P. Stiles

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The trial proceeded following a successful Charter application under s.10(b) that resulted in the exclusion of breath samples.

The accused also brought a s.11(b) Charter motion alleging unreasonable delay, which was dismissed.

On the merits, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted by evidence that the accused occupied the driver's seat solely to smoke a cigarette in cold weather after arriving home.

The court also found no realistic risk of danger to ground a conviction based on de facto care or control.

Both charges were dismissed.

The offender was convicted of agreeing with a person to commit sexual assault against a child under 16 years of age via telecommunications, contrary to s. 172.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The offender engaged in extensive online communications with an undercover police officer posing as a mother willing to allow sexual contact with her 11-year-old daughter.

The offender initiated discussions of sexual acts, sent explicit photographs and videos, and arranged an in-person meeting.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence followed by three years' probation, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA registration, 20-year s. 161 order, DNA order, and 10-year weapons prohibition.

The court rejected the offender's constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellant, Reaad Ferose, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in his blood, arguing that the trial judge erred in not excluding breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter despite multiple Charter breaches (ss. 8, 9, and 10(b)).

The trial judge had found breaches related to unlawful demand for breath samples (s. 8), arbitrary detention (s. 9), delayed right to counsel, and failure to properly implement the right to choose counsel (s. 10(b)).

However, the trial judge concluded that the impact of these breaches was minimal and admitted the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, particularly regarding the minimal impact of breath sample-related breaches as per R. v. Jennings, and the s. 10(b) breaches given the absence of demonstrated prejudice.

The accused was charged with making arrangements by telecommunication to commit sexual assault against a child under 16 years of age, and making arrangements to commit a child pornography offence.

The Crown's case relied on email and text message exchanges between the accused and an undercover police officer posing as a woman named Sara with an 11-year-old daughter.

The accused claimed the communications were fantasy and roleplay with no genuine intent to arrange sexual contact with the child.

The court rejected the accused's credibility and found that the accused had specifically intended to obtain Sara's agreement to engage in sexual activity with her daughter.

The charge under section 163.1 was dismissed due to insufficient evidence, but the accused was convicted on the section 172.2(1)(b) charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath sample analysis results, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded one breach of section 10(b) rights.

The court found breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b), but determined that exclusion of the evidence would not be warranted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty.