Anne M. Molloy

The self-represented moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the motions judge.

The Divisional Court reviewed the materials and found the motion to be entirely without merit.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded to the responding parties.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated December 9, 2020.

The plaintiff did not appear to oppose the motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and made no order as to costs.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 3, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the plaintiff in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order requiring them to pay the costs of an independent medical examination that they failed to attend.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the specific issues of whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction to order such costs in the absence of a court order for the examination, and if so, whether such an order should be made in this case.

Costs of the leave motion were fixed at $5,000 and reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The accused drove a rented van down a busy sidewalk in Toronto, killing 10 people and injuring 16 others.

He admitted to the acts but raised a defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing that his Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court found that while ASD qualifies as a mental disorder under s. 16, the accused did not lack the capacity to rationally evaluate his actions.

He knew his actions were legally and morally wrong but chose to commit them to achieve notoriety.

The NCR defence failed, and the accused was found guilty of 10 counts of first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder.

The offenders, two brothers, were convicted of second degree murder for the planned and deliberate killing of an innocent 17-year-old victim, whom they mistakenly believed was associated with a group that had previously robbed one of the offenders.

The Crown sought a 22-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 13-17 years, citing systemic anti-Black racism and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court found the murder to be exceptionally egregious, bordering on first degree murder, and sentenced both offenders to life imprisonment with a 20-year period of parole ineligibility, alongside mandatory weapons prohibitions and DNA orders.

Criminal trial arising from allegations that a high-level martial arts coach sexually abused a teenage athlete over a period of years within a coach-athlete relationship marked by control, secrecy, and grooming.

The court addressed delayed disclosure, the complainant's university essay about another coach's sexual offences, and multiple inconsistencies in the complainant's accounts, but concluded these issues did not undermine her credibility or the reliability of her evidence on the core allegations.

Similar fact evidence from other athletes was admitted for limited purposes and provided some contextual support, though the court placed little weight on it in proving the charged acts.

Applying the W.(D.) framework to the accused's denial, the court held the Crown proved all 10 counts beyond a reasonable doubt, while reserving on whether some counts should be stayed as duplicative.

In a judge-alone criminal proceeding involving sexual abuse allegations by teenage athletes against their taekwondo coach, the court considered both a Crown application to admit count-to-count and third-party similar fact evidence and a defence motion to sever counts involving one complainant.

Applying the similar fact framework, the court held that the evidence of other athletes was highly probative of the actus reus and of the controlling trust-based environment in which the abuse was alleged to have occurred, and that the Crown had disproved collusion on a balance of probabilities.

Applying the severance principles, the court nevertheless concluded that trial fairness required severance because the accused had an objectively justifiable intention to testify on one set of counts but not the others.

After the accused confirmed he would not testify on the remaining counts, the counts involving one complainant were severed and that complainant was barred from testifying as a similar fact witness in the ongoing trial.

The defence brought a motion for a sealing order and in camera proceedings during the testimony of their key expert witness, a US-based psychiatrist.

The expert issued an ultimatum that he would withdraw from the case unless his video recordings of the accused were sealed and shielded from public broadcast, citing concerns about copycat violence, notoriety, and stigmatization of the autism community.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court found that while the expert's concerns did not themselves justify a sealing order, his threat to withdraw would deprive the accused of his only defence, thereby creating a substantial risk to the administration of justice.

The court reluctantly granted the motion to preserve the accused's right to a fair trial, balancing it against the open court principle by implementing limited restrictions on public access to the video exhibits.

During a trial for multiple counts of first-degree murder and attempted murder, the Crown brought an application for the disclosure of audio and video recordings made by defence psychiatric experts during their interviews with the accused and his family.

The accused had raised a defence of not criminally responsible under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the recordings were protected by litigation privilege, but that this privilege would be waived if the experts were called to testify or if the recordings were used by a witness to refresh their memory.

The court ordered that the recordings must be disclosed to the Crown immediately upon any of the experts being called to testify.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge imposed on a 19-year-old first offender who pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

The sentencing judge had imposed the discharge without giving the Crown notice or an opportunity to make submissions, which the appeal court found to be an error in principle.

However, upon conducting a fresh assessment, the appeal court concluded that a conditional discharge was the fit and appropriate sentence given the offender's youth, lack of record, genuine remorse, and positive rehabilitative steps.

The appeal was dismissed and the conditional discharge was upheld.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion for disclosure of communications between the complainant and the CBC regarding a proposed documentary.

The Crown and third parties argued the communications were protected under s. 278 of the Criminal Code due to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court found that while there was a subjective expectation of privacy, the communications regarding the scope and terms of the CBC interviews were directly relevant to the defence's O'Connor application.

The court ordered the disclosure of relevant emails and texts, excising irrelevant personal details.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, applied for bail in a reverse onus situation.

The proposed release plan involved house arrest with electronic monitoring and his father as a surety.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused failed to meet his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court noted the accused's history of breaching court orders, fleeing the jurisdiction under a false name, and committing violent offences while on bail or in custody, concluding that electronic monitoring could not overcome the lack of a reliable supervision plan.

The accused, F.D., applied for a bail review based on a material change in circumstances, including a new release plan, significant trial delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the general impact of the pandemic on the inmate population.

The court found the proposed release plan, involving strict house arrest, electronic monitoring, and supervision by the applicant's fiancée's parents, to be robust.

Considering the strength of the supervision plan and the public health risks posed by COVID-19 in detention centers, the court granted bail, concluding that release would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

D.D. applied for a bail review, citing a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and trial delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that D.D. failed to satisfy the secondary and tertiary grounds for release.

The decision highlighted D.D.'s extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance with court orders, and the inadequacy of the proposed supervision plan.

The court concluded that the pandemic, while a relevant factor, did not outweigh the significant risk of reoffending and the necessity to maintain public confidence in the justice system.

This decision from a Gardiner hearing addresses factual determinations for sentencing after Curtis Murray and Corey Murray were convicted of second-degree murder.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, motivated by revenge against a specific group, and that the victim was killed under the mistaken belief he was part of that group.

While the judge's legal view was that these facts would typically constitute first-degree murder, the jury's verdict of second-degree murder was respected.

The court also determined that Curtis Murray was the leader and instigator, with Corey Murray being a willing but more of a follower, which was considered a mitigating factor for Corey.

T.L. brought a bail review application after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds following a shooting incident.

The initial bail hearing before a Justice of the Peace was flawed due to a misapprehension of evidence regarding a proposed surety.

The Superior Court conducted a *de novo* hearing, considering a new supervision plan involving house arrest with grandparents as sureties, electronic monitoring, and the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the accused satisfied the onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds, emphasizing the strength of the supervision plan and the elevated risks of detention during the pandemic.

T.L. was released on strict conditions.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on the Crown's failure to make proper and timely disclosure of relevant video surveillance evidence, and the loss of some of that evidence.

The court found that the police were unacceptably negligent in failing to preserve all relevant video footage, resulting in a breach of the accused's rights under section 7 of the Charter.

However, the court concluded that the prejudice to the accused was minimal and could be adequately addressed by alternative remedies, including adjournments and a specific jury instruction regarding the lost evidence.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defence applied for a publication ban on the accused's video-recorded statement to the police and a sealing order for information found on electronic devices seized during a search warrant execution.

The media opposed both orders.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and found that the defence failed to establish a serious risk to the administration of justice that necessitated a publication ban or sealing order.

The court emphasized the presumption of open court proceedings and the importance of freedom of the press.

Both applications were dismissed, with a temporary extension granted to allow for potential appeals.

Terrence Noftall, convicted of multiple sexual and child pornography offences, challenged the validity of production orders obtained by the Crown for psychiatric, psychological, medical, and employment records.

These records were sought in preparation for a potential dangerous offender application.

The defence argued that the production orders lacked statutory authority under s. 487.014 of the Criminal Code, as a dangerous offender application had not yet commenced, and that the disclosure of MCSCS records via a Memorandum of Understanding violated privacy rights.

The court dismissed the defence's application, ruling that s. 487.014 applies to the sentencing phase, including pre-assessment for dangerous offender applications, and that the MCSCS records were lawfully obtained under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.