Andrew K. Lokan

The applicants brought a Charter challenge alleging that the Government of Ontario's cancellation of a joint task force violated their right to freedom of association under section 2(d).

The task force had been proposed during collective bargaining between the union and the college employer council to help resolve a strike, but no collective agreement was reached and the strike was ended by back-to-work legislation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the task force was not part of any collective agreement and its cancellation did not substantially interfere with the collective bargaining process.

The applicants brought a constitutional application challenging PIPEDA provisions permitting voluntary disclosure of subscriber information to government institutions without prior judicial authorization and related veto provisions limiting disclosure to affected individuals.

They alleged infringements of Charter ss. 8, 7, and 2(b), arguing the scheme lacked oversight, accountability, and transparency.

The court held it was bound by appellate authority that PIPEDA does not itself confer search or seizure powers, so s. 8 was not engaged on this record, and further held the s. 7 claim was a repackaging of the s. 8 arguments.

The court also found no s. 2(b) breach because the veto provisions are discretionary, incorporate balancing, and did not substantially impede meaningful public discussion.

The Regional Municipality of Waterloo sought a declaration that its Site-Specific By-Law Number 25-021 regulating 100 Victoria Street North in Kitchener complies with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The by-law prohibits temporary structures and sheltering on the property, with a December 1, 2025 deadline for vacant possession to facilitate construction of the Kitchener Central Transit Hub.

Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained, chronically homeless individuals sheltering at the encampment, sought an interlocutory injunction restraining enforcement of the by-law pending determination of their Charter claims.

The court granted the injunction, finding serious issues to be tried regarding violations of section 7 Charter rights (life, liberty, and security of the person) and potential illegality under the Municipal Act, 2001, irreparable harm to vulnerable homeless persons, and balance of convenience favoring the injunction.

This costs endorsement addresses a motion in a proposed class action brought by self-represented plaintiffs seeking, among other things, an order that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) pay their legal costs or that amicus curiae be appointed.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ motion and ordered the proceedings stayed pending compliance with Rule 15.01(1).

The successful defendants, WSIB and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT), sought costs.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs, found no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event, and ordered Mr. Taylor to pay $2,500 each to WSIB and WSIAT.

The court considered a motion by self-represented lead plaintiffs in a proposed class action challenging workers’ compensation regimes across Canada.

The plaintiffs sought an order requiring the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) to pay their legal costs, or alternatively, the appointment of amicus curiae or permission for the lead plaintiffs to represent the class.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with Rule 15, which requires representative parties to be represented by counsel.

The court held that compliance with Rule 15.01(1) is mandatory and that the plaintiffs could not represent the class.

The court declined to appoint amicus curiae or grant an interim advance cost award, finding no exceptional circumstances or evidence of financial need.

The action was stayed pending the plaintiffs’ retention of counsel.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

The plaintiff brought a motion for the return of computer files and devices from its former Chief Operating Officer.

The parties agreed to appoint an Independent Solicitor to review the files for privilege.

After the Independent Solicitor's report was released, the defendants eventually returned the non-privileged files and the laptop, settling the motion.

The court determined that the plaintiff was the successful party and awarded costs, but reduced the amount claimed because the parties had acted in good faith to agree on the review process.

The costs of the Independent Solicitor were ordered to be shared equally.

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

The self-represented applicant moved under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a single judge's orders adding the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal as a party to his judicial review application and dismissing the application for extreme delay.

The applicant argued that s. 9(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act and the Divisional Court's test for delay violated the Charter and the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no constitutional violations, no error in adding the Tribunal as a party, and no error in dismissing the application due to an extraordinary and unexplained 12-year delay.

The moving party, a self-represented injured worker, brought a motion for interim relief and a notice of constitutional question pending a motion to review an order dismissing his application for judicial review for delay.

He sought interim reinstatement of workers' compensation benefits and the appointment of an amicus curiae to assist him.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether the motion was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

After receiving written submissions, the court dismissed the motion and notice, finding that the request for mandatory interim relief had no strong chance of success given the underlying dismissal for extreme delay, and that the appointment of amicus or state-funded counsel was not justified in this civil matter.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the respondent (N.) was entirely successful.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs of $99,500, reflecting a reduction from actual time incurred.

The appellant (F.) argued for each party to bear their own costs or for a reduced award, citing excessiveness and limited means.

The Court of Appeal found no special circumstances to warrant either full indemnity costs or no costs, ordering the appellant to pay the respondent $50,000 in all-inclusive costs, consistent with costs following the result and reasonable expectations.

The appellant mother travelled to Ontario from Dubai with her two children for a visit, but subsequently informed the respondent father that she would not return.

The father commenced proceedings in Ontario seeking a return order under s. 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The trial judge declined jurisdiction under ss. 22 and 23 of the Act, ordered the children returned to Dubai, and dismissed the mother's constitutional challenges to s. 40(3).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the risk of serious harm under s. 23, and upholding the constitutionality of the return order provision under both division of powers and the Charter.

The moving party sought to schedule a motion for interim relief, including reinstatement of workers' compensation benefits, in the context of an underlying motion for reconsideration of a dismissed application for judicial review.

The court found the motion appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.02, as the underlying application had already been dismissed for delay.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice to the moving party to provide written submissions explaining why the motion should not be dismissed, and stayed the motion pending the outcome.

The appellant appealed an order striking his application challenging an Ontario Securities Commission regulation that allows individuals to purchase stocks in the "exempt market" based on minimum income and net worth thresholds.

The appellant argued that "economic class" should be recognized as an analogous ground under s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The motion judge struck the application, finding the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, agreeing that the appellant failed to plead sufficient facts to establish "economic class" as an analogous ground, as it lacked the characteristics of immutability or constructive immutability, and the group had not suffered historic disadvantage or stereotyping.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This decision addresses competing carriage motions in proposed class actions concerning business interruption insurance claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered an "omnibus" action against 16 insurers and several focused actions against Aviva.

The court ruled that the Aviva-specific actions should proceed expeditiously, carved out from the omnibus action, with the Nordik Consortium and Lerners LLP appointed as carriage counsel for the Aviva claims.

The Workman Consortium was appointed carriage counsel for the omnibus action, excluding the Aviva defendants.

The decision prioritized the best interests of the class, fairness to defendants, and the objectives of the Class Proceedings Act, particularly access to justice and expeditious determination.

Following a trial where the applicant father successfully obtained an order for the return of the parties' children to Dubai, the court determined the issue of costs.

The father sought $486,000 on a partial and full recovery basis, relying on an offer to settle.

The respondent mother argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount due to her limited financial means.

The court found the father was entitled to costs and had beaten his offer to settle, but fixed costs at $250,000 on a partial indemnity basis to ensure the award was proportionate and within the mother's reasonable expectations and ability to pay.

In a non-Hague international child retention case, the court held that Ontario lacked jurisdiction under ss. 22 and 23 of the Children’s Law Reform Act to determine custody and access respecting two Canadian children retained in Ontario after a temporary trip from Dubai.

The court found the children were habitually resident in Dubai, there was a pending Dubai proceeding, and the evidence did not establish serious harm if they were returned.

The court also rejected a constitutional challenge to s. 40(3) of the Act, holding that the return-order provision was intra vires Ontario and did not violate ss. 2(a), 6, 7, or 15 of the Charter.

A return order to Dubai was granted, together with ancillary enforcement and sealing-related relief.

In a family law trial concerning whether two young children should be returned to Dubai, the respondent mother brought an application to adduce expert opinion evidence from a psychotherapist.

The proposed evidence concerned the potential emotional and psychological impact on infants separated from their primary caregiver.

The applicant father opposed the admission of the evidence.

Following a voir dire, the court applied the test for expert evidence and found the proposed expert was properly qualified and capable of giving fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence.

The court granted the application, permitting the expert to testify strictly on the potential impact of separation from a primary caregiver, but prohibited her from opining on the specific attachment of the children to either parent.

The applicant commenced an application for judicial review of two decisions made by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal over twelve years prior.

The Tribunal brought motions to be added as a party and to dismiss the application for delay.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to add the Tribunal as a party pursuant to section 9(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court also dismissed the application for judicial review, finding the twelve-and-a-half-year delay excessive, without reasonable explanation, and prejudicial to the Tribunal.

The self-represented applicant sought an immediate hearing of his application on the merits before a single judge of the Superior Court, citing urgency and dire financial consequences.

The case management judge clarified that an application on the merits could not be heard immediately and explained the proper use of section 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court directed that if the applicant required immediate relief, he must bring a motion for interlocutory relief, and maintained the previously ordered schedule for the respondent's motion to dismiss the application as an abuse of process.