Andrew J. Goodman

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, criminal negligence, and possession of stolen property after crashing a stolen vehicle into a house.

The accused suffered severe, life-altering injuries requiring constant medical care.

The court considered Gladue factors, though finding a tenuous link, and the accused's dire medical situation as mitigating factors.

A global sentence of four years was imposed, reduced to 21 months net after credit for pre-trial custody, along with a 10-year driving prohibition and restitution.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code arising from sexual activity with a complainant who had been sleeping in another man’s bedroom after drinking alcohol.

The central issue was whether the complainant consented or whether the accused reasonably believed she was consenting, including the possibility that she mistakenly believed the accused was another individual.

The court applied the W.(D.) credibility framework and reviewed evidence from the complainant, the accused, an eyewitness, and forensic experts.

While the judge rejected much of the accused’s testimony and had concerns about aspects of the complainant’s evidence, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown therefore failed to establish the offence on the criminal standard.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault with a weapon and one count of possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace arising from a street altercation involving multiple participants.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended key identification evidence, improperly relied on hearsay to support continuity of identification, and failed to consider self-defence.

The appeal court held the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of eyewitness testimony, applied the W.(D.) framework, and did not rely on hearsay for a prohibited purpose.

The court further found no air of reality to a self-defence claim given the defence theory that the appellant did not possess the knife.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence was found to be within the acceptable range.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to comply with a recognizance contrary to s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the reasons were inadequate, and the trial judge improperly applied the credibility analysis from R. v. W.(D.).

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that strict adherence to the W.(D.) formula is unnecessary so long as the substance of the instruction is respected.

Reviewing the reasons as a whole, the court found the trial judge properly assessed credibility, rejected the appellant’s explanation, and concluded the Crown proved the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after conviction for mischief to data and unauthorized use of a computer.

The sentencing judge imposed a fine and probation and treated the accused’s allegedly false testimony and manner of conducting the defence as a significant aggravating factor.

On appeal, the court held that the manner in which an accused presents a defence, including false testimony rejected at trial, cannot be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing.

The appellate court found this constituted an error in principle and reconsidered the appropriate disposition.

Given the offender’s lack of prior record, restitution, personal circumstances, and collateral employment consequences, the court substituted a conditional discharge with probation.

The court-appointed receiver sought approval for its counsel's fees totaling $255,955 for a 69-day receivership of a family farm.

The debtor opposed the fees as excessive.

The court found the receivership was relatively straightforward, the estate was modest, and the fees charged by senior Toronto counsel were disproportionate and inefficient.

The court reduced the approved fees to $157,500, applying local London rates.

Accused charged with drug offences sought exclusion of evidence seized from residences pursuant to search warrants under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the Information to Obtain and found the warrants were issued without sufficient grounds.

The police had re‑submitted essentially the same ITO to a different judicial officer after a justice of the peace refused the warrant, amounting to impermissible judge‑shopping and misleading drafting.

The search warrants were therefore invalid and the searches constituted unreasonable searches contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held the seriousness of the police misconduct and the impact on the accused’s privacy interests outweighed society’s interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The defendant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a costs endorsement awarding the plaintiffs $190,000 on a partial indemnity basis following a successful interlocutory injunction motion.

The defendant argued the costs award was excessive and inconsistent with principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

Applying Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered whether there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and whether the proposed appeal raised matters of sufficient importance.

While most alleged errors were rejected, the court found that the unusually high quantum of costs for a one-day injunction motion raised serious concerns regarding reasonableness and proportionality.

Given the potential access to justice implications, leave to appeal the costs award was granted.

The aboriginal accused, charged with sexual interference and sexual assault, challenged the jury array under s. 629(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing the sheriff was guilty of partiality because the jury panel contained no persons of aboriginal heritage.

The court reviewed the extensive efforts made by the sheriff and the Ministry of the Attorney General to obtain updated band lists from local First Nations reserves, which were unsuccessful due to a lack of response from band chiefs.

Distinguishing the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Kokopenace, the court found the sheriff's efforts were conducted in good faith, without bias, and were reasonable under the circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder for shooting his common-law partner in the head with a homemade firearm and burying her body in their backyard.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 17 to 18 years, while the defence argued for the statutory minimum of 10 years, supported by a jury recommendation.

The court rejected the jury's recommendation, finding it unrealistic given the serious aggravating factors, including the domestic context, use of a firearm, and extensive after-the-fact conduct to conceal the crime.

Applying the McKnight range for domestic homicides, the court fixed the period of parole ineligibility at 15 years.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder of the offender’s spouse, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 15 years while the defence argued for 10 to 12 years.

Applying ss. 718–718.2 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code and considering comparable jurisprudence, the court assessed aggravating factors including the brutal domestic killing, breach of trust, and the victim’s defensive injuries, as well as mitigating factors such as the offender’s lack of criminal record and positive community reputation.

The jury’s recommendation of 15 to 20 years was considered but not followed.

The court fixed the parole ineligibility period at 13 years.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to three counts of break and enter with intent, misleading police, and failing to attend court.

The sentencing judge imposed consecutive four‑month sentences on the break and enter counts, resulting in a global custodial sentence of 13½ months.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was excessive and offended the principles of parity and totality, particularly compared to a co‑accused who received a significantly shorter sentence.

The appeal court held that while the use of consecutive sentences did not amount to an error in principle or a demonstrably unfit sentence, the sentencing judge relied on incorrect information about the co‑accused’s sentence.

To correct the resulting disparity, the court allowed the appeal and reduced the total sentence.

The plaintiff sued family members for defamation arising from oral and written accusations that he had sexually abused two nieces as children, and the defendants counterclaimed in sexual battery and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

After a lengthy trial with expert evidence on trauma, memory, delayed reporting, recantation, and false memory, the court held that the abuse allegations were not proven on a balance of probabilities and dismissed the counterclaim.

The court found the impugned accusations plainly defamatory, rejected justification, and held that the broad dissemination of the allegations to extended family and others did not fall within qualified privilege.

The court further held that the statement warning that others might also be sexually abused was unsupported and malicious.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff with $125,000 in general damages and costs.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the brutal beating and stabbing of her mother while highly intoxicated.

The Crown sought 14-15 years, while the defence sought 12 years.

A key issue was whether the accused was entitled to enhanced pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code despite choosing not to have a bail hearing.

The court held that waiving a bail hearing is not an absolute bar to enhanced credit, but denied enhanced credit for most of the pre-sentence period due to the accused's severe institutional misconduct.

Enhanced credit was granted for the final six months due to improved behaviour and delay.

The court sentenced the accused to 12 years' imprisonment, less 3.5 years of pre-sentence credit, resulting in a net sentence of 8.5 years, along with an order delaying parole eligibility until half the sentence is served.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a Registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the contextual approach and the Reid factors, considering explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for lengthy litigation delay, including significant gaps in evidence regarding counsel’s reminder system and delay in bringing the motion.

The court also found prejudice to the defendants arising from missing documentary evidence and corporate changes undertaken in reliance on the dismissal order.

Balancing the interests of justice and the principle of finality, the court declined to set aside the Registrar’s order.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and a subsequent default judgment of over $1.1 million.

The plaintiff had obtained the default judgment without notifying the defendants, despite ongoing settlement discussions and an earlier agreement to hold the action in abeyance pending a jurisdictional challenge.

The court found that the defendants moved promptly upon learning of the judgment, adequately explained the default as resulting from a reasonable belief that the action was in abeyance, and demonstrated an arguable defence on the merits regarding the termination of the distributorship agreement.

The motion was granted and the default judgment was set aside.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple assaults and uttering threats arising from a domestic relationship.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly assessed credibility, and relied on impermissible propensity reasoning.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no reversible error in the credibility analysis and upheld the convictions on the later counts.

However, the court held that several counts were statute‑barred because the Crown elected to proceed summarily more than six months after the alleged offences without clear, informed, and unequivocal consent from the accused under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

Those convictions were quashed as a nullity, and the matter of sentence on the remaining counts was remitted to the trial judge for reconsideration.

The moving defendants sought dismissal of the action on the basis that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement in May 2007.

The court considered whether the correspondence and negotiations between the parties constituted a legally binding settlement, applying the two-step analysis for determining intention to create legal relations and agreement on essential terms.

The court found the evidence vague and concluded that the parties’ discussions amounted only to an attempt to reach an agreement, with essential terms unresolved.

However, the court held that an earlier unequivocal offer to discontinue the action against one individual defendant personally had been accepted.

The motion was therefore granted only to the extent of discontinuing the claim against that defendant personally, with the remainder of the motion dismissed.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death, dangerous driving causing death, impaired driving causing death, and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg causing death following a single motor vehicle rollover.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The court heard evidence from civilian witnesses, police, and expert witnesses on collision reconstruction and occupant kinematics.

The court rejected the defence expert's opinion that the deceased was the driver and accepted the Crown's expert evidence, along with civilian testimony and physical evidence, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The applicants, charged with drug offences following a warrantless search of their residence, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging breaches of their s. 7, s. 8, and s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The s. 7 claim arose from the principal police witness failing to disclose that his personal counsel was also representing one of the applicants at the preliminary inquiry.

The court found a s. 7 breach but held it did not warrant a stay of proceedings.

However, the court found that the applicants' s. 11(b) rights were violated due to an unreasonable delay of 28 months, largely stemming from the conflict of interest issue and institutional delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter.