Catherine Rachel Glaister

The appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a three-and-a-half-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the assessment of evidence, and consciousness of guilt based on post-offence statements to the police.

The Court of Appeal found that the reasonable doubt instruction substantially complied with the law, the jury was properly instructed to consider all evidence, and any shortcomings in the consciousness of guilt instruction did not prejudice the appellant given the overwhelming DNA and forensic evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a lengthy trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of three unsavoury witnesses, including a jailhouse informant.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence of post-trial recantations by two of these witnesses and argued that the trial judge made several errors, including failing to give an adequate Vetrovec warning and improperly admitting highly prejudicial evidence of a prior manslaughter conviction.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence of one witness's recantation and found that the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning and evidentiary rulings.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder based entirely on circumstantial evidence, including hair comparison, DNA, identification, and after-the-fact conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting prejudicial hair comparison evidence and in instructing the jury on identification and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting type 2 hair comparison evidence without confirming DNA, failing to properly instruct the jury on the limitations of the hair evidence, improperly leaving worthless identification evidence to the jury, and erroneously instructing the jury that they could infer guilt from a concocted alibi and ambiguous after-the-fact conduct.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation.

The Crown conceded the sexual exploitation conviction was unreasonable as the victim was not a 'young person' under the Criminal Code.

For the child pornography charges, which involved written materials, the trial judge had convicted the appellant before the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Sharpe.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the defence of artistic merit and by applying an overly broad definition of child pornography.

The appeal was allowed, an acquittal was entered for the sexual exploitation charge, and a new trial was ordered for the child pornography charges.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for sexual assault.

He argued that the summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law by finding that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that although the trial judge misapprehended a portion of the evidence regarding the complainant's continuous observation of the appellant, the verdict was reasonable based on the complainant's identification of the appellant through a combination of factors.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a brutal assault.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentence was substantial, it was not unfit given the brutal nature and duration of the assault.

The sentencing judge properly balanced the appellant's personal circumstances with the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

Fresh evidence showing some progress did not render the sentence unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The young person appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, use of a firearm, unlawful confinement, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and possession of stolen firearms.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions for the robbery and firearms offences, finding the circumstantial and direct evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions.

However, the court quashed the conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle, as there was no evidence the appellant had control over the vehicle.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the 22-month delay was not unreasonable given the complexities of the case.