduct on bail for 5.5 years, and significant collateral immigration consequences (likely deportation).

The court rejected the Crown's submission that the offender was a principal, finding him to be a courier, and distinguished his case from others involving airport employees with breach of trust.

Applying principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, restraint, and parity with a co-accused, the court imposed a sentence of nine years and six months' imprisonment.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for bifurcation in a family law proceeding, the respondent sought costs of $16,530.75 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The respondent relied on an offer to settle made prior to the motion.

The court found the respondent was entitled to full recovery costs from the date of the offer, but only partial indemnity costs prior to that date.

The court also excluded costs claimed for steps not directly related to the motion.

The court fixed the respondent's costs at $5,763 inclusive of HST.

The applicant, convicted of impaired driving, sought an order for the Crown to pay the cost of his trial transcript for his appeal, claiming financial inability.

The Superior Court of Justice, exercising its inherent jurisdiction, established a three-part test for such orders: financial inability, severe consequences or public interest, and arguable merit of the appeal.

While the applicant met the first two criteria (significant personal consequences due to conviction and public interest issues like systemic racial discrimination and Charter rights), the court found his appeal lacked arguable merit.

His claims of involuntary intoxication and Charter violations (right to French-speaking counsel) were deemed unlikely to succeed on appeal, as the trial judge's findings were based on credible evidence and proper legal analysis.

The motion was dismissed.

This decision addresses the costs of a six-day family law trial where the applicant, Michelle Grasso, was successful against the respondent, Rishi Bhatt, but unsuccessful against the Third Party Respondent, Dr. Gunvantrai Bhatt.

Dr. Bhatt was partially successful in his counter-claims against Ms. Grasso.

Dr. Bhatt sought costs against Ms. Grasso, arguing entitlement as the successful party and for full indemnity costs after a rejected settlement offer.

Ms. Grasso opposed, citing financial hardship and partial success against Rishi Bhatt.

The court, exercising judicial discretion, considered the parties' disparate financial positions, Ms. Grasso's unmeritorious claim against Dr. Bhatt, and Dr. Bhatt's unreasonable conduct during trial.

The court awarded Dr. Bhatt $41,716 in costs against Ms. Grasso, reducing the amount due to Dr. Bhatt's conduct and some unreasonable claims, and granted Ms. Grasso one year to make the full payment.

Following a summary judgment decision where the plaintiff was declared the beneficial owner of a disputed property, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant argued for partial indemnity costs apportioned against the plaintiff due to divided success.

The court found the plaintiff was substantially more successful, having achieved his primary goals of retaining the family home and avoiding capital gains tax indemnification.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $25,988, discounted slightly for his unsuccessful punitive damages claim.

The applicant, Mr. Van Eck, brought a motion for bifurcation in a matrimonial proceeding, seeking an initial trial solely on the validity of three domestic contracts.

He argued that upholding the contracts would preclude the respondent's claims for spousal support and equalization, saving time and costs.

The respondent, Ms. Pham, opposed the motion, arguing that bifurcation would cause prejudice and was not in the interest of justice, as the issues were complex and intertwined, particularly with her spousal support claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues regarding contract validity were not straightforward, a second trial would be inevitable due to the spousal support claim, and there would be significant duplication of evidence.

The court also noted potential prejudice to the respondent in assessing unconscionability without full financial disclosure and a determined separation date.

The applicant sought sole custody, child support, a restraining order, and a declaration of a beneficial interest in the family residence owned by her father-in-law (the third party respondent).

The respondent father did not participate in the trial.

The court granted the applicant sole custody, supervised access for the respondent, a restraining order, and retroactive and prospective child support based on an imputed income.

However, the court dismissed the applicant's trust and proprietary estoppel claims regarding the family residence, finding no credible evidence of financial contribution or a clear promise to transfer title.

The applicant was ordered to vacate the property and pay the third party respondent $13,640 in damages for trespass for unpaid utilities.