Bonnie R. Warkentin

The Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, moved for leave to adduce fresh evidence on an appeal from a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision.

The Tribunal had ordered the Registrar to register the respondent as a salesperson.

The fresh evidence consisted of court records and Canada Revenue Agency documents concerning tax proceedings and charges against the respondent for failing to file corporate returns.

The Divisional Court applied the Palmer test and admitted the fresh evidence, finding it was credible, relevant to a potentially decisive issue, and could reasonably have affected the result.

The tenant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing he was denied procedural fairness because he was given only thirteen days over the Christmas holidays to pay rent arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting the tenant failed to attend the original hearing, took no steps to pay the arrears after receiving notice, and continued to reside in the property rent-free for ten months.

The accused was tried on multiple counts including procuring a person under 18 for prostitution, living on the avails of prostitution of a minor, human trafficking of a person under 18, receiving a material benefit from trafficking, assault, and breaches of recognizance.

The Crown alleged that the accused lured a vulnerable 17‑year‑old complainant to another city, exercised control over her movements, used threats and violence, arranged hotel rooms and online advertisements for sexual services, and collected the proceeds from prostitution.

The defence argued the complainant voluntarily engaged in sex work and that the accused believed she was an adult.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence as credible and corroborated by documentary evidence and third‑party witnesses, rejecting the accused’s account.

The court found the accused exercised control and coercion over the complainant and knowingly exploited her as a minor.

Following a professional negligence trial, the court considered submissions on costs and the applicable rate of pre‑judgment interest.

The court corrected an error in the original reasons, confirming that pre‑judgment interest applied only to the $22,000 award rather than the total $50,000 damages figure referenced in the earlier decision.

It held that the appropriate pre‑judgment interest rate was 5% for the entire pre‑judgment period.

Although the plaintiffs sought more than $278,000 in partial indemnity costs, the court reduced the award after considering that the plaintiffs succeeded only in part and were unsuccessful on several factual allegations.

Applying principles from appellate authority regarding the purpose and reasonableness of costs, the court awarded $150,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

Following a motion to change concerning the interpretation of a separation agreement and the calculation of child support, the court determined the issue of costs.

The parties achieved mixed success, with the moving party prevailing on the interpretation of the agreement and retroactive child support period, while the responding party succeeded on the residence of the child for support purposes.

Applying the principles under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court found the moving party was more successful overall but that full indemnity costs were not warranted.

Costs of $5,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements were awarded to the moving party and characterized as support for enforcement purposes.

The court also approved a payment schedule proposed by the responding party for retroactive child support.

Following a family law motion concerning a restraining order, temporary spousal support, disclosure, reimbursement of expenses, and a cross‑motion for occupation rent and credits, the court determined the issue of costs.

The moving party was successful on the majority of issues, although she did not obtain the restraining order sought and received less spousal support than requested.

The responding party obtained only a modest credit for occupation rent and support already paid.

Applying s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that costs should follow the event but that full indemnity costs were not appropriate.

The court awarded partial costs of $4,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements to the moving party.

The plaintiff sued her parents alleging repeated physical and emotional abuse during her childhood, including blows to the head, emotional mistreatment, and a failure by the mother to protect her.

The trial was bifurcated under Rule 6.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine liability only.

The plaintiff relied primarily on her own testimony, limited third‑party affidavit evidence recounting statements she made in the past, and expert opinions interpreting her medical history and alleged trauma.

The defendants denied the allegations and presented evidence from themselves, their son, and police investigations indicating no corroboration of abuse.

The court found the defendants’ evidence more compelling and concluded that the plaintiff had not proven the alleged assaults, emotional harm, or breaches of fiduciary or protective duties on a balance of probabilities.

The plaintiff brought a negligence action against a municipality and road construction contractors after tripping on a height differential at a crosswalk during an ongoing road reconstruction project.

The court found that the unfinished roadway created a tripping hazard amounting to a condition of non-repair under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The defendants failed to install temporary ramping or provide adequate warning of the vertical gap between the roadway and depressed curb.

The court rejected allegations of contributory negligence and held that all defendants were occupiers responsible for site safety under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

Liability was apportioned 50% to the paving contractor and 25% each to the municipality and general contractor, and damages were awarded for general damages, income loss, future care, and expenses.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a master's costs order that directed no costs be awarded to either party following a motion in which the plaintiff had been substantially successful.

The court considered the standard for granting leave to appeal a costs order under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, which requires strong grounds demonstrating that the lower court erred in principle or exercised discretion improperly.

The court emphasized that appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with discretionary costs decisions absent clear error.

The master had considered the conduct of the parties and explained why costs were not awarded despite the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court found no basis to conclude the master was plainly wrong or erred in principle and refused leave to appeal.

A contractor brought an action under the Construction Lien Act seeking payment for labour and materials supplied during residential renovation work.

The homeowner denied liability, alleging incomplete and deficient work and counterclaimed for overpayment and repair costs.

After reviewing conflicting evidence regarding the percentage of project completion and the quality of workmanship, the court found the project was approximately 40% complete and that the contractor had incurred material expenses on the homeowner’s behalf.

Although some deficiencies were established, most alleged defects reflected higher construction standards than those contemplated by the parties’ low-cost arrangement.

Judgment was granted for the contractor for the unpaid value of labour and materials less modest deductions for proven deficiencies.

The offender was convicted after trial of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of oxycodone and methamphetamine, possession of ammunition while prohibited, and breach of probation.

Police surveillance and a search warrant led to the discovery of packaged cocaine, pills, brass knuckles, and multiple cell phones in the offender’s vehicle, as well as ammunition in his residence.

The offender had a prior criminal record including a previous conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking and was on probation for a violent offence at the time of the new offences.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for cocaine trafficking offences while considering the offender’s criminal history and the relatively small quantity of drugs involved.

A sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was imposed, less credit for 315 days of pre-trial custody, along with ancillary DNA, weapons prohibition, and forfeiture orders.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempt to administer a noxious thing, and sexual assault against a developmentally delayed complainant, alleging he attempted to infect the complainant with HIV.

The trial was severed from counts involving other complainants.

The court found the accused intended to infect others with HIV, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused attempted to anally penetrate the complainant without consent, due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The accused was acquitted of the main charges but found guilty of a conceded breach of probation charge.

The accused, a 47-year-old computer programmer with no prior record, was found guilty of possessing child pornography.

A search of his computer revealed 24 videos and 17 images.

A psychiatric assessment diagnosed him with pedophilia and hebephilia, though he was deemed a low risk to re-offend.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the accused to 6 months' incarceration followed by 18 months' probation, along with a 20-year SOIRA order and a section 161 prohibition order.

The Crown applied for certiorari to overturn a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondent on first degree murder and commit her to stand trial for second degree murder.

The respondent had struck and killed the victim with her vehicle following a prolonged period of criminal harassment.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by impermissibly weighing competing inferences regarding whether the murder occurred while the respondent was committing criminal harassment.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge properly conducted a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence and made no jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence of criminal harassment at the exact time of the murder.

The Crown brought an application to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of the video recording, an unrecorded cell block visit, and a failure to comply with a remand warrant.

The accused also argued that a previous ruling in a separate proceeding excluding the same statement should bar its admission based on issue estoppel.

The court held that issue estoppel does not apply to voluntariness rulings.

The court further found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, as the missing recording and technical warrant violation did not overbear the accused's will.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment to make a four-year-old child a permanent ward of the Crown.

The child's mother and father did not oppose the motion or present viable plans of care.

The paternal grandmother opposed the motion and presented a plan of care.

The court found that the grandmother had a long history of child protection involvement, lacked a relationship with the child, and failed to demonstrate an ability to meet the child's needs.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered that the child be made a permanent Crown ward.

The accused applied under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code to sever counts relating to one complainant from a multi-count indictment involving seven complainants alleging sexual offences and attempted murder arising from nondisclosure of HIV-positive status.

The accused argued he intended to testify regarding the severed complainant’s allegations, which included disputed non-consensual conduct, but not regarding the other complainants whose sexual encounters were admitted to be consensual at the time.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting a strong factual nexus among the counts and a viable similar fact evidence application based on an alleged pattern of behaviour and extensive chat log evidence demonstrating intent.

The court held that the accused established an objectively justifiable basis for testifying on the severed counts but not the others, and that forcing a joint trial would prejudice the accused’s right to choose whether to testify.

Severance of the counts relating to the particular complainant was therefore granted in the interests of justice.

The applicants brought a motion within an application seeking an order that the respondent pay $3.0 million to their jointly owned corporation to cover outstanding tax liabilities and accounting fees, and for authorization to retain a new accounting firm.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to convert the application to an action and transfer the proceeding to Toronto.

The court declined to order the $3.0 million payment, finding no immediate urgency, but ordered both parties to pay $17,000 each to the original accounting firm to complete the tax returns.

The applicant was granted sole authority to instruct the accountants and deal with corporate shares to pay tax liabilities.

The cross-motion to transfer venue was dismissed, and the request to convert to an action was deferred.

Following a jury conviction for three bank robberies committed within a short period, the court determined a fit sentence balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

The offender committed the robberies while addicted to drugs and had made significant rehabilitative progress while residing at a structured addiction recovery program pending trial.

The court credited extensive pre‑sentence custody, including time spent under restrictive conditions at the rehabilitation facility.

Applying the principles of proportionality and totality, the court concluded that a lengthy penitentiary term would undermine the offender’s rehabilitation prospects.

A custodial sentence followed by the maximum probationary period at the recovery program was imposed.

The respondent psychiatrist brought a motion under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act seeking an interim treatment order while an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision remained outstanding.

The appellant had appealed a finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment but had taken no steps to advance the appeal, resulting in a statutory suspension of treatment.

Evidence from the treating psychiatrist demonstrated that the appellant’s untreated psychotic disorder had significantly deteriorated, leading to aggression toward another patient and heightened risk to himself and others.

The court held that the statutory criteria for interim treatment were satisfied, including that treatment would substantially improve the appellant’s condition and that the benefits outweighed the risks.

An interim treatment order authorizing treatment without consent was granted pending the final disposition of the appeal.