Byron David Shaw

Following dismissal of a securities class action leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act, the successful defendant sought substantial partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued that the case raised a novel legal issue and that no costs should be awarded under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court rejected this characterization, finding the claim to be a conventional secondary market misrepresentation action and concluding that the leave motion lacked merit.

Applying the Civil Rules Committee Grid rates and reducing certain disbursements, the court fixed costs at $170,000 all-inclusive payable by the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction over their claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract against the respondent banks.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the contract was entered into in St. Kitts and the tort was completed there, meaning Ontario lacked presumptive connecting factors.

The Court also agreed with the motion judge's forum non conveniens analysis that St. Kitts was the appropriate forum, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice action arising from emergency treatment of a laceration caused by broken glass.

The court held that, while the plaintiff's plastic surgery expert was not practising in the same field as the emergency physician and therefore could not alone establish the standard of care in emergency medicine, the defendant's own emergency medicine expert did not eliminate a genuine issue for trial because his opinion was premised on an assumption contrary to the admitted evidence that the plaintiff reported feeling glass in the wound.

Applying the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 and Hryniak, the court found a triable issue on breach of the standard of care.

The motion was dismissed and the court remained seized.

The plaintiff sought leave under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act to advance a secondary market misrepresentation claim against a lender to an insolvent issuer following the issuer's collapse.

Applying the Supreme Court's Theratechnologies screening standard, the court held that the plaintiff failed to provide both a plausible interpretation of the promoter provisions and sufficient evidence showing a reasonable possibility of success at trial.

The court found that conventional banking, financial advisory, underwriting, and lending activities, even if essential to the transaction, did not amount to taking the initiative in founding, organizing, or substantially reorganizing the issuer's business.

The court also found insufficient evidence that the defendant knowingly influenced the release of the impugned disclosure documents.

Leave was denied.

In a joint cross-border insolvency trial concerning the allocation of approximately $7.3 billion in lockbox funds from the sale of global business lines and residual intellectual property, the court interpreted the Master R&D Agreement as an operating transfer-pricing document that granted limited licence rights but did not govern post-insolvency allocation.

The court rejected both the position that one Canadian debtor owned all sale proceeds by virtue of legal title and the position that the EMEA debtors jointly owned all intellectual property by operation of law.

Applying unjust enrichment principles and the broad remedial jurisdiction available in CCAA proceedings, the court held that a just result required a pro rata allocation among debtor estates based on allowed claims.

The court further directed that duplicate claims be counted only once for allocation purposes, that intercompany claims be included, and that interim distribution proposals be brought forward.

This was a costs endorsement following the defendants' complete success on a motion to dismiss and on opposition to an anti-suit injunction concerning foreign proceedings in St. Kitts.

The plaintiffs were self-represented, but the court held that self-representation was not a basis to deny costs to the successful parties.

Applying the general principles and the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the claimed partial indemnity costs reasonable.

Costs were awarded forthwith to the defendants in the amount of $10,298.20.

The plaintiffs sought an adjournment of a defendant's motion to dismiss the action for failure to post court-ordered security for costs.

The court noted the plaintiffs' repeated failures to comply with court orders and the apparent overlap with another related proceeding, raising a possible abuse of process concern.

The adjournment was nevertheless granted because counsel represented that the jailed plaintiff's evidence was necessary to respond to the motion, and the court found little prejudice in a short delay.

The dismissal motion was adjourned peremptorily to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were barred from taking further steps until the security ordered had been posted.

Costs thrown away of $2,500 were ordered payable forthwith to the responding defendant.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent doctor following the death of a patient who underwent an axillary-femoral bypass.

The trial judge found the respondent breached the standard of care by using a graft that was 'not recommended' by the manufacturer and failing to obtain informed consent, but concluded the appellants failed to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in his robust and pragmatic analysis of the evidence and correctly concluded that the 'material contribution' approach to causation was inapplicable.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a joint and several costs order of $247,566.14 made against them following the respondent's successful motion to appoint a receiver.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision to award costs jointly and severally, including against the individual moving party personally.

The court held that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion and that the stringent test for granting leave to appeal a costs order was not met.

Following the appointment of a receiver over corporate defendants’ books and records in a commercial dispute involving alleged fraud and breach of agreements, the court determined the quantum of costs payable to the successful plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $298,000, including substantial disbursements for forensic accounting services.

The defendants challenged the reasonableness of the fees and argued certain expert-related disbursements were not recoverable.

The court held that detailed cost outlines rather than docket production were sufficient, emphasized that costs must be fair and reasonable to the unsuccessful party under Rule 57.01(1), and confirmed that expert forensic accounting fees were recoverable.

Costs were fixed at $180,000 plus HST for fees and $67,566.14 for disbursements, payable jointly and severally by the defendants.

The Crown and Ontario First Nations entered into a revenue sharing agreement requiring the Crown to appoint a First Nations representative to the board of directors of the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG).

When no appointment was made, First Nations sought arbitration.

The Crown and OLG moved to strike the claim, arguing the appointment was protected by Crown prerogative and non-justiciable.

The arbitration panel dismissed the motion and also allowed First Nations to withdraw its claim against OLG.

The Crown and OLG appealed both decisions.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Crown prerogative could not be used to avoid a declaration that a contract had been breached, and that OLG was not a necessary party to the arbitration.

Former psychiatric patients alleged that experimental ‘social therapy’ programs at a provincial psychiatric facility between 1968 and 1979 constituted torture and unlawful experimentation.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to add five additional former patients as plaintiffs decades after the events.

The defendants argued the claims were statute‑barred under historical limitation provisions in the Medical Act, Health Disciplines Act, Mental Hospitals Act, and Mental Health Act.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that those limitation provisions applied where the alleged conduct amounted to torture rather than professional services or treatment.

The motion to amend and add the additional plaintiffs was granted without prejudice to the defendants’ right to later raise limitation defences.

The plaintiff moved for the appointment of a receiver over the books and records of several corporate defendants following loans exceeding USD $111 million for casino and gaming ventures in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.

The defendants failed to provide required financial reporting, access to records, and audited statements despite contractual obligations and prior court orders.

Evidence indicated possible fraudulent reporting, significant discrepancies in financial information, and unexplained diversion of approximately $50 million to related entities.

The court held that the defendants had repeatedly obstructed access to records and that the circumstances justified the equitable appointment of a receiver to secure and review corporate books and records.

The motion was granted.

The defendants moved for a stay of an action concerning approximately $35 million in reserve funds retained from Casino Rama revenues.

The plaintiff alleged that maintaining the reserves breached limits imposed under a later revenue-sharing agreement, while the defendants argued the dispute arose under an earlier agreement that required arbitration.

The court considered the competence-competence principle and jurisprudence directing courts to defer to arbitration where it is arguable that a dispute falls within an arbitration clause.

Because the dispute arguably arose under the earlier contract incorporating arbitration provisions, the court held that the matter should proceed to arbitration.

The action was therefore stayed pending determination by an arbitrator of whether the dispute falls within the arbitration agreement.

The appellant union challenged the employer's unilaterally imposed mandatory random alcohol testing policy at a paper mill.

The arbitration board allowed the grievance, finding the policy unjustified absent evidence of a workplace alcohol problem.

On judicial review, the board's decision was set aside, and the New Brunswick Court of Appeal dismissed the union's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada (6-3) allowed the appeal, holding the arbitration board's decision was reasonable.

The majority found the board properly applied the established arbitral "balancing of interests" test, which requires evidence of enhanced safety risks to justify random testing.

The dissent would have found the board's decision unreasonable for departing from the arbitral consensus on the evidentiary threshold without explanation.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action for secondary market misrepresentation sought leave to appeal a decision quashing their summonses to two Manulife employees and refusing to compel the defendants to file affidavits on the upcoming leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which followed established jurisprudence that defendants are not required to deliver affidavits or be subjected to cross-examination if they do not intend to lead evidence on the leave motion.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the death of Frederick Fowlow, who died from a detached vascular graft four days after undergoing an axillofemoral bypass surgery performed by the defendant surgeon.

The plaintiffs alleged the surgeon was negligent for using a graft that the manufacturer expressly warned was not recommended for that specific procedure.

The court found that the surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to read the manufacturer's instructions, using the non-recommended graft, and failing to inform the patient of the manufacturer's warning.

However, the action was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to prove causation; there was insufficient evidence to establish that the detachment of the graft was caused by the type of graft used rather than being a known inherent risk of the procedure.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action alleging negligence and lack of informed consent arising from cosmetic breast augmentation and tummy tuck surgery.

The court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert evidence because the expert lacked familiarity with the Ontario standard of care, leaving no admissible evidence on the negligence claim.

The court therefore dismissed the standard of care allegations but proceeded on the issue of informed consent.

Considering the patient’s limited English proficiency, education, and the circumstances surrounding the consultations and consent forms, the court found that the physician failed to ensure the patient understood the material risks and consequences of the procedures.

The court held that a reasonable person in the patient’s circumstances would not have proceeded had adequate disclosure been made, and awarded damages.

The appellant brought a class action alleging that the respondent transmission repair franchisor breached consumer protection legislation by charging an 'Inspection Service' fee, which the appellant characterized as an illegal fee for an estimate when repairs are authorized and carried out.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the fee was for the labour required to remove and reinstall the transmission, not for an estimate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing with the motion judge's statutory interpretation and finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order striking her fresh amended pleading for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and failing to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleading was fatally deficient and could not be repaired by further amendment.

The Court also declined to admit fresh evidence, applying the Sengmueller test, as the evidence could have been adduced earlier with reasonable diligence and would not have been conclusive.