Bonnie R. Warkentin

The applicant, Shirley-Anne Spencer, a common-law spouse of the deceased, brought an application seeking dependent support from the estate, a constructive trust over certain assets, and enforcement of an alleged oral agreement for equal division of all assets with the deceased's son, Jeffrey Hutchings.

The court dismissed all of the applicant's claims, finding that she had been adequately compensated as a dependent through beneficiary designations, that there was no unjust enrichment to support a constructive trust, and that no legally binding oral agreement for equal division of the estate assets was formed.

The Severances, defendants by counterclaim, moved to strike a counterclaim brought by Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario and Carillion Canada Inc. (HMQ) in the Subject Action.

HMQ's counterclaim sought contribution and indemnity for claims asserted against them in a separate Barrie Action, where the Severances were not parties.

The court found that HMQ's counterclaim was procedurally improper under Rule 21.01(1)(b) as it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action in the Subject Action, as such claims should be brought as third-party claims in the Barrie Action.

The motion to strike was granted without leave to amend, though HMQ was not prejudiced from seeking leave to add the Severances as third parties in the Barrie Action.

The defendants brought a motion to add Brian Kraynyk as a party to their counterclaim, alleging fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

The motion was dismissed because the two-year limitation period for adding Mr. Kraynyk had expired.

The court found that the defendants had knowledge of the underlying issue (failure to install a septic tank) well over two years prior to bringing the motion, and their claim of newly discovered evidence was not credible.

While the motion to add a party was dismissed, the motion to amend the statement of defence was granted, excluding any paragraphs referencing the proposed added party and personal claims against him.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's pleadings and for directions after the defendant failed to comply with a previous order to allow the recovery of personal property and pay costs.

The court issued detailed directions establishing a protocol for the plaintiff to retrieve its chattels, including the attendance of independent third parties.

The motion to strike was adjourned to allow the defendant to respond, with a warning that further non-compliance would be grounds to strike the pleadings.

The offender, A.K., was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against a child, A.A., who was 7 when the offences began and continued until she was 13.

The court considered aggravating factors including the offender's position of trust and authority, the victim's young age, the duration and nature of the assaults, and the use of force.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and community support.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, particularly for child sexual abuse, the court imposed an eight-year penitentiary sentence, reduced to seven years and seven months after pre-trial custody credit.

Various ancillary orders were also made, including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, National Sex Offender Registry registration for 20 years, and a lifetime contact prohibition with the victim and restrictions on contact with persons under 16.

Bay City Contractors (Thunder Bay) Inc. moved for partial summary judgment for $200,338.56 for work completed on a construction project.

Quinan Construction Limited counterclaimed for $285,713.24, alleging contractual breaches, delays, deficiencies, and post-termination costs.

The court granted partial summary judgment to Bay City for the undisputed amount of $200,338.56 but found a genuine issue for trial regarding Quinan's counterclaim.

Payment of the summary judgment was stayed until the counterclaim is resolved.

Costs for the motion were divided, with each party bearing their own.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 20 months and one week, but the trial judge deducted time for exceptional circumstances (the original trial judge's recusal), bringing the net delay to 16 months and one week, below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the Jordan framework or the sufficiency of his reasons, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an arbitration award that upheld a union grievance regarding a teacher laid off out of seniority order.

The board argued it retained a junior teacher because she possessed specific skills (ASL and PECS) necessary for a special education course, fulfilling its statutory duty to provide the 'best possible program.' The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusion reasonable that the collective agreement's seniority provisions and the statutory requirements were complementary, and that the junior teacher did not possess recognized qualifications superior to the senior teachers.

The appellant appealed her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, particularly regarding credibility findings in a Charter application.

The Charter application alleged arbitrary detention and sought exclusion of evidence, claiming the traffic stop was solely for a roadside sobriety test.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, finding the traffic stop lawful based on observed Highway Traffic Act infractions and that the breath demand complied with the Criminal Code.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's credibility findings and concluding that the reasons were sufficient, finding no basis to interfere with the rulings.

Following a four-day family law trial where the applicant mother was largely successful on the issues of custody and parenting, she sought partial indemnity costs of $17,000.

The respondent father, who was self-represented, did not provide costs submissions.

The court awarded the applicant $10,000 in costs, noting the respondent's refusal to accept a clinical investigator's findings and insistence on a trial.

Half of the costs award ($5,000) was designated as a support order to be collected by the Family Responsibility Office.

The accused was tried on historical child sexual offence allegations arising from an extended family caregiving relationship.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the complainant's evidence, rejected the accused's evidence, and found the complainant's credibility was not undermined by delayed disclosure, continued family contact, or asserted implausibility arguments grounded in stereotypical assumptions about sexual abuse victims.

The court found guilt on sexual interference and sexual assault, but entered acquittals on invitation to sexual touching and unlawful confinement because those counts were either not independently established or were inadequately supported by the evidence.

The court directed further submissions on sentencing and the possible application of the Kienapple principle.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the defendants sought full indemnity costs of $84,327.60.

The court found that while the claim was not explicitly vexatious, the lack of evidence to support the plaintiff's position warranted an award of substantial indemnity costs to express the court's disapproval.

Applying the principle of reasonableness, the court reduced the requested amount and fixed costs at $40,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following success on a summary judgment motion, the defendants sought costs to be awarded personally against the plaintiff's lawyer, Mr. Brian MacIvor, under Rule 57.07(2).

The court clarified that such a request cannot be satisfied by usual costs submissions and requires a formal motion supported by affidavit evidence, allowing the solicitor to respond.

The court outlined the two-part test for personal costs against a solicitor, requiring that costs be incurred unnecessarily and that the court exercise its discretion.

The request for personal costs was dismissed in the context of the costs submissions, with the court directing the defendants to bring a proper motion if they wished to pursue the matter.

The accused, charged with sexual offences and improper storage of firearms, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his residence.

Following his arrest, police conducted a warrantless search of his home and garage to locate firearms, during which they discovered a piece of clothing in a gun locker.

The police subsequently obtained a search warrant and seized the clothing.

The court found that the warrantless search violated the accused's section 8 Charter rights, as he had not provided informed consent.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown sought to admit video statements of a child complainant (A.A.) under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault trial.

The respondent objected, arguing the statements were not made within a reasonable time after the alleged offences.

The court found that while a three-year delay might be acceptable given the complainant's reasons for non-disclosure, the Crown failed to present the entire video statements in the voir dire.

Without viewing the full statements, the court could not ascertain if they conformed to the rules of evidence and met all s. 715.1 criteria, particularly regarding leading questions.

Consequently, the Crown's application was denied.

The defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after successfully moving to strike the plaintiffs' 'Notice of Withdrawal of Jury Notice' and after the plaintiffs abandoned their cross-motion to strike the jury notice.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct in creating a non-existent form and ignoring the Rules of Civil Procedure warranted the court's disapproval.

The court awarded the defendant substantial indemnity costs fixed at $6,000.

The applicants, including the Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, brought applications for judicial review challenging the Ontario government's decision to withdraw the 2015 sex education curriculum and replace it with the 2010 curriculum.

They argued the directive infringed teachers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and students' rights under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court granted the applicants public interest standing but dismissed the applications on the merits.

The court found no infringement of s. 2(b) because teachers remained free to address topics from the 2015 curriculum, and no infringement of ss. 7 or 15(1) because the 2010 curriculum did not inherently deprive students of security of the person or substantively discriminate against protected groups.

The applicant media organization sought judicial review of a decision to hold an in camera hearing for an extension of time application under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act regarding police misconduct allegations.

The applicant argued the decision-maker erred by failing to apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test for open court proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply to administrative or procedural functions under the Police Services Act, which contains its own statutory framework for determining when hearings may be closed to the public.

At a pre-trial hearing, the court struck the pleadings of Superior Fine Papers Inc., Reliance Holdings Limited, and Reliance Developments Corporation ("Superior et. al.") in two related actions due to their repeated failure to comply with court-ordered litigation timetables, deliver documents, make representatives available for examinations for discovery, and pay previously ordered costs.

The court also awarded further costs against Superior et. al. and set conditions for any motion to set aside the striking of pleadings, including the prior payment of all outstanding costs.

Bruce Carson was convicted of fraud on the government under section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, following appeals to the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada which overturned his initial acquittal.

The sentencing hearing considered mitigating factors, including his age, admissions shortening the trial, dated criminal record, and the attempted nature of the fraud.

Aggravating factors included his prior fraud record and the potential for significant financial gain.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation for offences impacting government integrity.

Considering the dramatic negative effect on Carson's life and the prior uncertainty of the law, the court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation and 100 hours of community service, rejecting the Crown's request for a conditional sentence.