Natalie J. Gerry

The applicant, Shirley-Anne Spencer, a common-law spouse of the deceased, brought an application seeking dependent support from the estate, a constructive trust over certain assets, and enforcement of an alleged oral agreement for equal division of all assets with the deceased's son, Jeffrey Hutchings.

The court dismissed all of the applicant's claims, finding that she had been adequately compensated as a dependent through beneficiary designations, that there was no unjust enrichment to support a constructive trust, and that no legally binding oral agreement for equal division of the estate assets was formed.

The appellant, Jo-Ann Bodnar, appealed a summary judgment order in favour of the respondent, the Estate of Peter Boban, concerning an outstanding mortgage.

The motion judge found no triable issue regarding the interest rate or the application of part performance or promissory estoppel.

On appeal, the appellant did not challenge the interest rate finding but argued that the respondent had agreed to limit its remedies to foreclosure based on a 1996 mortgage action and subsequent consents.

The Court of Appeal found no evidence to support this claim.

The appellant also raised new arguments regarding issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel, abuse of process, and laches, which were not pleaded or argued below.

The court refused leave to raise these new arguments as no reasonable explanation was provided for their late introduction and the respondent would be prejudiced.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent damages for negligent misrepresentation regarding a failing septic system in a real estate transaction.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to apply a 50% discount for betterment.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's admission of expert evidence or assessment of betterment.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits approximately two years later, well beyond the required timelines.

The respondent denied the benefits due to the delay.

The applicant argued she had a reasonable explanation for the delay, citing psychological impairment and reliance on her former legal counsel.

The Tribunal found that neither explanation was objectively reasonable, noting the applicant's ability to complete other significant tasks during the delay period and her failure to follow up with her counsel.

The application for benefits was dismissed, and the applicant's request for costs was denied.