Bonnie R. Warkentin

The offender was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated sexual assault, and administering a noxious thing after intentionally attempting to infect multiple sexual partners with HIV.

The court found that the offender acted deliberately and maliciously, lying about his HIV status and seeking out vulnerable young men.

The court sentenced the offender to a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced by pre-sentence custody.

The court also designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 5-year supervision order, finding a substantial risk of reoffending based on his pattern of reckless and predatory conduct.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an interaction with the complainant after a church service.

The complainant alleged the accused attacked her, choked her, and sexually assaulted her outside the church.

The accused testified that the interaction was consensual and related to faith healing, denying any sexual contact.

The court applied the W.(D.) test for credibility and found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including contradictions with video surveillance and prior testimony.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The father, who had been restricted to supervised access since 2013 due to criminal charges and allegations by the mother, was acquitted.

During the ongoing family trial, the court delivered immediate oral reasons terminating the supervised access regime.

The court found that the mother failed to rebut the presumption of maximum contact and that the father had demonstrated consistent, loving parenting.

The court ordered joint custody with primary care to the mother, immediate transition to unsupervised access, and reunification counselling for the father and child.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $11,853.89, while the defendants argued the amount should not exceed $5,000 based on average awards for similar written motions.

The court found the motion for leave involved complex constitutional issues, justifying a higher award than typical leave applications.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $8,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following reasons for judgment in a family law application determining the valuation date for equalization and dismissing a spousal support claim, the successful party sought full indemnity costs.

The court applied the presumption under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules that the successful party is entitled to costs but considered the relevant factors under Rule 24(11).

Although counsel argued that full indemnity costs were appropriate due to discounted legal rates, the court relied on appellate authority cautioning against awarding full indemnity where the result would effectively replicate actual costs.

The court concluded that partial indemnity costs were appropriate and reduced the claimed amount by 30 percent.

Costs were awarded in the amount of $17,305 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a motion judge’s decision partially refusing to strike portions of a statement of claim under Rule 21.

The defendants argued that certain claims relating to the plaintiff’s removal from political office were non‑justiciable due to Crown prerogative and that references to testimony before a Parliamentary Committee were barred by parliamentary privilege.

The court held that the low threshold for surviving a pleadings motion meant the motion judge’s rulings were not open to serious debate.

The court further held that potential conflicts between parliamentary privilege and solicitor‑client privilege could appropriately be addressed at trial on a full evidentiary record.

The applicant, a federal crown corporation operating a national passenger railway, sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the valuation of its Ottawa passenger station for municipal taxation purposes.

The applicant argued the station had only nominal value due to the lack of a competitive market for passenger rail, while the respondent argued for a hypothetical market value.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the legal correctness of the Board's decision to create a hypothetical market and noting the case involved an important question of law regarding the valuation of railway stations.

The parties separated after a nine-year relationship.

The applicant sought credits for overpayment of child support and pre-paid spousal support based on his payment of household expenses post-separation, which the court dismissed.

The court granted the applicant reimbursement for half the cost of home renovations and his share of the home equity that was depleted by liens registered against the respondent.

The court dismissed the applicant's claim for sole ownership of household chattels.

The respondent was awarded spousal support of $775 per month for two years, with the applicant permitted to deduct a portion of the support to recover the amounts owed to him by the respondent.

The accused, a former senior political advisor with connections to federal officials, was charged under s. 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code with fraud on the government for seeking a benefit for his partner in connection with promoting water treatment systems to First Nations communities.

The Crown argued that the accused used his government influence to advance a supplier in a three‑way business relationship involving the federal government and First Nations bands.

The court held that the evidence established the accused attempted to influence government officials but that any potential sales of point‑of‑use water treatment systems were decisions made autonomously by individual First Nations communities.

Because the government did not procure or approve those systems, there was no “transaction of business with or any matter of business relating to the government” within the meaning of s. 121(1)(d).

The court concluded the essential element of government business was absent.

The applicant sought an uncontested divorce and asserted that the parties separated in 1999, arguing that the respondent’s claims for equalization and spousal support were statute‑barred.

The respondent contended the parties only legally separated in 2014 and sought retroactive and ongoing spousal support, equalization of net family property, and confirmation that funds she withdrew using a power of attorney were a gift.

The court applied the indicia of separation and found that the spouses had lived separate and apart since November 1999 despite maintaining friendly contact and ongoing voluntary financial assistance.

Any equalization claim was therefore statute‑barred, and the voluntary support provided over many years exceeded what would have been payable under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The court also found that the withdrawal of $22,000 using the power of attorney was not a gift.

The applicant sought to quash a search warrant executed at his residence and to exclude a firearm and ammunition seized during the search, alleging violations of ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The warrant was based on intercepted communications during a police firearms trafficking investigation, where investigators interpreted coded references in telephone conversations as referring to handguns and ammunition.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain contained misleading statements, insufficient grounds, and improper interpretation of coded language.

Applying the warrant review principles from Garofoli and subsequent jurisprudence, the court held that the reviewing judge’s role was limited to determining whether the issuing justice could have granted the warrant based on reliable evidence.

The court found that any errors in the ITO were minor, made in good faith, and did not undermine the existence of reasonable and probable grounds.

The application to quash the search warrant and exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought an application for bail review seeking release pending trial after a prior detention order based on the tertiary ground.

The accused argued that a strengthened bail plan with additional sureties, substantial financial pledges, and evidence of prior compliance constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court applied the framework from R. v. St‑Cloud governing bail review under ss. 520 and 521 of the Criminal Code.

It held that the proposed additional sureties and financial pledges did not constitute a material and relevant change in circumstances and did not sufficiently address the tertiary ground concerns.

Given the seriousness of the alleged offences, the apparent strength of the Crown’s case, and the potential for lengthy imprisonment, continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge imposed on the respondent for an unprovoked attack on a pregnant public transit operator.

The Crown argued the sentence failed to reflect denunciation and deterrence and was contrary to the public interest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly balanced the sentencing principles, including the respondent's mental health issues and status as a first-time offender, and correctly applied the principles for conditional sentences.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim without leave to amend under Rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process.

The defendant alternatively sought further and better particulars of alleged construction delays and related claims.

The court held the statement of claim disclosed a viable cause of action in breach of contract and was not frivolous or vexatious.

Although portions pleading negligence were struck due to contractual limitations restricting claims to breach of contract, the plaintiff was granted leave to amend.

The court also dismissed the request for particulars, finding the information sought was largely within the defendant’s knowledge and amounted to improper attempts to obtain evidence prior to discovery.

Following a family law trial concerning spousal support and equalization of net family property, the court addressed costs.

The parties disputed entitlement to costs and relied on multiple offers to settle, some of which were made on the eve of trial and therefore fell outside the cost consequences under Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that although success was divided, the respondent spouse was overall more successful on the most contentious issues, including the quantum of spousal support.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded, but full or substantial indemnity costs were declined given the complexity of the issues and partial success of the other party.

The court also declined to award pre‑judgment interest on the equalization payment.

In this criminal jury trial ruling, the accused sought to have the defence of mistake of fact put to the jury on bid-rigging charges under s. 47(2) of the Competition Act.

The court held that whether the RFPs were calls for bids or tenders was a question of fact, not law, and applied the air of reality test to determine whether the defence should be left with the jury.

On the totality of the evidence, including uncertainty in the procurement documents and witness evidence, the court found an evidentiary foundation for an honest mistaken belief.

The jury was therefore permitted to consider the mistake of fact defence in relation to the nature of the RFPs.

On a mid-trial application for a directed verdict, a self-represented accused sought acquittal on bid-rigging and conspiracy counts arising from a multi-accused prosecution concerning a Transport Canada RFP.

Applying the directed verdict standard, the court held that the Crown's case against the moving party rested on thin direct evidence and circumstantial inferences that were not reasonably available on the whole of the record.

The evidence established only knowledge of and limited participation in his company's own joint venture proposal, which was not illegal.

There was no evidence capable of supporting membership in the larger alleged three-bid scheme or conspiracy.

A directed verdict of acquittal was entered on both counts.

In a criminal prosecution alleging bid-rigging and conspiracy arising from multiple federal government IT procurement processes, the Crown moved for a similar fact ruling permitting the jury to use evidence on one count across other counts against the same accused.

Applying the governing similar fact evidence framework, the court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect and it is sufficiently connected to a live issue.

The court found minimal moral prejudice because the jury had already heard the impugned evidence, but concluded that significant differences among the three groups of procurements reduced the probative value of using the evidence across all procurements.

The motion was therefore granted only in part, limited to the CBSA RFPs and subject to further submissions after the defence evidence.

The Attorney General of Canada sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its motion to strike parts of the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The underlying action involved an aircraft runway overrun, with the plaintiffs alleging Transport Canada was negligent in designing, constructing, and certifying the runway.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision to leave the duty of care analysis for trial.

Accused charged with bid‑rigging and conspiracy challenged the constitutionality of s. 69(2) of the Competition Act, which deemed certain documents and records found in possession of a “participant” to constitute prima facie proof of knowledge and related facts.

The applicants argued the provision created evidentiary and legal presumptions that effectively shifted the burden of proof onto the accused, contrary to the presumption of innocence under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court held that the section required the trier of fact to accept knowledge of documents as proven and could compel the accused to respond before the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The provision therefore infringed the presumption of innocence and fundamental justice and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Section 69(2) was declared of no force or effect in criminal proceedings, though its use in Competition Tribunal proceedings was unaffected.