Human Rights

The accused was charged with ten offences related to child pornography and breaches of a section 161 order, all stemming from items found on a cellular telephone seized during a search warrant execution.

The Crown alleged the accused possessed, accessed, and made available child pornography, made child pornography, committed sexual assault and sexual interference, and breached court orders.

The court found the accused guilty of possession and accessing child pornography, making child pornography available, making child pornography, and breaching a section 161 order regarding contact with minors.

The court acquitted on sexual assault and sexual interference due to the Crown's failure to prove the victim's identity as particularized in the information, and acquitted on other breach counts due to insufficient evidence.

Elijah Gilmore-Bent sought a stay of charges for possession of a loaded firearm, alleging violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Charter due to excessive force by correctional officers and a subsequent cover-up through false reports and testimony.

The court found that Officer Warburton's use of pepper spray was excessive and unnecessary, aggravated by Gilmore-Bent's 15-day segregation.

Furthermore, several officers colluded to write false use-of-force reports and provided dishonest testimony, indicating a systemic lack of oversight and accountability.

The court determined that no alternative remedy was sufficient and that continuing the prosecution would undermine the integrity of the justice system, granting a stay of proceedings.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial date exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The Crown argued that the delay was due to exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the co-accused's need for new counsel, which necessitated an adjournment.

The applicant had opposed the adjournment and offered to proceed if severed from the co-accused.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the ceiling and that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

While acknowledging the impact of COVID-19 and the importance of joint prosecutions, the court determined that the Crown had a duty to sever the applicant's trial when the joint prosecution compromised his s. 11(b) rights and unreasonably extended the prejudice he was suffering.

The Crown's failure to sever was deemed a failure to take reasonable steps to avoid the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicant's s. 11(b) right and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (driving with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood) on December 17, 2017.

The defence raised Charter arguments alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), and challenged the constitutional validity of the presumption of identity in transitional cases when paired with the new presumption of accuracy.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and the constitutional challenge, finding no violations of the defendant's rights and that the presumptions of identity and accuracy operate on parallel tracks without conflict in transitional cases.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking in persons contrary to section 279.01 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought the mandatory minimum sentence of four years imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate to his circumstances.

The court found the mandatory minimum infringed section 12 and could not be justified under section 1.

The court determined an appropriate sentence of 21 months was warranted based on the circumstances of the offence and offender, and declared the mandatory minimum invalid in these proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The trial proceeded following a successful Charter application under s.10(b) that resulted in the exclusion of breath samples.

The accused also brought a s.11(b) Charter motion alleging unreasonable delay, which was dismissed.

On the merits, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted by evidence that the accused occupied the driver's seat solely to smoke a cigarette in cold weather after arriving home.

The court also found no realistic risk of danger to ground a conviction based on de facto care or control.

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

Following the Crown's case, the defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence on the grounds of an alleged violation of her right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant argued that police improperly steered her toward duty counsel rather than allowing her to consult with private counsel of her choice, and that police failed to confirm her satisfaction with duty counsel before conducting breath tests.

The court rejected the Charter challenge, finding that the defendant understood her rights, failed to assert a preference for private counsel, and bore responsibility for diligently exercising her right to counsel.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle rollover on Highway 427.

The Crown proceeded on both counts.

The defence challenged the arrest on reasonable and probable grounds and brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7 and 8 regarding video surveillance of the accused urinating in a police cell.

The trial judge found the arrest was lawful and dismissed the Charter applications, finding that although a privacy breach occurred, the police had provided adequate notice and privacy protection measures.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of the over-80 offence.

Three appellants appealed dismissals of their Charter section 11(b) applications for stays of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in Part I Provincial Offences Act prosecutions.

The central issue was whether the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan applies to Part I offences or whether a lower ceiling should apply given the simplicity of such proceedings.

The court held that the 18-month ceiling applies to all provincial court matters, including Part I offences.

The court also addressed the test for demonstrating unreasonable delay below the ceiling, the requirement for meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, and the circumstances in which summary dismissal of frivolous applications is appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of cocaine for trafficking after police officers detained him on a street in Windsor, Ontario without reasonable suspicion, violating his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The trial judge found the detention arbitrary and the searches unlawful but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in assessing the seriousness of the Charter breach by relying solely on the officers' subjective belief that they were not detaining the appellant.

The court found the police should have known they were exceeding their powers following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Grant, and excluded the evidence, entering acquittals on all counts.

The appellant was charged with possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

Police arrested him before obtaining a search warrant for his residence, and then denied him access to counsel for almost six hours while they obtained and executed the warrant.

The appellant immediately requested to speak to a lawyer upon arrest but was refused.

The trial judge found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the police followed an unconstitutional routine practice of denying access to counsel whenever they intended to obtain a search warrant, without considering the specific circumstances of the case.

The court held that the evidence should have been excluded as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his 15-year-old cousin.

The Crown relied on the complainant's pregnancy as corroborating evidence of the assault.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's section 276 application seeking to cross-examine the complainant about other sexual activity that could account for her pregnancy.

The trial judge, who took over after the application judge became unable to continue, held that he was bound by the application judge's ruling.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in refusing the cross-examination and that the trial judge erred in holding himself bound by the prior ruling.

The court ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm on two grounds: (1) whether his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached, and (2) whether the trial judge's finding that the gun used in the robbery was a firearm was unreasonable.

The appeal was heard after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which fundamentally changed the approach to s. 11(b) claims by establishing a presumptive 30-month ceiling for trial completion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable grounds to investigate, the officer conducted an investigative detention and interrogation of the accused while the accused was naked without providing rights to counsel.

The court found breaches of section 8 (unreasonable seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court excluded the accused's verbal admissions, observations of impairment related to balance and coordination, and breath test results under section 24(2) analysis, finding that admitting such evidence would condone unacceptable police conduct and Charter violations.

However, observations regarding the accused's eyes and breath odour were admitted.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "drive over 80" following his arrest on January 20, 2014.

The accused brought an application for relief pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The trial proceeded on March 18-19, 2015, and continued on June 19, 2015.

The total delay from arrest to the continuation date was 17 months.

The court found that the Crown's failure to provide readily available disclosure, particularly the cell video, caused substantial delay.

The court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a RIDE check investigation.

The defence brought a s. 24(2) Charter application to exclude breath test results, arguing that the police violated the accused's s. 10(b) rights to counsel by imposing an unreasonable 15-minute time limit for private counsel to return a call before proceeding with breathalyzer testing.

The court found that the officer failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel of choice and excluded the evidence, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in his blood (Over 80) following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown's case rested on an approved screening device (ASD) test that registered a "fail." The defence raised a Charter challenge arguing that residual mouth alcohol could have affected the reliability of the ASD result, claiming the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The court found that the officer reasonably relied on the ASD result and that the accused's statement regarding the timing of his last drink (two hours prior) did not constitute credible evidence of recent alcohol consumption that would have required the officer to delay the test.

The conviction was entered.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and unlawful possession of marijuana contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown admitted that Detective MacKillop's warrantless search of the accused's computer and thumb drive breached section 8 Charter rights.

The court found multiple Charter breaches including the warrantless search of electronic devices, the search of two additional devices not authorized by warrant, and a section 10(b) breach when the accused was questioned about computer ownership without being informed of the child pornography investigation or his right to counsel.

The court excluded the child pornography evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the pattern of police carelessness and disregard for Charter rights, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging multiple breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including: failure to comply with the "forthwith" requirement for the roadside screening device demand; improper calibration of the approved screening device; failure to inform the accused of his right to counsel; and arbitrary detention following the investigation.

The court found multiple Charter breaches and excluded the breath test evidence, resulting in acquittal.

The applicant brought a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial commenced on January 19, 2012, but was not completed until July 25-27, 2012, with further adjournment to February 28 and March 1, 2013.

The total delay from charge to projected trial completion was approximately 27 months.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and R. v. Godin, analyzing the length of delay, reasons for delay (inherent, Crown actions, accused actions, and institutional factors), and prejudice to the accused.

The court found approximately 10 months of institutional delay, which fell within the Morin guideline of 8-10 months.

The application was dismissed.