Catherine Rachel Glaister

This is an appeal from a conviction for uttering threats, criminal harassment, and breach of probation, and from the imposed sentence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's judicial notice of text messaging mechanics, assessment of gaps in the Crown's case, and credibility findings regarding the complainant.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge erred in the extent of judicial notice taken regarding text message fabrication methods, this error did not affect the outcome.

The court upheld the trial judge's credibility findings and her determination that the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt despite evidentiary gaps.

The appeal against sentence, seeking a conditional discharge, was also dismissed, as the trial judge had considered mitigating factors and imposed a lenient sentence given the repeat nature of the domestic violence.

The defendant, Suzana Vidinovski, was found guilty after a jury trial of three counts of fraud over $5,000 and four counts of uttering forged documents.

The offences, committed between 2012 and 2014 while she was an administrative assistant, involved fraudulently obtaining approximately $81,000 from her employer, Core Realty Group Inc., through forged cheques and letters of direction.

The court considered her prior criminal record for similar offences and the significant breach of trust.

The Crown sought a prison term of 4-5 years, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day or 8-10 months incarceration.

The court determined that a conditional sentence was inappropriate due to the lack of exceptional mitigating circumstances and the need for general and specific deterrence and denunciation.

Vidinovski was sentenced to 18 months incarceration, 2 years probation, a restitution order of $44,556.44, and a DNA order.

The applicant, charged with fraud and related offences, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from the date of charges to the anticipated end of trial was over 35 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework to determine whether periods of delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability should be deducted as defence delay.

The court concluded that certain periods of unavailability for rescheduled preliminary inquiry and trial dates constituted defence delay, reducing the net delay to 27 months.

As the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown sought to adduce a statement made by the accused to police after he turned himself in.

The accused had refused to be video or audio recorded but agreed to answer questions, which the officer noted down.

The defence opposed the admission of the statement, arguing it was involuntary due to the police's failure to video record the interview as required by appellate jurisprudence.

The court found that the police did not deliberately avoid recording the statement, but rather respected the accused's refusal to be recorded while answering questions.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The defendant employer was charged with failing to ensure compliance with section 37(1) of Ontario Regulation 213/91, which requires that material or equipment at a construction project be stored and moved in a manner that does not endanger a worker.

A transport driver employed by the defendant was fatally crushed when a curb machine tipped over while being unloaded from a float trailer.

The defendant brought a motion for non-suit, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt because the cause of the accident was not established.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the prosecution need not prove how the accident occurred, only that the prohibited act (moving equipment in a manner that endangered a worker) took place.

The fact that a worker was fatally injured constituted prima facie evidence of endangerment.

The Crown prosecuted Alpa Lumber Mills Inc. and its supervisor Van Kham Sichantha for failing to ensure that a rip saw machine (Rip Saw #1) was properly shielded or guarded to prevent product or material being processed from endangering worker safety, contrary to sections 25(1)(c) and 27(1)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act and section 26 of Ontario Regulation 851/90.

A worker was injured when a wooden stake was ejected from the machine at high velocity and pierced his arm.

The defendants argued they had taken all reasonable care by relying on the machine's built-in safety features, regular maintenance, and worker training.

The court found both defendants guilty, holding that the hazard of ejected material was reasonably foreseeable based on the manufacturer's own warnings, and that the defendants failed to take all reasonable steps including obtaining and reviewing the correct operating manual, implementing regular inspection of anti-kickback mechanisms, and ensuring workers did not stand in front of the infeed opening.

The Crown charged Wal-Mart Canada Corp. with failing to ensure that measures and procedures prescribed by regulation were carried out at a workplace, specifically that the floor be kept free of obstructions and hazards.

A maintenance worker tripped over an empty pallet left on the floor in the receiving area and fell, striking his head.

The worker died two weeks later, though the Crown conceded it could not prove causation.

The court found that the empty pallet constituted an obstruction and hazard under the applicable regulation.

While Wal-Mart had training programs, policies, and safety procedures in place, the court found the defendant failed to establish the due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities, primarily due to the absence of safety sweep logs for the receiving area and insufficient evidence of implementation of safety procedures in that specific location.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant corporation brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of section 11(d) rights based on an alleged promise by a Ministry of Labour inspector not to prosecute.

The defendant claimed the inspector's assurance, followed by the laying of charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, constituted an abuse of process.

The court found that the defendant failed to establish a clear agreement or deal with the inspector, that the inspector's conduct did not rise to the level of abuse of process, and that no Charter breach occurred.

The motion was dismissed in its entirety.

The defendants, K-Tech Building Systems Inc. and its president Stanley Kondrotas, were charged with five offences under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 arising from their agreement with Bonnie Engel to construct a prefabricated cottage on her property.

The charges included making false, misleading or deceptive representations regarding material ordering and delivery, making an unconscionable representation, failing to provide a future performance agreement with prescribed requirements, and failing to refund payment within 15 days of cancellation notice.

The court found that the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 applied to the transaction despite arguments that the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act should govern.

The defendants were convicted on four of five counts after failing to establish the due diligence defence.

The court found that the defendants' failure to include a completion date in the agreement created a situation where the consumer had the right to cancel after 30 days, and the defendants failed to meet their obligations under consumer protection legislation.

The appellants, contractors and their employees, were charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a workplace accident during an expansion project at Pearson International Airport.

A justice of the peace quashed the charges, finding the appellants' work was integral to a core federal aeronautics undertaking and thus immune from provincial legislation.

The application judge granted certiorari and mandamus, setting aside the decision and directing a trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' normal operations as going concerns were not integral to the federal undertaking, and the application of provincial workplace safety standards did not impair the core of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable due to weak identification evidence.

The victim gave a generic description of the assailant and could not identify the imitation gun found on the appellant upon his arrest.

The only identification evidence was an in-court identification, which the Crown conceded had virtually no evidentiary value.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the verdict was unreasonable, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly treated the trial as a credibility contest and engaged in improper propensity reasoning based on the appellant's criminal record, contrary to the requirements of R. v. W.D. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a group assault on a 15-year-old boy.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, party liability, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for a specific witness.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to cross-examine a witness on prior inconsistent statements under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellants appealed jury convictions for two murders arising from a drug-debt execution theory advanced through accomplice and jailhouse informer evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate Vetrovec caution regarding key unsavoury witnesses and also committed several additional reversible errors, including admitting highly prejudicial investigative hearsay, admitting evidence of a co-accused’s manslaughter conviction, excluding exculpatory portions of a recorded statement under the whole statement rule, permitting inadmissible hearsay concerning one appellant’s alleged admission to his girlfriend, and failing to control prejudicial Crown cross-examination and oath-helping evidence.

The court rejected the reasonable apprehension of bias claim and declined to intervene on several discrete evidentiary rulings, but found the cumulative and individual errors too serious for the curative proviso.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the grounds that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the verdicts were unreasonable, and the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons met the Sheppard requirements and that the verdicts were supported by ample circumstantial evidence.

Specifically, it was reasonable to infer that the appellant, who was seen searching the area where a gun and bullet-proof vest were found after a car crash and flight, was the driver who discarded those items.

The court also found no reversal of the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to consider mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's statement that there were no mitigating factors meant he had considered and rejected them.

Given the young age of the victim, the fact of penetration, and the threat of violence, the sentence was deemed fit, even having regard to the totality principle.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

At trial, the judge placed considerable emphasis on the complainant's emotional display during testimony, which related to an alleged threat against his mother.

However, the trial judge had previously precluded evidence on this issue, deeming it unnecessary.

The Court of Appeal held that relying on this emotional display after precluding evidence on the issue was unfair and deprived the appellant of the opportunity to make full answer and defence.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break-ins following a jury trial.

During the trial, a police officer testified about unrecorded and ambiguous statements made by the appellant.

Although the trial judge and counsel agreed by the end of the case that the appellant had not admitted involvement, the trial judge failed to clarify this to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that because the Crown's case was not overwhelming, there was a real risk the jury interpreted the statements as an admission.

The appeal from conviction was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually interfering with his niece and a family friend, both young children.

At trial, the judge admitted four out-of-court statements by the niece which contained details missing from her viva voce testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the statements should not have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge did not err in finding the necessity and reliability criteria were met for the statements, he erred in admitting all four statements instead of just one.

The cumulative impact of the four statements was prejudicial, and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The conviction appeal regarding the niece was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The sentence appeal regarding the family friend was dismissed.